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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO

-----''-------'--'--------and

vs.

--'-"-~-~-'--------and

Appealed from the District Court of the__...,.___________
Judicial District for the State of Idaho, in and
f o r - - ' - ~ ~ - - - - - County
Hon. -------------'------'----'-'--- District Judge

Attorney_ for Appellant_

Atte>r?tey_ for Respondent_,,
Filed this _ _ _ _ day of - - - - - - - - - , 20__
,I ~-loll,. ddll

- - - - - - - - - - Clerk

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
State of Idaho,
Plaintiff/Respondent
vs.

SUPREME COURT
NO.

William Wolfe,
Defendant/Appellant.
****************************
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL
****************************
Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District
of the State of Idaho,
County of Idaho.
HONORABLE Michael J. Grif
****************************
Attorney General's Office
PO Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010
State Appellate Public De
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, ID 83703-6914
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Defendant: Wolfe, William Franklin

State of Idaho vs. William Franklin Wolfe
Date

Code

User

Judge

12/2/2004

MISC

KATHYJ

put old case on computer

John Bradbury

MOTN

KATHYJ

Motion Sealing Judicial Notice

John Bradbury

MOTN

KATHYJ

Motion for Rule 35 Relief from an Illegal Sentence John Bradbury

NOTC

KATHYJ

Notice, Objection and Request for Relief

John Bradbury

LODG

KATHYJ

Memorandum in Support of ICR Rule 35 Relief
for an Illegal Sentence

John Bradbury

AFFD

KATHYJ

Affidavit in Support

John Bradbury
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KATHYJ

Certificate Of Mailing

John Bradbury

AFFD
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John Bradbury

LODG
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Memorandum in Support
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Order

John Bradbury

12/27/2004

MOTN

KATHYJ

Motion to Reconsider

John Bradbury

2/11/2005

PETN

KATHYJ

Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

John Bradbury

NOTC

KATHYJ

Notice of Error, Objection and Request for Relief John Bradbury

MOTN
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Motion for Expedited [or] Emergency Proceedings John Bradbury
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Memorandum in Support of
Emergency/Expedited Proceedings

John Bradbury

AFFD

KATHYJ

Affidavit in Support of Emergency/Expedited
Proceedings

John Bradbury

5/10/2005

DEOP
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Memorandum Decision and Order

John Bradbury

5/11/2005

PETN
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Petition for Appointment of Special Prosecutor

John Bradbury
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ORDR
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Order for Appointment of Special Prosecutor
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Defendant: Wolfe, William Franklin Order
Appointing Counsel Court appointed Brit D
Groom

John Bradbury

9/5/2006

MOTN
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Motion to Submit Brief of North Central Idaho
Jurisdictional Alliance, Amicus Curiae, Limited in
Scope, in Support of the Idaho county
Prosecutor
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KATHYJ

Brief of North Central Idaho Jurisdictional
Alliance, Amicus Curiae, Limited in Scope, in
Support of the Idaho county Prosecutor

John Bradbury

8/16/2007

MOTN

KATHYJ

Motion for Change of Speical Prosecutor

John Bradbury

8/23/2007

ORDR

KATHYJ

Order Granting Motion for Change of Special

John Bradbury

prosecutor
4/25/2011

MOTN

KATHYJ

Motion to Notice Hearing Request for Judicial
Notice

Michael J Griffin

4/29/2011

ORDR

KATHYJ

Order Dismissing Motion

Michael J Griffin

5/5/2011

MOTN

KATHYJ

Motion for Judicial Notice of New Idaho State
Supreme Court Opinion in Support of Motion to

Michael J Griffin

Reconsider ICR 35 Motion
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APSC

KATHYJ

Appeal~_dJo_ The Supreme Court
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Michael J Griffin
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Case: CR-1982-0018290 Current Judge: Michael J Griffin
Defendant: Wolfe, William Franklin

State of Idaho vs. William Franklin Wolfe
Date

Code

User

6/9/2011

MOTN

KATHYJ

Motion and Affidavit in Support for Appointment of Michael J Griffin
Counsel

MOTN

KATHYJ

Motion and Affidavit for Fee Waiver

Michael J Griffin

ORDR

KATHYJ

Order Appointing Special prosecutor

Michael J Griffin

ORPD

KATHYJ

Order Appointing State Appellate Public Defender Michael J Griffin

CERT

KATHYJ

Certificate Of Mailing

6/13/2011

Judge

'

i

Michael J Griffin

"·'

.b'Jw~

BOX 70010
BOISE, ID.

FEB 11 2005

83707

ROSE E. GEHRING

.M!!!r:~~:RT

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND J U D ~ D E P U 1 Y
DISTRICT, IN AND FOR IDAHO COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO

* * * * *

~~/4/~

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Petitioner.
-Vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent,

F:J. '7't?'

Case No./

PETITION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF

The Petitioner alleges:
1.

I am in custody south of Boise (address supra).

2.

Judgment

and sentence was imposed by the

second

judicial

district court judge Reinhardt, J.,
3.

The sentence of fixed life without parole was imposed for

murder in the first degree in case number 18290.
4.

The sentence date being August 5th 1982.

5.

A finding of guilt having been found after a plea of not

guilty was entered.
6.

I

appealed from the judgment of conviction and imposition

of sentence timely.

On November 30th 1984, a decision affirming

the same was entered.
7.

The GROUNDS on which I base my application for

post-conviction relief, include I.e. §§19-2901 {a)(1) & -4205:

POST-CONVICTION.

1

§I.
INNEF~CTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL REQUIRING REVERSAL
OF THE SENTENCE AND CONVICTION FOR FAILURE TO RAISE
STATUTORY BAR PRECLUDING STATE JURISDICTION.
A.

Ineffective Assistance of

counsel at

trial,

appeal,

and in all previously filed collateral attacks upon the
conviction

and

Violating

sentence.

Article 1 section 13.

Idaho

Constitution

United States Constitutional

Amendments 5th & 14th (rights to counsel) via., Strickland
v.

Washington,

466 u.s.

668,

104 s.ct.

2062,

80

L.ED.2d

674 (1984);
-THE STRICKLAND TEST(1)Counsel's
the

assistance

circumstances

occured

on

an

of

Indian

the

was

unreasonable

case.

reservation

[That
and

the

considering
homicide

involved

and

all

alleged
Indian.

Furthermore, that there had been no waiver of said tribal
jurisdiction of this offense.
(2)

There is a reasonable probability that, absent the

errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt
respecting guilt.

( See Strickland,

at 2066

note 97.) [Because

the district court lacked jurisdiction to try cases of homicide
occuring in the Indian Reservation where an Indian was involved
and no written waiver by exclusive tribal authorty had
occurred].

POST-CONVICTION.

2

-PREJUDICE PRONG(a)

Showing Of Prejudice via., Strickland,

There is more than a
without

counsel's

error

at 2067.

"reasonable probability"

{ in

failing

to

raise

objection

and request for dismissal of the charge due to
jurisdiction)

the

result

of

the

trial

would

that

lack of

have

been

differant as a matter of law.
Certainly,

the

verdict
"(a]

Strickland,

at

2068,

probability

is

a

would

have

reasonable

probability

been

deferent

probability

sufficient

to

is

a

undermine

confidence in the outcome [of the trial].
(b)

Appeal.

In Evitts v.

Lucey,

105 s.ct.

830,

83 L.Ed.2d 821

(1985) the Supreme Court held that the Stricklan, standard
of

ineffective

assistance

appellate counsel.

of

counsel

also

applies

to

My appeal number 14755 was an appeal

as a matter of right.
The court in Gray v. Green,
following

factors

which

exist

778 F.2d 350, held the

in

my

case

and

entitle

me to relief:
-INADEQUATE PERFORMANCE PRONGS-ia

If

appellate counsel

significant

and obvious

has

issue

failed
( failure

to

raise

could

be

viewed as deficient performance), and
-ii- If [the] issue not raised may have resulted
POST-CONVICTION.

3

·in reversal of conviction, or an order for new
proceedigns,

See also

the failure was prejudicial.

Griffin v. Aiken, 775 F.2d 1226, 1235-36.
Where my trial counsel raised virtually no
defense,

the presumption

of effective

assistance

is

overcome

by fa~ling to raise the existance of a statutory bar to
prosecution due

to lack of j lirisdiction.

See Gray v.

Green,

supra note 125, 778 F.2d at 352, note 128.
B.

Late consideration of my application is

in this

case because,

would result

a

appropriate

strict application of

in manifest

injustice

with the concept of fundamental

and

justice.

is

time bar

inconsistent
See LaFon

State, 119 Idaho 387, at 390, note 5. 807 P.2d 66

v.

(Ct.App.

1991} reh 1 g denied (1991).
11

The district court concluded that a strict
application of the limitation would have
the effect of depriving him of his claim"
[Emphasis added]
More
Idaho

importantly,

976,

842

P.2d

the
976,

case
842

of
P.2d

Olds
312

v.

State,

122

{Ct.App.1992),

declares that,
"where a challange to unlawful commitment exists,
it may be brought at any time and is exempt
from time constraints to which postconviction
petitions are usually subject."
Noting Wests

Key Code

[ 10.

HABEAS

CORPUS KEY

603].

To

the

extent applicable.

POST-CONVICTION.

4

I

8.

of

court to

respectfully request this

this

petition

§19-4201 et seq.,

as

done

via

Idaho I s

consider the

Habeas

Corpus

whole

Statute

(inmates incarcerated in state whom complain

of illegal confinement).
To the extent this court may feel that I
from a

time bar I

would be quick to

submit

ought to suffer
the case before

the Idaho State Supreme Court under its original jurisdiction.
That is if the court issues a notice of intent to dismiss.
for

failure

to state a

claim for

relief or

invoking a

time

bar.
This presentation here is merely a

forrnali ty in attempt

to show the highier court circumstances require thier remedial
intervention.
9.

At all times relevant counsel has failed to inform me and

or object to the courts lack of
case

evolving

from

involving an Indian,

within

the

jurisdiction to act
Nez-Perce

Indian

for which no waiver by

in this

reservation,

tribal

authority

has been given.
The offense charged falls

with the,

Federal Court

via,

Indians "Major Crimes Act".
On the face of the decision on appeal at State v.
691 P.2d 1293, that court held the incident occurred,

Wolfe,
"at the.

Silver Dollar Bar, in Stites, Idaho County, Idaho."
I am not allowed to have relevant maps because the
I.D.o.c. policy and procedure prevents it due to security
reasons.
POST-CONVICTION.

5

'

J

I technically have not yet discovered evidence that
said location is reservation lands.

I do seek judicial notice

of my impediment and implications invoking the discovery rule
overcoming the Statutory limitations period, which is
non~jurisdictional.
10.

I am seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

11.

The relief I seek is to vacate the judgment and conviction

in this case.
12.

This

petition is

accompanied by my affidavit in support

of the petition.
Signature of Petitioner
STATE OF IDAHO

)

COUNTY OF ADA

)

) SS:

I, ,c:::;~#'~ being duly sworn upon my oath, depose
and say that I have subscribed to the foregoin petition; that
I know the contents thereof;
and that
the matters
and
allegations therein set forth are true.
signaufe of Petitioner
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this
2005.

POST-CONVICTION.
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OROFINO, IDAHO

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DlSTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO
WILLIAM WOLFE1

Petitioner,
vs.

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CR 18290
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

)

Respondent

)
)

This case comes before me on William Wolfe's Petition for Post Conviction
Relief.
Facts
Jn. 1982 an Idaho County jury convicted William Wolfe of murdering Scott Gold
at Stites, which is situated within the reservation of the Nez Perce Tribe. See, Appendix

1. He was sentenced by Judge George Reinhardt August Si 1982 to a fixed tenn oflife
:imprisonment. Mr. Wolfe appealed. The conviction and sentence were affirmed in
November 1984.
On December 2, 2004, Mr. Wolfe filed a Motion for Rule 35 Relief from an
Illegal Sentence and Memorandum and Affidavit in Support. He claimed his conviction
was unlawful because the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the
murder of an Indian within the boundaries of the reservation. In an order signed
December 14, 2004, I summarily dismissed the motion as untimely. I did not reach the
merits ofiv.fr. Wolfe's claim at that time.

.....
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On December 27, 2004, Mr. Wolfe filed a motion to reconsider my order. On
February 11, 2005 Mr. Wolfe filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief with an
accompanying affidavit and memorandum.
Contentions

Mr. Wolfe contends that because his victim, Mr. Gold, was an enrolled member
of the Ne.z Perce Tribe and the crime occurred at Stites, which is within the boundaries of
the Nez Perce Indian Reservation, the district court lacked jurisdiction to try him for
murder. He asserts that the Indian Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153) grants the
federal government exclusive jurisdiction over his offense.
Discussion
Indian Country is defined in part as "all land within the limits of any Indjan

reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States government notwithstanding the
issuance of any patent, and , including rights-of-way running through the reservation."
18 USC § 1151.
Jurisdiction in Indian Country depends on the nature oftb,e offense and status of
the offender and the victim. Jurisdiction over crimes between non-Indians in Indian
country is vested in the state courts, which is known as the McBratney Rule. United

States v. McBratney 104 U.S. 621 (1881). Mr. Gold was an enrolled member of the Nez
Perce Tribe. What courts have jurisdiction over crimes by non-Indians against Indians i:n
Indian Country is the question Mr. Wolfe's petition presents.
As a general proposition crimes by Indians against Indians or their property in
Indian country is within the jurisdiction of the tribal courts. The exception to that general

rule is the Indian Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153, which enumerates fourteen crimes

@ooa
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over which the federal courts are vested exclusive jurisdiction. United States v. Johnson
637 F2d 1224.1231 (9 th Cir. 1980). The acts read as follows:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general laws of the United
States as to the punishment of offenses committed in any place within the sole and
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, except the District ofColumbi~ shall
extend to the Indian country. This section shall not extend to offenses committed
by one Indian against the person or property of another Indian. nor to any Indian

committing any offense in the Indian country who has been punished by the local
law of the tribe, or to any case where, by treaty stipulations, the ex.elusive
jurisdiction over such offenses is or may be secured to the Indian tribes
respectively.
The Supreme Court described the Act as a "carefully limited intrusion of federal
power into the otherwise exclusive jurisdiction of the Indian tribes to punish Indians for
crimes committed on Indian land." United States v. Wheeler 43J U.S. 313, 325 n. 22.
This Act was originally passed in 1817 to fill jurisdictional gaps in Indian

territory. It has been applied more recently to exclude state court jurisdiction when a
crime occurs in Indian country and an Indian is involved. Williams v. United States, 327
U.S. 711 (1946) (federal court not Arizona court had exclusive jurisdiction over crime

· committed by non-Indian against an Indian in Indian country).
State jurisdiction over Indians an.d Indian country was expanded in 1953 with the
passage of Public Law 280. Pub. L. No. 280, § 7, 67 Stat 588 (1953). Public Law 280
conferred exclusive state jurisdiction over Indians and Indian Country in six states and
granted other states, including Idaho, permission to assume jurisdiction over Indian

[4]004
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affairs by affirmative legislative action. Id. The statute was amended in 1968 with the
passage of the Indian Civil Rights Act which added the requirement of tribal consent
before a state can assume jurisdiction. 25 U.S.C. § 1321.
In 1963, pursuant to Public Law 280, Idaho enacted I.C. § 67-5101, assuming
limited jurisdiction over Indians and Indian country.
67-5101 State jurisdiction for civil and criminal enforcement concerning
certain matters arising in Indian country.

The state of Idaho, in accordance with the provisions of 67 Statutes at Large, page
589 (Public Law 280) hereby assumes and accepts jurisdiction for the civil and
criminal enforcement of state laws and regulations concerning the following
matters and purposes arising in Indian country located within this state, as Indian
country is defined by title 18, United States Code 1151, and obligates and binds
this state to the assumption thereof:
A. Compulsory school attendance

B. Juvenile delinquency and youth rehabilitation
C. Dependent, neglected and abused children

D. Insanities and mental illness
E. Public assistance
F. Domestic relations

G. Operation and management of motor vehicles upon highways and roads
maintained by the county or state, or political subdivisions thereof.
I.C. 67-5101 clearly did not confer general criminal jurisdiction or jurisdiction in
particular over homicide to the state courts. In State v. Matthews, 133 Idaho 300 (1999),

05/r0/2005 14:27 FAX 2084765
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the Idaho Supreme Court found that state court jurisdiction and the execution of a state
court search warrant on the reservation were proper in a. murder case where both the
defendant and victim were Indians but the crime occurred off of the reservation in
Lewiston. However, the court stated in dictum that "It is noteworthy that the State of
Idaho, under I.C. § 67-5101, did not assume jurisdiction over murder crimes or the
execution of state court search warrants within Indian country." Matthews, 133 Idaho at
311.

There appears to be little doubt that the federal courts had exclusive jurisdiction
over Mr. Wolfe's offense. "Crime in which the victim, but not the perpetrator, is Indian
are subject to (a) federal jurisdiction under§ 1152, as well as pursuant to federal criminal

law of general applicability, and (b) state jurisdiction where authorized by Congress."

United States v. Bruce, 394 F3d 1215, 1222 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Johnson, 637
F2d 1224, 1232 n. 11; see> Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 698, 699 (1990). Unlike some

states, where jurisdiction over all offenses involving Indians was either granted or
assumed, Pub. L. No. 280, § 7, Idaho limited its jurisdiction to the offenses itemized in

LC.§ 67~5101. Murderisnotincluded.

Mr. Wolfe's argument that the State did not have jurisdiction to convict him of
murder has merit under 18 U.S.C. § 1152. Setting aside a conviction for first-degree
murder is serious business and should not be lightly undertaken. As a result I want this
issue to be fully briefed and argued before I make a decision. I, therefore, am goin.g to
require the State and request the Nez Perce Tribe to submit briefs on this issue.

141006
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Order
The State is ordered and the Nez Perce Tribe is requested to file briefs within
forty-five (45) days of today's date addressing whether or not the Idaho district court has
jurisdiction over JY.Ir; Wolfe, a non-Indian defendant, who murdered an Indian victim,
Scott Gold, an enrolled member of the Nez Perce Tribe, :in Indian Country. Mr. Wolfe
will then have twenty-one (21) days to file a reply brief. Oral argument will follow.
It is so Ordered thls

7-

day of May, 2005.
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CERTJFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing IvIEMORANDUM AND
DECISION was mailed, postage prepaid, tbis{O:l.~day ofMay~ 2005, to the following:
William Wolfe
Inmate# 18593
ICCH211B
P.O. Box 70010

Boise, ID 83707
Kirk MacGregor
Idaho County Prosecutor,
Delivered to tray

Daren Fales
Public Defender,

Delivered to tray
Nez Perce Tribe
Office of Legal Counsel
P.O.Box305
Lapwai, ID 83540-0305

Clerk of the District Court
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!DAHO COU!'ITY DIS·TRICT COURT
FILED
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MAY '3 l 2005

lN THE DISTRJCT COUi~T OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF THE

STATE

OF

IDAHO,

IN AND

FO~ THE

COUNTY

OF

IDAHO

)
)

)

WILLIAM F. WOLFE
Plaintiff.

)
)
)
)
)
)

VS.

STATE OF IDAHO
Defendant.

CASE NO. CV 05-36455
ORDER

Petitioner William Wolfe p\~titions and supporting documents seeking relief from
his conviction for first degree murder should have been filed separately t-1s a civil case

for rellef under Rule 35 or for post conviction relief as the fapts and law warrant. Copies

of those pleadings &hall be flied in Case No. 18290 and the original pleading$ shall be
filed in the civil case.

Jeff Payne is appointed a$ spacial prosecutor and Daren Fales is appointed as
public defender in the civil case.

It is so ordered this

ORDER - l

~1_ day of May 2005

JOHN BRADBUR
f D, ST CQlJZT
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Mailing Certificate
l, the undersigned Deputy c.:terk, do hereby certify that I mailed or delivered a copy
of the foregoing document to the following persons on ..6. 10\

·w ·

Jeff Paynei delivered to tray
Dar~n Fales, daUvered to tray

Wnliam Wotte
Inmate #18593
ICC H21118

P. 0. Box: 70010
Boise, 10 83707

ROSE E. GEHRING, CLERK
SY:~~

KathyJoson1
Deputy Clerk

l•, ..
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNY OF IDAHO

WILLIAM WOLF,
Petitioner/Defendant,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent/Plaintiff.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV2005-36455,
and CR 1982-1-8-9-2-G- t i;i_qo
ORDER DISMISSING MOTION

Mr. Wolf was convicted of murder. In addition to appealing his
conviction he also filed a Motion for relief from an illegal sentence pursuant
to ICR 35 in his criminal case# CR 1982-18920, and a Petition for PostConviction Relief in case # CV 2005-36455. Both the Motion pursuant to
ICR 35 and the Petition for Post-Conviction relief alleged, among other
grounds, that the victim of the crime was an enrolled member of a native
American tribe and that the crime took place within the boundaries of the
Nez Perce Reservation.
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR HEARING

1

Mr. Wolf argues that the State of Idaho lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to try him for this crime and his conviction and sentence were
therefore illegal.
The Court, in an order filed May 31, 2005 directed that the issues be
decided in one case, Case #CV 2005-36455. The Court fully addressed all
issues raised by Mr. Wolf in both his Motion for relief pursuant to ICR 35 and
his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief in its Memorandum Opinion of October
26, 2006. All of Mr. Wolf's claims for relief were dismissed by the Court's
Order of December 21, 2006, including his claim that the State of Idaho
lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
Mr. Wolf's request for a hearing on his Motion for relief pursuant to ICR
35 that he filed in December 2004 is DENIED on the grounds and for the
reasons that he has already had a hearing on that Motion and it was Denied.
Dated this 29 th day of April, 2011.

Michael J. Griffi
District Court Judge

ORDER DENYING
........ MOTION FOR HEARING
G)
;.,;

~0
\,.,.
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IDAHO COUNTY OISTRIC"Y r'Al '"' ...
AT

Io: J.Q_ 6'~C5cK

William Wolfe
I.D.O.C. #18593
I.S.C.I. Unit 13C-68A
P.O. BOX 14

-. A"M'"'

---:...:.. ..

JUN - 9 2011

Boise, Idaho 82707

Appellant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO.
William Wolfe
Appellant

Case No. CR-1982-18290
S.C. Docket No.

vs.

NOI'ICE OF APPEAL
(I.C.R. 35 ILLEGAL SENTENCE)

-------

STATE OF IDAHO
Respondent

TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT I STATE OF IDAHO, AND THE PA."<TY I S ATTORNEYS
IDAHO COUNTY PROSECUTOR AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1. The above-named appellant appeals aginst the above-named respondent to the
Idaho Supreme Court from the Second Judicial District Court in the County of
Idaho in the above-entitled action. The Honorable Michael J. Griffin
presiding.
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the
Judgment or order described in paragraph l above are appealable orders under
and pursuant to Rule l](c)(l-10),I.A.R.
3. a preliminary statement of the issues on appeal, which the appellant then
intends to assert in the appeal, provided any such issues on appeal shall not
prevent the appellant from asserting other issues on appeal, are:
ISSUES
On February 22, 1982, William li'volfe was charged with first degree murder
in the District Court of Idaho County for Killing Scott Gold outside the
Silver Dollar Bar in Stites Idaho.
Mr. Wolfe contends that Mr. Gold was a Native American and that the
Silver Dollar bar in Stites Idaho is located on the Nez Perce Reservation.
Thus the State Of Idaho did NOT have Subject Matter Jurisdiction and deprived
him of his right to liberty without due process of law.
Dated this

S-

day of June, 2011.

William Wolfe, Appellant

z.;

··CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 5"" day of June, 2011. I mailed a true and
correct copy of this NOTICE OF APPEAL for the purpose of filing with the court
and of mailing a true and correct copy via prison mail system for processing
to the U.S. mail system to:

~~~U/6~

\iJillia'm Nolfe

Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID. 83720-0010

Idaho County Prosecutor
Idaho County Courthouse
320 West MainAve.
Grangeville, ID. 83530

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO
State of Idaho,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

Supreme Court No.

vs.

Idaho County No. CR 82-18290

William Wolfe,
Defendant/Appellant.

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE
RE: EXHIBITS

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Idaho
I, Rose E. Gehring, Clerk of the District Court of the
Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho,
County of Idaho,

in and for the

hereby certify that the following are all the

exhibits admitted or rejected to-wit:
There are No Exhibits involved in this appeal.
Dated this 15th day of June 2011.

Kathy M. Ackerman, Clerk

By:Jt\W,, LJ~JVt()Orv
Deputy

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE RE: EXHIBITS - 1
fl":»
:.: .~

I:~,·
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO
)

State of Idaho,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

)IDAHO COUNTY NO. CR 82-18290
)
)

vs.

)

William Wolfe,
Defendant/Appellant.

)
)
)

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Idaho
I, Kathy M. Ackerman, Clerk of the District Court of the
Second Judicial District,
County of Idaho,

of the State of Idaho,

in and for the

do hereby certify that the above and foregoing

Record in the above entitled cause was compiled and bound under my
direction, and is a true, full and correct Record of the pleadings
and documents as are automatically

red under Rule 28 of the

Idaho Appellate Rules.
I,

do

further certify,

that all exhibits,

offered or

admitted in the above enti.tled cause, will be duly lodged with the
Clerk

of

the

Supreme

Court

along

transcript and the clerk's record,

with

the

court

reporter's

as required by Rule 31 of the

Idaho Appellate Rules.
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE - 1

.

;,,·'

.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF,
a

I

have hereunto

set my hand and

the seal of said Court at Grangeville, Idaho,

s 15th day

of June 2011.
M. Ackerman, Clerk

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE - 2
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lDAHO COUNTY D!STRiCT C-?UR.f
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P.O. BOX 70010
BOISE, IDAHO. 83707
Petitioner prose

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE .$e:_ l. 0 i\}t)
TRICT, IN AND FOR

-:f:t)}\t)?J

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

-Vs.

Wo L f-'Z._ W· ; \ I\ A"'",
Defendant/Movant.
_______________

JUDICIAL DIS-

COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No.

\
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MOTION SEEKING JUDICIAL
NOTICE VIA., I.R.E. 201

I.

COMES
whom
of

requests

certain

I.C.

'vV riA£ \.AJ ~

NOW

\

this

facts

§19-1421,

honorable

via.,

,

court

Idaho Rule

presumptions

defendant/rnovant ,:i 7herein,

and

to
of

facts

take

judicial

Evidence

Rule

judicially

notice
201 ,

&

noticed.

[ESTABLISHING FACTS STIPULATED TO OR NOT]N, 1

NOTE:

The facts I wish to establish are presented under oath as sworn to by
me, within the accompanying Affidavit in Support.

MOTION SEEKING JUDICIAL
NOTICE VIA., I.R.E. 201
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II.
NOTICE

IS

HEREBY

GIVEN

TO ALL

PARTIES

THAT

THE

FOLLOWING

FACTS AND PRESUMPTIONS ARE TO BE TAKEN AS TRUE AND CORRECT:
III.

Judicial

Notice Of Adjudicative Facts Within The Scope

Of Article II Are Sought.

A.

Kinds Of Facts.
The judicially noticed facts

I

present are not

subject

to reasonable dispute in that they are either;
1.

Generally known within the territorial

jurisdiction

of the trial court or;
2.
to

Capable of accurate and ready determination by resort
sources

whose

accuracy

cannot

be

at

reasonably

be

questioned.
B.

Time Of Taking Notice.
Judicial

proceeding.
(on

notice
~his

jurisdictional

may

holds

true

matters)

taken

any

stage

on

I.C.R.

12(b)(2)

and

I.C.R.

35

of

the

objections

relief

from

an

illegal judgment.

MOTION SEEKING JU])ICIAL
NOTICE VIA., I.R.E. 201
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C.

Whether Discretionary Or Mandatory.
A court

may

take

judicial

notice,

whether

requested

or not and shall take judicial notice if requested by a party
and

supplied

with

the

necessary

In

information.

instances

where the facts are already part of the record judicial notice.
is

proper.

See State,

Dep I t

of Law Enforcement v.

Engberg,

109 Idaho 530, 708 P.2d 935 (Ct.App.1985).
D.

Opportunity To Be Heard.
If

the

court

should

demonstrate

an

unwillingness

to

take judicial notice of facts readily evidenced by the record.
I respectfully do seek a hearing and notice the same hereby.
I

am

entitled

to

be

heard upon

this

timely

request,

as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor
of the matters noticed.
E.

Facts To Be Noticed.
The following

this case,

[THE RECORDS SHOW]

facts

are

demonstrated by

the record

in

which are already in the possession of the court

and subject to mandatory notice thereof.
1.

The

victim was

an Indian

and a

member of

the

Nez

Perce tribe.
2.

The

crime alleged occurred in Stytes Idaho,

within

the boundaries of a known Indian Reservation.
3.

The

prosecution never

obtained any

consent to

act

on behalf of the Nez Perce tribal authorities.

MOTION SEEKING JUDICIAL
NOTICE VIA., I.R.E. 201
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4.

That the crime of murder so committed is exclusively

under law of the United States.
5.

That the state courts do have a list of crimes (other

than murder)
sentence

me

which

they

may have

Hence,

for.

the

intended

sentence

now

to

try

and

in place

is

illegal but, may be reached via., I.C.R. 35.N, 2
IV.
Supporting
v.

Hunsaker,

authority

117

Idaho

was permissible for a
clerk's
P.2d

records) .

1144

exists

192,

in

the

786 · P.2d

case

583

of

Hunsaker

(Ct.App.1990)(It

judge to take judicial notice of court

In

State

(Ct.App.1992)(The

v.

Howell,

court

is

122

Idaho

empowered

209,
to

832

notice

state department rules and reg's).
In
P.2d

the

651

case

of

(Ct.App.

Trautman

1989)

territorial

jurisdiction

capable

accurate

of

and

v.

(facts
of

the

ready

Hill,

116

generally
trial

Idaho

known

337,

775

within

the
are

court

or

which

determination

by

resort

to

sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned).
In
BUREAU

the

Trautman,

extends

to

case

judicial

official

reports

notice

of

published

governmental
therefrom.

NOTE: That is unless the state had absolutely no jurisdiction what-soever. In which case they might be considered neglegent. Of course,
a presumption toward a minimal splinter of propriety seems to be
. '.,.L' -'.: ; .1.rnore,::,]Phe:J;l.t'ap-pE<fr>pr±ake1y. stated.

-

MOTION SEEKING JUDICIAL
NOTICE VIA., I.R.E. 201

Page -4

uuoo:ts

That the victim was

a

member

of the

Nez

Perce Tribe is

a

matter of Indian Bureau records and is capable of notice.
p

The state maps and Atlas show Stttes/Idaho/USA, as being
in

the

boundaries

of

Indian

lands

and

a

presumption

exclusive jurisdiction under United States law exists

of

(absent

some threshold showing by the state that the tribal authority
waive or conferred said right).
As to the instant remedy of rule 35 relief.
understood

that

the

defendant

arrested or held under
state

jurisdiction.

may

have

suspicion of any

But

not

murder

It is widely

originally

been

offense capable

which

is

of

exclusively

under laws of the United States.
Therefore,

the

defendants

remedy

in

rule

35

is

appropriate and goes to require a sentence change commenserate
Even if only reached

with any offense originally intended.
through a Nunc Pro Tune application.
DONE this

J..~ day of November,

2004.

By,\.,\.)&\.--u~

,MOTION SEEKING JUDICIAL
NOTICE VIA., I.R.E. 201

ouoo :::;:
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lDAHO COUNTY DlSTRiCT COURT
FILED
('-,..

~;...:::0::...0'CLOCK _ _
r->. . . .M.

W; )\ ', 'f}t-J\ \ ,~J] l ~~

0 2 2004

P.O. BOX 700)0
BOISE, IDAHO. 83707
Petitioner prose

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SQ_ Q O I\\ 1)
TRICT, IN AND FOR

JUDICIAL DIS-

COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO.
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO,

Case No.

)

Plaintiff,

MOTION FOR RULE 35 RELIEF
FROM AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE.

}
)

-Vs.

vv7 o l fe;, k? ; I l, A,~

_______________
Defendant/Movant.

)
)
)
)
)
)

I.
defendant
now

present

via.,

I.C.R.

et seq.,

this
35 &

motion
47,

and federal

for

in violation of state law I.C.

§67-5101

§1162,

an

does

judgment

u.s.c.

from

whom

illegal

law 18

relief

herein

28

u.s.c.

§1360

et

seq., but not limited solely to these laws.
[AN AFFIDAVIT & MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT WILL ACCOMPANY HEREWITH]

MOTION FOR RULE 35 RELIEF
'FROM AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE

Page -1.

'l

UlJ

u· <)

.--, .,

UJ.l

II.

BASED UPON THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS CONCISELY STATED:

The

subject

matter

of

the

homicide

in

question

is

now

and at all times has been solely within the exclusive federal
authority.

Therefore,

the

state

district

court

has

acted

outside of its jurisdiction to prosecute and punish this first
degree murder charge.
III.

THE RELIEF SOUGHT IN RULE 35:

Since
of

state

federal
court

courts

generally
It

convictions.

defer

is

to

presumed

the

propriety

generally

that

the state court did have jurisdiction for some other offense.
As

is

listed

accordance with

within
laws

Idaho

Code

involving

§67-5101

indian

et

lands.

seq.,
See

or

18

in

U.S. C.

§1151.
Therefore,
to

vacate

whatever
only

a

the

the

defendant

sentence

for

respectfully
first

jurisdictional offense
misdemeanor)

government

may

as

the

allow

catagory

laws

for

degree

of

&

this

jurisdiction

seeks

this

court

murder

and

affix

sentence
state

and

within

( even

if

federal
the

stae

district court.
DONE this ~ a y of November, 2004.

MOTION FOR RULE 35 RELIEF
FROM AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE
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0UOO') ",'

Vil.,

!DAHO COUNTY DiSTRiCT COURT
FILED
AT
cl(} O'CLOCK

P.M.

N;

P.O. BOX 70010
BOISE, IDAHO. 83707
ROSE E. GEHRING
CLER' OF DISTRICT COURT

Petitioner prose

'

)

-4:""..a:..~~=A',..~llSYi~DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE
TRICT,

IN AND FOR

J)

M-v

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff,
-Vs.

______________
Defendant/Movant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Se,C.'ON D

JUDICIAL DIS-

COUNTY' STATE OF IDAHO.

Case No.

) ~ d.:10

NOTICE, OBJECTION AND REQUEST
FOR RELIEF VIA., I.C.R. 12(b)

I.

Notice is hereby given to all

parties,

that

I

object

to

the courts lack of sentencing jurisdiction, in a homicide case
that is exclusively under laws of the United States.
II.

Notice
of murder

the

court

has

proceeded

allegedly committed upon a

against
Nez

me

for

a

crime

Perce tribe member,

done within the boundaries of Indian lands, subject exclusively
to laws of the United States.

_____

... _

NOTICE, OBJECTION AND REQUEST
FOR RELIEF VIA., I.C.R. 12(b)

OUUO')';t
u \."

Page -1.

III.

I object to .the state courts lack of jurisdiction to try
and sentence acts excluded by the Indian Major Crimes Act from
state

authority.

[Exceptions

from

State

jurisdiction

I.C.

§67-5103]
IV.

The
convict

state
me

may

with

have
some

originally
other

intended

cognizable

to

offense

charge

and

code

and

commenserate with Idaho Code §67-5103,
"state jurisdiction for civil and criminal
enforcement concerning certain matters arising
in indian country"
Whereby a motion for I.C.R. Rule 35 relief is being submitted
contemporaniously herewith.

The court may wish to adjust

the

judgment accordingly.

v.
I

do

whatever

seek

time

sentence

without parole.

served

imposed

is

and
not

release
for

a

from

confinement

term

of

fixed

if

life

A Rule 35 motion for an illegal sentence must

issue.
DONE t h i s ~ day of November, 2004.

NOTICE, OBJECTION AND REQUEST
FOR RELIEF VIA., I.C.R. 12(b)

· ··oo,,..,,'
Du
J't

Page -2

IDAHO COUNlY DlSTRlCT COURT

AT

,._
a;- &s l.DO'C1'(!:i~
LOCK µ .M.

VJ \ lI f\\"\/\ \A (J lf ~

ROSE E. GEHRING
.K OF DISTRICT COURT

1

P.O. BOX 70010
BOISE, IDAHO. 83707

::..A:J~~WL.l!..L:":iJILDEPUTY

Petitioner prose

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

Plaintiff,

-Vs.

VJ o L f- ~ 'vv ;

I'

1

AN;

Defendant/Movant.
_______________

JUDICIAL DIS-

COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO.

TRICT, IN AND FOR-f.Df\:HD
STATE OF IDAHO,

5Q.. t._,(} N I)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

l 8 i.5--0

Case No.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
I.C.R. RULE 35 RELIEF FOR
AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
I.

\i?olfz 'vv";\ 11 f:>""'- ,

I
present
of

Fact

also
35

this

Memorandum

presented

submitted

Relief.

defendant/movant

In

(juxtaposed)

the

attached

Affidavit

contemporaneous

herewith

the

Done

within

Support

herein,

pursuant

to

Idaho

7(b), & Idaho Criminal Rule 47.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT

Rule

of

do
with
In

Motion
Civil

hereby

Issues
Support

For

Rule

Procedure

[MOTIONS GENERALLY]

Page -1

nu ou~1 .~·

II.

JURISDICTION & VENUE

AUTHORITY TO RULE UPON MY RULE 35.

A.

The Sentencing Court Has Venue To Hear My Rule 35.
The

term venue,

pleading and practice, a neighborhood;
or county

in which an injury is

Movant
the

court

venue

over

does
has
a

in the

sentence must

have

law

place

been done,

[3 Bl.Comm. 294]

not waive venue,

venue

the neighborhood,

declared to

or fact declared to have happened.

In common

as visne.

formerly know

nore does

original

he

The

action.

lay within

the

concede

that

matter

sentencing

of

court.

See State v. Wimer, 118 Idaho 732, 800 P.2d 128 (Ct.App.1990)~
Do

CAVEAT:

by

the

Code

state

§19-301

not

interpret

court

this

regarding

prevents

such

as

acceptance

the

case

venue

in

in

of

venue

chief,

Idaho

cases

cognizable

exclusively in the courts of the United States.
that

this

pursuant

court
to

has

venue

Idaho Criminal

solely

to

hear

Rules

as

promulgated

state supreme court at rule 1.

this

I

allege

Rule

35

by

the

[SCOPE]

N, 1 • Venue is nonj urisdictional; proof of proper venue is satisfied if
shown by a preponderance of the evidence, direct or circumstantial
evidence may be used to establish venue.
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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT

noon,--"
.._,,((/'',

O) u
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B.

The Sentencing Court Has Rule 35 Jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction is

a

term

of comprehensive

import

embracing

every kind of judicial action Federal Land Bank of Louisville,

Ky.

v.

Crombie,

Criminal

Rule

258

35

Ky.

383,

expressly

80

S.W.2d

grants

39,

40.

authority

to

The

Idaho

correct

an

illegal sentence at any time.
"The court may correct an
Illegal Sentence 3.at any
time"
A motion

for

correction or

imposition of an illegal
day time constraint.

reduction of

sentence is

See State v.

sentence based

not subject

Vetsch,

101

to the

Idaho 595,

upon
1 20-

618

P.2d 773 (1980).
The

court

has

authority

See King v.

at any time.

to

correct

State,

114

an

illegal

Idaho 442,

sentence

757 P.2d 705

(Ct.App.1988).
Unlike a legal but allegedly excessive sentence, an illegal
sentence may be corrected at any time.

See State v.

Lee,

116

Idaho 515, 777 P.2d 737 (1989).
Of course

it wouldn't matter anyway because

I

should be

excused from filing a timely motion pursuant to this rule under
special circumstances or because of misleading conduct of
state.

See

State

v.

Hocker,

119

Idaho

105,

803

P.2d

the
1011

(Ct.App.1991).N, 2

N,2. Circumstances of special circumstances exist where jurisdictional defect
can be raised at any time via., I.C.R. 12(b)(2).
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT

Page -3

uu 00 3·;

The record in this

the

Nez

a homicide upon an

allegedly

done

Idaho.

seek judicial notice of the record via.,

I

within

case shows

of Evidence Rule 201 et seq.,
CAVEAT:

belief

Once
that

again
the

reservation,

at

Stytes

Idaho Rule

(See Seperate Motion).
am

I

Perce

Indian

state

compelled

district

to

note

court

my

does

express

not

have

jurisdiction to try and sentence me for an offense within
the exclusive jurisdiction of laws of the United States.
The state has jurisdiction to rule upon my rule 35 motion
which is based upon an illegal sentence.
III.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

The

movant

herein

stands

ready

for

relief

Criminal Rule 35 from an Illegal Sentence.

via.,

Idaho

Having been tried

and convicted before the second district court in Idaho county,
for

the

occurred

offense
on

or

of
about

murder

in

the

LIS' /198~.

first
A

life

degree.
sentence

Sentence
without

parole was imposed.

IDTE:

The issues of fact are established within my affidavit in support
of rule 35 relief. See contemporaneous filing submitted herewith.
Done via I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3).

Page -4

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT

OUU03t,

IV.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.

It was on or about~/~/~~, when the defendant and an

in Stytes Idaho.
The

c~

5'c ill

Indian named

LD

, were in an altercation at a bar

Well within the boundaries of Indian lands.

alleged

Reservation.

('J

victim

died

while

on

the

Nez

Police arrested the defendant as

Perce
a

Indian

suspect and

later charged him with first degree murder.
Its possible that police also charged
one of
I

the

don't

proceed

crimes

even
upon

reachable

know

about.

the murder

by

state

Though

jurisdiction,

they

charge now

the defendant with

lacked

one

that

authority
As

in place.

set

to

forth

in the Indian Major Crimes Act.
So that might

The defendant was intoxicated at the time.
have

given

rise

to

an

alternative

charge

noticed

at

the

magistrates arraignment.

v.
EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE UNITED STATES:

A.

The Indian Major Crimes Act.
Federal

Major

Crimes

law
Act

at

18

u.s.c.

§1153

( I.M.C.A.) 11 •

If

implements
an

alleged

the

"Indian

offense

is

committed against the person or property of an Indian or another
person.

Jurisdiction is conferred on the federal courts.

Page -5

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT

OU'Onn
uJ~

The

allegation

involving

acts

of

upon

an

murder
Indian,

made
within

against
the

the

boundaries

reservation constitutes an offense in violation
States.

The

state

district

court

defendant

lacked

of the
the

of

the

United

requisite

N 3

jurisdiction to try defendant for that offense • .::.:..L:::.
B.

MURDER.
In the case of Youngbear v. Brewer, 415 Supp. 807, the

state court lacked jurisdiction to try a murder of an Indian
within

the

reservation

Stytes Idaho_N, 4
reservation lands.

of

an

inclusive

settlement,

just

like

See limits of state jurisdiction over indian
(22 U.C.L.A. Rev. 535, 557 (1974)]

N,3. Any conviction of a non-Indian of an offense uponaa10nindian of'. · :: ,
an offense upon Indian within the reservation, are subject to federal
jurisdiction under the Indaian Country Crimes Act. [Non-Indian Status
Is Irrelevant J •
N, 4. The subject matter of murder upon an Indian within the reservation
is within the exclusive federal authority.
See I.C. §67-5101; et
seq., 25 u.s.c.A. §§1321-1326.
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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT

· 0UOO40

C.

Controversies Involving A Non-Indian.
The fact that an Indian is involved in the offense charg~,

particularly

involving a

state of all

power

non-Indian,

to deal

with

automatically

the

strips

controversy under

the

state

law, and a state court does not have subject matter jurisdiction
in this homicide case because it is within the exclusive federal
authority.
( 1980);

See Odenwal t

and

v.

Zaring,

see White Mountain

1 02 Idaho 1,

Apache Tribe

v.

624

P. 2d 383

Bracker,

448

U.S. 136, 100 s.ct. 2578, 65 L.Ed.2d 665 (1980).
D.

There Has Been No Tribal Consent Conferring Jurisdiction.
District

arising

on

Courts

Indian

have

no

jurisdiction

reservations

unless

such

of

controversies

jurisdiction

has

been conferred by the governing bodies of the tribes occupying
such reservation.

See Boyer v. Shoshone-Bannock Indian Tribes,

92 Idaho 257, 441 P.2d 167 (1968).
The

record

in

this

case

proves

that

the

state

never

obtained the Nez Perce tribal governing bodies consent in order
to try this case/crime.

I respectfully seek Judicial Notice~ 5-

of these facts upon the record via., I.R.E. Rule 201.

N,5. See accompanying Motion and Affidavit in Support, seeking Judicial Notice
filed contemporaneously herewith.
Page -7

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT

Uu u'lO

/-<;
1: ..i

The victim was a member of the Nez Perce Tribe,

1.

whom

died on the reservation.
The

2.

conduct

alleged did

occur within

the

boundaries

of said reservation.
The state never obtained jurisdiction from Nez

3.

Tribal governing

bodies, requisite

to prosecute

a

Perce
murder

in this case.
4.

The

state

the homicide
may

have

was

without

occurring on

originally

jurisdiction

to

the reservation.

charged

some

other

proceed

upon

Although

they

offense

besides

murder, which they are capable of?
5.
a

The
term

sentence

is

therefore

commenserate with

an

Illegal

offense

and

( other

must

reflect

than murder)

by which the state court actually ~eld jurisdiction over.

N:>TE:

A motion under rule 35 subjects only the sentence to re-examination.
It cannot be used as the procedural mechanism to attack the validity
of the underlying conviction. See State v. McDonald, 130 Idaho 963,
950. P.2d 1302 (Ct.App.1997). A presumption that there may be valid
basis for some crime charged other than murder exists!

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT

Page -8

0-000,.:t ~:,-,

VI.

RELIEF SOUGHT.

I

respectfully

request

that

this

honorable

court

would

grant a telephonic conference in this matter.
That an order for said hearing be noticed to all parties
forthwith.
At the hearing I

wish to

hear exactly what sentence

the

court intends to claim it held jurisdiction on.
Since the
and a
a

judgment and

conviction says

term of fixed life without parole was

declaration by this court defining a

it

is

for

imposed.

murder
I

seek

cognizable offense and

related sentence respectively.
DONE t h i s ~ day of November,

2004.
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IDAHO COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

co
(\
..........
/.J
f) :c)5 O'CLOCK_.M.
C::11

w.tJY~

AT

wl~fe-.

OEC 02 2004

P.O. BOX 70010
BOISE, IDAHO. 83707

ROSE E. GEHRING

~. ·/cC~lf~ OF ~/4
Clf1\Udd'~
()ot5YloEPUiY
COUITT

Petitioner prose

IN THE DISTRICT couRT oF THE
TRICT I

IN AND FOR

-r 'D}H (J
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

STATE OF .IDAHO,

Plaintiff,

-Vs.

Defendant/Movant.

Se c.-<J Nn

JUDICIAL DIS-

COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO.

Case No.

lg~ ~-0

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT

--------------- )
STATE OF IDAHO

)

)
COUNTY OF ADA

SS:

)

I WO L~<... w; l UAi'fl-. affiant/defendant/movant hereing, does
certify and attest as sworn to under penalty of perjury that
the following statement is true and correct to the best of
my knowledge and recolection.
1 /. THAT my full name is 'r,,.J:f//Arc::, feiwtt.lr:iWnL(-a and I am the
defendant/movant/affiant in this proceeding for rule 35 relief,
judicial notice and rule 12 objections.

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT

Page -1.

·uou.,.,,
O
..... ,.

,,:., t,4•

RE:

RULE 35 RELIEF.

2/.

THAT my sentence is

illegal because

only

had

charge

other

jurisdiction

than

homicide

to

{via.,

the

and

the district

punish

Indian

Maj or

me

for

court

offenses

Crimes

Act

and

its progeny) .

3/.

THAT

rule 35

the district

court has

jurisdiction to

(involving an illegal sentence)

now,

act

on

my

and is therefore

timely.

4/.

THAT the court ought to give me a

lessor sentence then

life without parole as a matter of law!
RE:

JUDICIAL NOTICE.

5/.

THAT the Idaho Rules of Evidence Rule 201

allows for this

court to notice the following adjudicative facts, which aren't
subject to reasonable dispute.
A.
B.

The victim was a member of the Nez Perce Indian tribe.
The

crime alleged

occurred

in

Stytes

Idaho,

within

the boundaries of a known indian reservation land.
C.

The

prosecution never

obtained

any

authority,

entered into any agreement for consent to act,

nore

on behalf

of the governing Nez Perce tribal authority.
D.

That the crime of murder so committed is exclusively

under law of the United States.

Page -2.

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT

U,Uf) u·· u 'j:/ .~· ·
I

RE:

RELIEF AVAILABLE VIA., I.C.R. 35.

6/. THAT the court has authority to correct or reduce the life
term now in place, based upon imposition of an illegal sentence.
7 /.

THAT

I

presume

the

state

court

did

jurisdiction under some other catagory of

have

some

offense

kind

(other

of

than

murder), which is cognizable by state courts --- even if only
a misdemeanor,

or maybe

a

trafic

code

or

something

( stemming

from intoxication of the defendant}?

8/.

THAT the court ought to adjust my judgment and commitment

and order credit for time served via., Idaho Code §19-309.

RE:

OBJECTIONS VIA., I.C.R. 12(b)(2).

9/.

THAT the

in nature

and

lack of state court jurisdiction is

substantive

may

time

be

raised by

objection at

any

via.,

I.C.R. 12(b}(2).
10/.

lack

THAT said objection is being leveled now based upon the
of

jurisdiction

of

the

district

court

to

sentence

for

a life term in this case.
FURTHERS SAYETH AFFIANT NAUGHT this ~.2--day of

2004.

By,
SUBSCRIBED

4,,,.,,4wi '

AND

SWORN

to

before

me

,#cV,

~J~~
thisJ~nJ. day

of

2004.

* *
* * *
* S E A L *
* * *
* *
.AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT

JANEL GARDNER
Notary Publ\C

State of Idaho
. . - ~ • w o o...
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lDAHO COUNTY DISTRICT COURT
f) ,
FILED
;)
AT
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o·cLOcK ____r::_.M.

ex ,

Lv ,' J I: A-M \/1212 L£,

_L

P.O. BOX 70010
BOISE, IDAHO. 83707

:-15

DEC O2 2004

Petitioner prose

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE Se..C.. ~ N 'D

~Jo.RV

TRICT, IN AND FOR
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
-Vs.

Defendant/Movant.
_______________
I.
I

certify delivery of;
Sentence)

COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO.
Case No.

I g cl- 1 0

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING.

U~l\.}JZQ~,

Illegal

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

JUDICIAL DIS-

defendant/movant/affiant

(1)

( 2)

herein,

Motion for Rule 35 Relief
Affidavit

In

Support

(3)

do

(From An

Memorandum

In Support (4) Notice, Objection And Request For Relief Via.,
I.C.R. Rule 12(b), & {5) Motion Seeking Judicial Notice Via.,
I.R.E.

201,

to

the

District

Court

Clerk

& to

the

County

Prosecutor, by placing the following documents into the hands
of

prison

staff

for

mailing,

U.S.

1st class on this 11/l~ /2004 date.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING. 1 of 1.

I \ (\

()

UUU

0'XI
/
f''

parcel

postage

pre-paid

CLW.CO.COURT
Dec-!.4-200-4

10:49am

From·lDAHO COU1;

1ST COURT

12089832376

141003

T-883

P.003/004

F-260

Mailing Certificate

I, the undersigned Deputy Clerk, do hereby certify that I mailed or delivered a copy
of the foregoing document to the following persons on J;) ,I l/, OL( :
Jeff Payne, delivered to tray
WUliarn Wolfe
P.O. Box 70010

Boise, 1D 83707

RO~ GEHRING, CLERK
8)1

wwtlmlL

Katt1y:f6hnon
Deputy Clerk

UUU0,~8

14]002

CLW.CO.COURT
D~c-l.4-2004

10:42am

T-983

120B9632376

Frcrn·!DAHO CO~·.· , _IST COURT

P.OOZ/004

F-260

IDAHO COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

.

.

AT/{), 54_

FILED

/)

O'CLOCK-L::t__.M.

DEC 14 2004

)
)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO
Plaintiff,

vs.

Case No. CR 18290

)

)
)

WILLIAM WOLFE
Defendant.

ORDER

)
)

The motion of William Wolfe for relief pursuant to Idaho Criminal Code Rule 35 is
summarily dismissed as untimelr'

!t is so Ordered this

I tr". day of December 2004.

N BRADBURY
District Judge

·,uu·o,:c,../
U
·..:.:.:

C:l'RDF.R •

1

AHO coUNiY DISTRICT COURT
i
FILED
/')
AT
~
O'CLOCK __c_.M.
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·w;/few't)

w~

1.,/--e_
P.O. BOX 70010
BOISE, ID. 83707
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r;·.. rr
t...,

2 7 t!UIH

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO

* * * * *
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)

Plaintiff,

Case No.(:~ 8290
MOTION TO RECONSIDER
FOR I.R.C.P. 60(b)
RELIEF

)
)

-Vs.

)
)
)

,

________________
Defendant/Movant.

)

COMES NOW, W ~ i,J~

)

, defendant/movant herein

whom does seek relief from the order denying my timely
request for a rule 35, due to an illegal sentenee.
This Motion is presented within ten days from the order
denying relief.
in

support,

It is accompanied with AFFIDAVIT,

based

upon

the

courts

mistake

that

&

MEMORANDUM
my

request

was untimely.
DONE this a..i_th day of December 2004.

NJ.IE: I CBJB:!I' 'lO 'llE UISJ.R.lCI.' <IlRl.S EHtR via., I.R.C.P. 12. & ID aA1M '.lmr I 1.M
&HERlm :amcmc:mL cr:t:F.INMNr AS A RESDr CF 'IlE IIIEGU. smEN:E,. El\9ID tB:N 'IlE
DlSlRICI.' <D:RIS IKK CF JCRIIDI< !I'll N 'ID CINlJ.Cl'.

MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT. -1.

r.: ,o o o' 10 .)L

'1v-_~w~
P.O. BOX 70010
BOISE, ID. 83707

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

* * )* * *

Plaintiff,
-Vs.

Defendant/Movant.
________________

)
)

Case No.e.~18290

)

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT
OF I.R.C.P. 60(b).

)
)
)
)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO)
) SS:
County of Ada
)

Lv Jb

I
L-0~ , affiant herein, whom does swear that
the following facts are true and correct to the best of my
knowledge as sworn to under penalty of perjury as follows:
1 /.

THAT My full name is lv ~ A ,

IJJejA,

and I am the

affiant/movant/defendant in the above referenced cause.
2/.

THAT I am basing my request for relief on factors of

an illegal sentence and not a discretionary request.
3/.

THAT I am entitled to relief from the illegal judgment

of Conviction against me on or about August 5th 1982.

4/.

THAT the order denying my rule 35 relief was based on

a substantive error in fact which mislead the court as to
its rule of law in this case, to me detriment.
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF I.R.C.P. 60(b).

,•,6

('
)000 J.l

Page -1.

5/.

THAT I am entitled to relief because the trial court

lacked jurisdiction to try or sentence me for first degree
murder, since the crime culminated within the Indian
reservation and involved an Indian.

FURTHER SAYETH AFFIANT NAUGHT this,.d:;'..Z..--th day of December

2004.
By,

~~~

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me thisjjw{_day of
December 2004.

JANEL GARDNER
Notary Public
State of ldah9

** * * *
*
*
*
*
***SE AL**
*
*
* * * ** * *

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
do hereby certify mailing of my
I ~~
I.R.C.P. 60(b) relief, to the district court clerk, and the
county prosection at the below ascribed address, by placing
the same into hands of prison staff, for delivery via., U.S.
mail postage pre-paid first class.

41//k

Done by me this

A ~ay of December 04.
BY,

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF I.R.C.P. 60(b).

000052
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IDAHO COUNTY ~ C T COURT
· - ,1

r. Qlol
"'" ~ .

:f\l - 'i' 1

W: \/;AV' \tJ (?L{~

~RIGINAL

P.O. BOX 70010
BOISE, ID. 83707

~()

U'CLOCK

ROSE E, GEHRING
c , K O ~ I C T COURT

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO

* * )* * *
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
-Vs.

Case Nolt18290
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF I.R.C.P. 60(b).

)

)
)

________________
Defendant/Movant.

)
)

ME MO R A N D U M I N

S U P P O R T

This is a memorandum in support of my I.R.C.P. 60(b)
request for relief from the courts order wrongfully denying
an I.C.R. Rule 35 motion for relief from an illegal sentence
based upon the courts lack of jurisdiction to try a murder
which culminated on an Indian reservation and involved a known
Indian tribe member.

NOTE: I am seeking relief via., I.R.C.P. rule 60(b)(1),[for mistake
in fact], (3) misrepresentation [the fact that my rule 35 is based
upon an illegal sentence and not a discretionary request], and (6)
for any other reason justifying relief. All involving issues of
fact which are prejudicial to my case due to the error so complained.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF I.R.C.P. 60(b).

Page -1.

000053

.M;.

DEC 2 7 2UU4

:· 1~ · hO<QD

STATE OF IDAHO,

r\
L

DEPUTY

FIRST relief via., I.R.C.P. 60 (b)(1) is proper where I can
show (a) how the mistake was made [the court made an error
in fact when it held that my rule 35 was untimely because
there is no such time limits on issues of law involved upon
an illegal sentence] and (b) the honorable judge

,:fei&e1:RRA2>Al>le,t1

made the mistake in his December

li,

2004

order.
In this case a reasonably prudent man would have done
the same under such circumstances and relief from judgment
ought to issue • . See Thomas v. Thomas, 119 Idaho 709, 809
P.2d 1188 (Ct.App.1991).
FURTHERMORE, subsection (6) of this rule allows for
relief for Any Other Reason Justifying Relief!

See First

Sec. Bank v. Stauffer, 112 Idaho 133, 730 P.2d 1053
(Ct.App.1986).
ADDITIONALLY, subsection (3) presents a vehicle for
relief from an order based upon mistake.

See

v. Keller, 100 Idaho 10, 592 P.2d 66 {1979).
is a mistake of fact.

Hearst Corp.
In my case there

Whether or not the district court abused

its discretion in ruling on my rule 35 motion for an illegal
sentence as a matter of discretion, raher than as a matter
of law.
An illegal sentence may be corrected at any time.

See

King v. State, 114 Idaho 442, 757 P.2d 705 (Ct.App. 1988).
THEREFORE, the District Court has abused its discretion
and the order denying relief must be vacated due to
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF I.R.C.P. 60(b).

Page -2.

OOUUJ~

error/mistake/misrepresentation of the fact that the relief
is not one subject to discretionary review but one of law.

DONE this '.clJ_th day of December
2004.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I \;I:)).' AM Wii L~c. do hereby certify mailing of my
I.R.C.P. 60(b) relief, to the district court clerk, and the
county prosection at the below ascribed address, by placing
the same into hands of prison staff, for delivery via., U.S.
mail postage pre-paid first class.
Done by me this/2 P day of December 04.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF I.R.C.P. 60(b).

Page -3.
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iDAHO COUNTY D!SIB!CT COURT

'b

vJL.i!L~/~
BOX 70010
"
BOISE, ID.

83707

'

I

Ll)1:£:;igl>

I\
~ .M.

[5[) O'CLOCK

,

ROSE E. GEHRING

~UcilSTRICTCOURT
,
, ~
•
I
\l'\$1 DEPUTY

. , .a
•

.

I

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL
DISTRICT, IN AND FOR IDAHO COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO

* * * * *
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Petitioner.

-Vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,

Case

No./~'P:J <JO

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF EMERGENCY/EXPEDITED
PROCEEDINGS

Respondent,
________________

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT

The

following

issues of

fact

and

law are

presented

in

favor of the Defendant/Movant obtaining not only
expedited/emergency

proceedings

but,

also

towards

obtaining

relief via., I.C.R. 35, or 47.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT.

000056

1

-STATEMENT OF THE CASEA charge of murder in the first degree was filed by the
Idaho

County,

Idaho,

State

prosecutor

from

the

February

20,

1982, shooting of an Indian on Indian Lands.
The State prosecutor never obtained permission or waiver
from

the

Nez

Perce

tribal

authority

at

any

time.

The

State

in fact keeps this defendant from federal authorities.
The

State

in

fact

keeps

this

defendant

from

federal

authorities.
The

State

convicted,
an

commits

sentenced

offense

solely

reversible

and

under

then

error

imposed

exclusive

an

when

it

illegal

charged,

sentence

federal ·jurisdiction

of

via.,

the "INDIAN MAJOR CRIMES ACT".
On

about

the

end

of

2004

a

paralegal

friend

asked

the

defendant if he knew whether or not his offense occurred inside
an

Indian

reservation

and

hence

under

exclusive

federal

jurisdiction.
The
any

defendant

sought

corroberative

proof

incarceration.

The

to

obtain

needed

State prison

a
to

map

of

show

the
his

perpetually forbids

area,

or

illegal
him

from

doing so, and hence precludes discovery.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT.

-
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000057

2

I am now filing for relief from an illegal sentence and
the court ommitts to act.

I am claiming false imprisonment

occurs once the State prosecution becomes aware of the taint
and fails to act.

Every day hence is an aggravating factor

denying me a quick and speedy trial in the federal court thereby
circumventing justice illegally.
-STATEMENT OF FACTSThe

offense

I

am

tried

and

convicted

of

by

the

State

court was done in fundamental error because the federal court
has

exclusive

in Stites,
lands,

jurisdiction

Idaho County,

involving

an

of

all

"MAJOR

CRIMES"

Idaho

( Nez

Perce)

Indian Reservation

Indian

[See

protectorate.

committed

AFFIDAVIT

IN

SUPPORT accompanying here with]
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF EXPEDITED PROCEEDINGS
do

hereby

plead

my

case

for

"Exigence"

[/egzejens/] requiring expedited proceedings.
"State of being urgent or exigent; pressing
need or demand; a case requires immediate
attention, assistance, or remedy; critical
period or condition, pressing necessity."
[State v. Rubion, Tex.Civ.App., 292 S.W.2d
650, 657]
"a sudden an unexpected happening or an
unforeseen; occurance or condition requires
immediate remedy".
[Los Angeles County
v. Payne, 8 Cal.2d 563, 66 P.2d 658, 663]
Exigent

circumstances

exist

in

this

situation

which

demands unusual or immediate action.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT.

~-···,·0·00058

3

UNLAWFULNESS OF JUDGMENT & CONVICTION.

RE:
1.

The

conviction is

against

federal

code

via.,

the

Indian

Major Crimes Act" and I am wrongfully incarcerated as a result
of

said

State
&

&

illegal

incarceration.

Federal due process

I. Const. Art. 1 § 1 3 ]

I

Such

clauses

prejudice
[U.S.

violates

Amend.

5th

the
14th

&

have been denied my freedom based upon

sham jurisdiction unlawfully.
RE:

MY QUICK
The

&

SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHTS:

presuption

is

that

county

officers

Federal prosecutors and informed them that
Law

back

in

1982.

It

is

further

I

contacted

the

violated Federal

presumed

that

tribal

authorities never held a timely hearing nor waived jurisdiction.
The
(or

right

tribal

of

review)

this
is

defendant/accused
guaranteed

by

the

to

a

sixth

speedy

trial

amendment

of

the constitution and such right is implemented by 18 U.S.C.A.
§3161 et seq., and Fed.R.Crim.P. 50

In my case the State courts

have interfered with that speedy trial right.
The case of Barker v. Wingo, 407 u.s. 514, 92 s.ct. 2182,
33

L.Ed.2d

101,

lists

four

factors

to

be

considered

in

determining whether delay was unreasonable:
A. Lenght of Delay.

Here it's been over twenty' year:5_X: ::i

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT.
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B.

Governments Justification for the Delay.

Due to an illegal

unconstitutional State court conviction, done absent authority
to act!
C. Prejudice Caused By The Delay.
innocent!

Witnesses

that

would

might well

be dead by now.

I at all
have

times have plead

testified

in

my

favor

Surely they' 11 be impossible to

find!

All

due

to lengthened

pretrial

investigatory state if you will.
quick

RE:

&

I

incarceration!

Call

it

am still being denied a

speedy federal court redress.

STATE COURT INFRINGEMENT ON THE "SPEEDY TRIAL ACT".
In federal

courts,

the Federal Act

of 1974

establishes

a set of time limits for carrying out the major events
information,

indictment,

arraignment)

my federal criminal case.

The precursers

in

the

(e.g.

prosecution

of

[18 u.s.c.A §3161 et seq.,]

to filing pleadings charging

homicide are subject to the Federal Act of 1974.

me in

this

State court

actions outside of state court jurisdiction are extra-judicial
in nature.

5

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT.

1

!

OUOOGfI

RE:

PRE-INDICTMENT INCARCERATION CREATES PREJUDICE.
Such prejudice

is not confined to

merely an

impairment

of the defense but includes any threat to what has been termed
an

accused's

financial,

significant

in

the

stakes,

prompt

psychological,

termination

may ultimately deprive me of life,

of

a

physical

and

proceeding

which

liberty or property.

[See

U.S. v. Dreyer, C.A.N.J., 533 F.2d 112, 115]
Prejudice is presumed in cases of extended incarceration
imposed prior to trial or a preliminary proceeding!
a conclusive presumption exists.

[People v.

I

declare

Sellers, 3 Dept.,

109 A.D.2d 387, 492 N.Y.S.2d 127, 128.]
A

substantive

incarceration

rule

extends

of

law

exists

where

beyond

two

decades,

post

without

a

arrest
proper

(Federal) charge being leveled!
I am prejudice in my ability to proceed and defend.
STATE COURTS KNOWINGLY PROCEED ABSENT
JURISDICTION, EVEN AFTER NOTICED
I

told the trial court of the error on _-_-04,

my rule 35 application

(for an illegal sentence).

within

That court

and County prosecutor continue to error by ommiting to act.
Since my present sentence provides for a life term until
the day I die!

I hereby declare:

The State conviction of an offense
federal

jurisdiction

via.,

the

"INDIAN

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT.

subject to exclusive
MAJOR

CRIMES

ACT".

6

OUOOS.1

The

perpetual

punishment.

life

term

now

in

place

is

cruel

and

unusual

It must be void.
CONCLUSION

I

am prejudiced by the inordinate delay of federal court

process.

Such

prejudice

my

circumstances

Therefore,

is

presumed

as

a

matter

of

require . expedited proceedings

law.
and

the State really must vacate my judgment.
DONE this

cf

day of February, 2005.

DEFENDANT/MOVANT

-CERTIFICATE OF MAILINGI

P,:;,:.&'-.-#'4do
7

hereby certify delivery of this document

to all parties by placing same into hands of prison staff form
mailing

via

U.S.

Postal

Service

1st class

pre-paid

this

£-

_.?$'date.
BY ME,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT.
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BOX 70010
BOISE, ID.

FEB 11 2005
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ROSE E. GEHRING

~A!!F~~~OORT

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND J U D ~ D E P l I T Y
DISTRICT, IN AND FOR IDAHO COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO

* * * * *

W~w~

)
)
)

Petitioner.

)

-Vs.

)
)

STATE OF IDAHO,

)

F:J. "7t::l

Case No./

PETITION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF

)
)

Respondent,

)

The Petitioner alleges:
1.

I am in custody south of Boise (address supra).

2.

Judgment

and sentence was imposed by the

second

judicial

district court judge Reinhardt, J.,
3.

The sentence of fixed life without parole was imposed for

murder in the first degree in case number 18290.
4.

The sentence date being August 5th 1982.

5.

A finding of guilt having been found after a plea of not

guilty was entered.
6.

I

appealed from the judgment of conviction and imposition

of sentence timely.

On November 30th 1984, a decision affirming

the same was entered.
7.

The GROUNDS on which I base my application for

post-conviction relief, include I.C. §§19-2901 (a)(1) & -4205:

1

POST-CONVICTION.

UOOOS~

§I.
INNEFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL REQUIRING REVERSAL
OF THE SENTENCE AND CONVICTION FOR FAILURE TO RAISE
STATUTORY BAR PRECLUDING STATE JURISDICTION.
Ineffective Assistance of counsel at trial,

A.

appeal,

and in all previously filed collateral attacks upon the
conviction

and

sentence.

Article 1 section 13.
Amendments 5th

&

v. Washington,

Violating

Idaho

Constitution

United States Constitutional

14th (rights to counsel) via., Strickland

466

u.s.

668,

104 s.ct.

2062,

80

L.ED.2d

674 (1984);
-THE STRICKLAND TEST(1)Counsel 1 s
the

assistance

circumstances

occured

on

an

of

Indian

the

was

unreasonable

case.

[That

reservation

and

the

considering
homicide

involved

and

all

alleged
Indian.

Furthermore, that there had been no waiver of said tribal
jurisdiction of this offense.
(2)

There is a reasonable probability that, absent the

errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt
respecting guilt.

( See Strickland,

at 2066

note 97.) [ Because

the district court lacked jurisdiction to try cases of homicide
occuring in the Indian Reservation where an Indian was involved
and no written waiver by exclusive tribal authorty had
occurred].

POST-CONVICTION.

2

. o· n
(1JU
I .0 D'A:
f

-PREJUDICE PRONG(a)

Showing Of Prejudice via., Strickland,

There is more than a
counsel I s

without

error

at 2067.

"reasonable probability"

( in

failing

to

raise

that

objection

and request for dismissal of the charge due to lack of
jurisdiction)

the

result

of

the

trial

would

have

been

differant as a matter of law.
Certainly,

the

verdict

would

"[a]

reasonable

Strickland,

at

2068,

probability

is

a

probability

have

been

deferent

probability

sufficient

to

is

a

undermine

confidence in the outcome [of the trial].
(b)

Appeal.

In Evitts v.

Lucey,

105 s.ct.

830,

83 L.Ed.2d 821

(1985) the Supreme Court held that the Stricklan, standard
of

ineffective

assistance

appellate counsel.

of

counsel

also

applies

to

My appeal number 14755 was an appeal

as a matter of right.
The court in Gray v. Green,
following

factors

which

exist

778 F.2d 350,

in

my

case

and

held the
entitle

me to relief:
-INADEQUATE PERFORMANCE PRONGS-ia

If

appellate counsel

significant

and obvious

has

issue

failed
( failure

to

raise

could

be

viewed as deficient performance), and
-ii- If [the] issue not raised may have resulted
POST-CONVICTION.

3

000065

in reversal of conviction, or an order for new
proceedigns,

the failure was

prejudicial.

See

also

Griffin v. Aiken, 775 F.2d 1226, 1235-36.
Where my trial counsel raised virtually no
defense,

the

presumption

of

effective

assistance

is

overcome

by failing to raise the existance of a statutory bar to
prosecution due

to lack of jurisdiction.

See Gray

v.

Green,

supra note 125, 778 F.2d at 352, note 128.
B.

Late

in this
would
with

consideration of my application
case

because,

result
the

a

strict

in manifest

concept

of

application

injustice

fundamental

is

and

justice.

appropriate
of

is

time

bar

inconsistent
See LaFon

State, 119 Idaho 387, at 390, note 5. 807 P.2d 66

v.

(Ct.App.

1991) reh'g denied (1991).
11

The district court concluded that a strict
application of the limitation would have
the effect of depriving him of his claim"
[Emphasis added]
More
Idaho

importantly,

976,

842

P.2d

the
976,

case
842

of
P.2d

Olds
312

v.

State,

1 22

(Ct.App.1992),

declares that,
11

where a challange to unlawful commitment exists,
it may be brought at any time and is exempt
from time constraints to which postconviction
petitions are usually subject."
Noting

Wests

Key

Code

[ 1 0.

HABEAS

CORPUS

KEY

603] .

To

the

extent applicable.

POST-CONVICTION.

4

0000615

8.
of

I

respectfully request
done

this

court. to
Idaho I s

via

consider

Habeas

the

Corpus

whole

this

petition

as

Statute

§19-4201

et seq.,

(inmates incarcerated in state whom complain

of illegal confinement).
To the extent this court may feel
from

a

time

bar

would be quick

I

to

that I
submit

ought to suffer
the

case

before

the Idaho State Supreme Court under its original jurisdiction.
That is if the court issues a notice of intent to dismiss
for

failure

to

state

a

claim

for

relief

or

invoking a

time

bar.
This presentation here is

merely a

formality in

attempt

to sho~ the highier court circumstances require thier remedial
intervention.
9.

At all times relevant counsel has failed to inform me and

or object
case

to the

evolving

involving an

courts lack

from

within

Indian,

for

of

the

jurisdiction
Nez-Perce

which no

waiver

to

Indian
by

act

in

this

reservation,

tribal

authority

has been given.
The
Indians

11

offense

charged falls

with

the,

Federal

Court

Major Crimes Act".

On the face of the decision on appeal at State v.
6.91

via,

P. 2d 1 2 9 3,

that court held the incident occurred,

Wolfe,
11

at the

Silver Dollar Bar, in Stites, Idaho County, Idaho."
I am not allowed to have relevant maps because the
I.D.O.C. policy and procedure prevents it due to security
reasons.
5

POST-CONVICTION.

",lo· o· ,,

U u . D,

'

J

I technically have not yet discovered evidence that
said location is reservation lands.

I do seek judicial notice

of my impediment and implications invoking the discovery rule
overcoming_ the Statutory limitations period, which is
non~jurisdictional.
10.

I am seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

11.

The relief I seek is to vacate the judgment and conviction

in this case.
12.

This

petition is

accompanied by my affidavit in support

of the petition.

h~~~.
Signature of Petitioner
STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF ADA

)
) SS:
)

b,.A-~~

I,
being duly sworn upon my oath, depose
and say that I have subscribed to the forego in petition; that
I
know the contents thereof;
and that
the matters and
allegations therein set forth are true.

S .gnaufe of Petitioner
2005.

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this

'ii!:fI dt

6
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JU

DISTRICT, IN AND FOR IDAHO

* * * * *
)
)
)
)
)
)

Petitioner.
-Vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,

Case No.

Jg-' cl, 7 0

NOTICE OR ERROR, OBJECTION
AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF

)

)
)
)

Respondent,

________________
~

~fendant

gives writt~ NOTICE to all parties; Judge
Prosecuto~ ~ , by presenting copies to
Idaho C nty ~ r i c t Court filing.
[Via.,
I.R.C.P. S(a),(d) & (e)]

"~
F\ his&
0 eacho

I.
1/ •

NOTICE:

The above

named

defendant

has

been wrongfully

proceeded against by the state courts because the 2-20-82
homicide complained of culminated within the Nez Perce
Reservation and
via., the

11

involved exclusive federal

court

Indian

jurisdiction

INDIAN MAJOR CRIMES ACT".
II.

2/.
via.,

OBJECTION:
I.C.R.

The defense hereby raises this timely objection

12(b)(2)

"that the complaint

&

information filed

against me fails to show jurisdiction of the State court".

OBJECTION.

1

OUOOGS

A.

CAUSE SHOWN FOR TARDY.OBJECTION.
Due

and on

to

inadequate

assistance

direct appeal.

I

was

of

counsel

never informed

at

trial

about

the

state's lack of jurisdiction to try my exclusive federal
offense.
Furthermore,

I

fall

under

rule which tolls time limitations.

the

Evionsky,

discovery

I was;

(1) Held out of State without Idaho access, &
Perpetually suffer prejudice from State D.O.C.
rules that preclude me from obtaining any maps to
prove Stites, Idaho, is within the Nez Perce Indian
Reservation.
A requisite to preclude State court
jurisdiction.
(2)

B.

EXCUSABLE NEGLECT.
The court must find

that my tardiness is

excusable

neglect because the court itself operated under a belief
that it held jurisdiction!
In the case of Full Circle,

Inc.

Idaho 634, 701 P.2d 254 (Ct.App.1985)
is

determined

by

examining

what

v.
11

Schelling,

108

excusable neglect"

might

be

expected

of

reasonable prudent person under similar circumstances".
Where

delay

is

the court must fine

due

to

State

imposed

excusable neglect

impediment,

( due to

perpetual

incapacity to discover).
III.
3/.

RELIEF SOUGHT:

I respectfully request this court to grant

expedited proceedings and hold an emergency hearing for
determining the merits of my prompt release from State custody.

2

OBJECTION.
1 ri
(ju

U' 0 -, ur
i

IV.
I

have

IN CONCLUSION.

given Notice of the

States

lack of

jurisdiction

to proceed upon my offense subject to exclusive federal
jurisdiction

under

the

Indian

Major

Crimes

Act.

The

court

must deem the matter as being one requiring exigency and must
grant emergency proceedings now.
DONE this cf> day of

~

I

2005.

MOVANT
-CERTIFICATE OF MAILINGI ,:;:;-e::.;~~~ do hereby certify delivery of this document
to all parties by placing same into hands of prison staff form
mailing via
0

/!_- S"

U.S.

Postal Service

1st class

pre-paid this

,;Jf _

date.
BY ME,

3

OBJECTION.
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BOX 70010
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83707
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND

2005

11
~!.

,.i.,

JU~~~~~~

DISTRICT, IN AND FOR IDAHO COUNTY,

* * * * *
)

_,2'£ 0

Case No./?

)

Petitioner.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

-Vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,

________________
Respondent,

COMES NOW,

/t#.,._A/,4,

MOTION FOR EXPEDITED
[OR] EMERGENCY PROCEEDINGS

)

defendant/movant herein,

pursuant

to I.R.C.P. Rule 7 and in accord with I.C.R. 47 (MOTIONS]
moves
for

for

EXPEDITED

reconsideration

sentence}.

PROCEEDINGS
from

denial

on

my

of

Rule

motion
35

done /V-~~4,

( for

Also seeking appointment of counsel.

whom.

an

illegal

[See AFFIDAVIT

IN SUPPORT attached hereto].
GROUNDS FOR RELIEF OR THEORY OF LAW TO BE PRESENTED WITHIN
THE MEMORANDUM & SUPPORTING AFFIDAVIT
In

this

jurisdiction

to

particular

case

try my alleged

where

the

of fens~, having

court
took

lacked
place

on

an Indian Reservation and subject to Federal Law (Indian Major
Crimes Act) •

EMERGENCY PROCEEDINGS.

000072

1

There could not be a legal (nore] constitutional judgment
&

conviction as a result of that substantive error.
Therefore,

defendant
of

is

such

the

resultant

illegal

and

deprivation

conformance

with

Idaho

punishment

endured
The

unconstitutional.

requires

very

this
nature

proceedings

expedited

Constitution

by

Article

1

§18.

in

(justice

to be speedily administered).
RE: NOTICE OF HEARING.
I also ask the court to notice up a hearing on my motion
(to reconsider and for expedited proceedings).
RE: ORDER TO TRANSPORT & APPOINTING COUNSEL.
Because I am not allowed to possess requisite form orders
to transport inmates from the prison, due to security reasons.
I am otherwise unable to complete the notice requirements
in order to be heard.
I therefore ask this court to issue an order for transport
and granting me counsel with whom I may consult prior to

the

hearing on this matter.
Noting

that

I

have

never

waived

counsel

at

any

stage

of these proceedings.
RE: OBJECTION TO DENIAL OF ACCESS TO COURTS.
The

defendant

herein

does

set

NOTICE

OF

ERROR

and

OBJECTION to the courts prolonging of this inevitable procedure
(see

accompanying

notice

& objection)

to

quash

the

State

judgment and conviction in this case.

2

EMERGENCY PROCEEDINGS.

0UOU73

RE:

PREJUDICE.
I

I

am

prejudice by incarceration in

am denied access

to maps

necessary to

the I .D. o. C.

because

prove discovery

that

the acts alleged within the crime alleged happened within the
Indian

reservation

and

are

subject

I

request

this

soley

to

Federal

Jurisdiction.
RELIEF
calendar

and

SOUGHT:

schedule my

case

that could be made available.

for

the

court
very

to
next

adjust

its

motions

day

Also order the State to Notice

up the Hearing and Order Transport as I cannot do so.
DONE this

?

day of

7..d,

2005.

I

-CERTIFICATE OF MAILINGI 4,,,~?P"~,

do hereby certify deli very of this document

to all parties by placing same into hands of prison staff form
mailing

via

U.S.

Postal

Service

1st class

pre-paid

this

Z..-

BY ME,

3

EMERGENCY PROCEEDINGS.

0000 ·, t
"'1'

V../Lf-P
~
BOX 70010 ~
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83707

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL
DISTRICT, IN AND FOR IDAHO COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO

* * * * *
)
)

Petitioner.

Case

No./E'A, 50

)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

-Vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF EMERGENCY/EXPEDITED
PROCEEDINGS

Respondent,
________________

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT

The

following

issues of

fact

and

law are

presented

in

favor of the Defendant/Movant obtaining not only
expedited/emergency

proceedings

but,

also

towards

obtaining

relief via., I.C.R. 35, or 47.

1

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT.

0 0 0 O')~

-STATEMENT OF THE CASEA charge of murder in the first degree was filed by the
Idaho

County,

Idaho,

State

prosecutor

from

the

February

20,

1982, shooting of an Indian on Indian Lands.
The State prosecutor never obtained permission or waiver
from

the

Nez

Perce

tribal

authority

at

any

The

time.

State

in fact keeps this defendant from federal authorities.
The

State

in

fact

keeps

this

defendant

from

federal

authorities.
The

State

convicted,
an

commits

sentenced and

offense

solely

under

reversible
then

error

imposed

exclusive

an

when

it

illegal

federal

charged,

sentence

jurisdiction

of

via.,

the "INDIAN MAJOR CRIMES ACT".
On

about

the

end of

2004

a

paralegal

friend

asked

the

defendant if he knew whether or not his offense occurred inside
an

Indian

reservation

and

hence

under

exclusive

federal

jurisdiction.
The
any

defendant

sought

corroberative

proof

incarceration.

The

to

obtain

needed

State prison

a
to

map

of

show

the
his

perpetually forbids

area,

or

illegal
him

from

doing so, and hence precludes discovery.

2

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT.

0 Up O0·1' ·.L

I am now filing for relief from an illegal sentence and
the court ommitts to act.

I am claiming false imprisonment

occurs once the State prosecution becomes aware of the taint
and fails to act.

Every day hence is an aggravating factor

denying me a quick and speedy trial in the federal court thereby
circumventing justice illegally.
-STATEMENT OF FACTSThe offense

I

am

tried

and

convicted

of

by

the

State

court was done in fundamental error because the federal court .
has

exclusive

in Stites,
lands,

jurisdiction

Idaho County,

involving

an

of

all

"MAJOR

CRIMES"

Idaho

(Nez

Perce)

Indian Reservation

Indian

[See

protectorate.

committed

AFFIDAVIT

IN

SUPPORT accompanying here with]
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF EXPEDITED PROCEEDINGS
I

µ.?~

?'/~

do

hereby

plead

my

case

for

"Exigence"

[/egzejens/] requiring expedited proceedings.
State of being urgent or exigent; pressing
need or demand; a case requires immediate
attention, assistance, or remedy; critical
period or condition, pressing necessity. 11
[State v. Rubion, Tex.Civ.App., 292 S.W.2d
650, 657]
11

"a sudden an unexpected happening or an
unforeseen; occurance or condition requires
immediate remedy".
[Los Angeles County
v. Payne, 8 Cal.2d 563, 66 P.2d 658, 663)
Exigent

circumstances

exist

in

this

situation

which

demands unusual or immediate action.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT.

3

RE:

UNLAWFULNESS OF JUDGMENT & CONVICTION.

1.

The conviction is

against

federal

code

via.,

the

Indian

Maj or Crimes Act" and I am wrongfully incarcerated as a result
of

said

illegal

State & Federal
&

incarceration.
due process

I.Const.Art.1§13]

I

Such

clauses

prejudice
[U.S.

violates

Amend.

the

5th & 14th

have been denied my freedom based upon

sham jurisdiction unlawfully.
RE:

MY QUICK
The

&

SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHTS:

presuption

is

that

county

officers

Federal prosecutors and informed them that
Law

back

in

1982.

It

is

further

I

contacted

the

violated Federal

presumed

that

tribal

authorities never held a timely hearing nor waived jurisdiction.
The
( or

right

tribal

of

review)

this
is

defendant/ accused
guaranteed

by

the

to

a

sixth

speedy

trial

amendment

of

the constitution and such right is implemented by 18 u.s.c.A.
§3161 et seq., and Fed.R.Crim.P. 50

In my case the State courts

have interfered with that speedy trial right.
The case of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 s.ct. 2182,
33

L.Ed.2d

101,

lists

four

factors

to

be

considered

in

determining whether delay was unreasonable:
A. Lenght of Delay.

Here it's been over twenty' yea:r;_~,t~_::,_ _ _ __

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT.

4
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B.

Governments Justification for the Delay.

Due to an illegal

unconstitutional State court conviction, done absent authority
to actl
C. Prejudice Caused By The Delay.
innocent!

Witnesses

that

would

might well be dead by now.

I at all
have

times have plead

testified

in

my

favor

Surely they' 11 be impossible to

find!

All due

to lengthened

pretrial
I

investigatory state if you will.
quick

RE:

&

incarceration!

Call

it

am still being denied a

speedy federal court redress.

STATE COURT INFRINGEMENT ON THE

In federal

courts,

11

SPEEDY TRIAL ACT".

the Federal Act

of 1974

establishes

a set of time limits for carrying out the major events
information,

indictment,

arraignment)

my federal criminal case.

The precursers

in

the

[18 u.s.c.A §3161

to filing pleadings

(e.g.

prosecution

of

et seq.,]

charging me in

homicide are subject to the Federal Act of 1974.

this

State court

actions outside of state court jurisdiction are extra-judicial
in nature.

5

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT.

Uu. oo· .i.., ,._.
t,.

1

RE:

PRE-INDICTMENT INCARCERATION CREATES PREJUDICE.
Such prejudice is not confined to

merely an

impairment

the defense but includes any threat to what has been termed
an

accused's

financial,

significant

in

the

stakes,

prompt

psychological,

termination

may ultimately deprive me of life,

of

a

physical

and

proceeding

which

liberty or property.

[See

U.S. v. Dreyer, C.A.N.J., 533 F.2d 112, 115)
Prejudice is presumed in cases of extended incarceration
imposed prior to trial or a preliminary proceeding!
a conclusive presumption exists.

[People v.

I

declare

Sellers, 3 Dept.,

109 A.D.2d 387, 492 N.Y.S.2d 127, 128.]
A

substantive

incarceration

extends

rule

of

law

exists

beyond

two

decades,

where

post

without

a

arrest
proper

(Federal) charge being leveled!
I am prejudice in my ability to proceed and defend.
STATE COURTS KNOWINGLY PROCEED ABSENT
JURISDICTION, EVEN AFTER NOTICED
I

told the trial court of the error on _-_-04,

my rule 35 application (for an illegal sentence).

within

That court

and County prosecutor continue to error by ommiting to act.
Since my present sentence provides for a life term until
the day I die!

I hereby declare:

The State conviction of an offense subject to
federal

jurisdiction

via.,

the

"INDIAN

MAJOR

exclusive

CRIMES

ACT".

6

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT.

OUUO~G

'

.
The

perpetual

punishment.

life

term now

in

place

is

cruel

and

unusual

It must be void.
CONCLUSION

I am prejudiced by the inordinate delay of federal court
process.
Therefore,

Such

prejudice

is

presumed

as

a

matter

of

law.

my circumstances require expedited proceedings and

the State really must vacate my judgment.
DONE this

;;' day of February, 2005.

DEFENDANT/MOVANT

-CERTIFICATE OF MAILINGI # ~ ~ d o hereby certify delivery of this document
to all parties by placing same into hands of prison staff form
mailing via U.S.

Postal Service

1st class

pre-paid this

£-.

~,r _P.$' date.
BY ME,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT.
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~~/4?&,
BOX 70010
~

BOISE, ID.

FEB 11 2005

83707

.!

ROSE E. GEHRING
~~~CTCOURT

1/~~"3JY\

DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL
DISTRICT, IN AND FOR IDAHO COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO

* * * * *
)

Case No.

)
)
)
)
)

Petitioner.
-Vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,

/f

l '5 U·

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT
OF EMERGENCY/EXPEDITED
PROCEEDINGS

)
)
)

________________
Respondent,

STATE OF IDAHO

)

COUNTY OF ADA

)

)

) SS:

I/4:t;zL,«~~am the affiant herein whom swears that
the following information is true and correct to the · bes:!: of
my knowledge

&

understanding,

under

penalty

of

purj ery,

as

follows;
1/.

THAT

my

full

name

is

h.~£,

and

I

am

the

defendant/movant/affiant herein captioned.
2/.

THAT on about February 20,

homicide

offense

culminating at

1982,
the

I

was

property

arrested for
of

the

a

Silver

Dollar Bar, in Stites, Idaho County, Idaho, which I'm alleging
is on Indian Tribal Lands.

1

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT.

ooooq,:-:

V/i...

/

3/.

THAT the State of

Idaho did

wrongfully proceed

against

me to trial, conviction & sentenced me for a fixed life without
parole in the Idaho Department of Corrections (IDOC hereafter).
4/.

THAT

homicide

trial

&

committed

appellate
on

the

counsel

never

reservation

is

jurisdiction of the federal government via.,

told

me

under

that

a

exclusive

the "Indian Maj or

Crimes Act".
5 I.
lack

THAT trial counsel never moved to dismiss the charge for
of

jurisdiction

because

they

suffered

from

a

relevant

mis-understanding of the law/fact.
6 I.

THAT after sentence imposed I

have been held in custody

of the IDOC out of State and in State under contract with a
private company.
7 I.

THAT I

cannot get my hands on maps to show that Stites

Idaho is on the reservation (a necessary precurser to preclude
State jurisdiction).

The IDOC simply prohibits access to maps

period.
8/.
of

THAT I require counsel be appointed for the sole purpose
discovery

of

such

maps

establishing

boundaries

of

the

reservation.
9/.

THAT I also seek judicial notice of the following facts.
A.

The alleged offense of 2-20-82,

involved an

Indian

(alleged victim); &
B.

It allegedly happened on reservation lands;

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT.

&

2

oouo:;:

C.

It

was

subject

to

the

exclusive

federal

court

jurisdiction via., "Indian Major Crimes Act".
D.

That

the

State

court

& conviction

judgment

are

therefore extra judicial & must be vacated!
E.

That

I

fall

under

a

discovery

exception

negating

any limitations in the bringing of this matter now!
1 0 /.

THAT the

court must

EXPEDITE the

proceedings

and

take

an EMERGENCY hearing as soon as is possible in order to preclude
further

prejudice

to

the

defendants

ability

to

proceed

to

federal trial and defend.
FURTHER SAYETH AFFIANT NAUGHT this

..£_

day of February,

2005.

DEFENDANT/MOVANT/
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

?r4 day of

February

2005.

JANEL GARDNER
Notary Public
State Of Idaho

~~.~~~~
CERTIFICATE OF MAILINGI

------'

do hereby certify delivery of this document

to all parties by placing same into hands of prison staff form
mailing via

U.S.

Postal Service

1st class

pre-paid this

date.
BY ME, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
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BY.

(?
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OROFINO, IDAHO

1N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO
WILLIAM WOLFE,
Petitioner.

)
)
)
)

vs.

)
)

STATE OF IDAHO,

)

Respondent.

CASE NO. CR 18290
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

)
)

This case comes before me on William Wolfe's Petition for Post Conviction
Relief.
Facts

Jn 1982 an Idaho County jury convicted William Wolfe of murdering Scott Gold
at Stites, which is situated within the reservation of the Nez Perce Tribe. See, Appendix
1. He was sentenced by Judge George Reinhardt August 5, 1982 to a fixed term oflife
imprisonment. Mr. Wolfe appealed. The conviction and sentence were affirmed in

November 1984.
On December 2, 2004, Mr. Wolfe filed a Motion for Rule 35 Relief fro1n an
Illegal Sentence and Memorandum and Affidavit in Support. He claimed his conviction

was unlawful because the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the
murder of an Indian within the boun,daries of the reservation. In an order signed
December 14, 2004, I summarily dismissed the motion as untimely. I did not reach the
merits of:Mr. Wolfe's claim at that time.

000085

.a.T.

On December 27, 2004, Mr. Wolfe filed a motion to reconsider my order. On
Februa:ry 11 1 2005 Mr. Wolfe filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief with an
accompanying affidavit and memorandum.
Contentions
Mr. Wolfe contends that because his victim, Mr. Gold, was an enrolled member
of the Nez Perce Tribe and the crime occurred at Stites, which is within the boundaries of

the Nez Perce Indian Reservation, the district court lacked jurisdiction to try him for
murder. He asserts that the Indian Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153, grants the
federal government exclusive jurisdiction over his offense.
Discussion
Indian Country is defined in part as "all land within the limits of any Indjan
reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States government notwithstanding the
issuance of any patent, and , including rights-of-way running through the reservation."
18 USC§ 1151.

Jurisdiction in fudian Country depends on the nature of the offense and status of
the offender and the victim. Jurisdiction over crimes between non-Indians in Indian
coontry is vested in the state courts, which is known as the McBratney Rule. United

States v. McBratney 104 U.S. 621 (1881). Mr. Gold was an enrolled member of the Nez
Perce Tribe. What courts have jurisdiction over crimes by non-Indians against Indians in
Indian Countzy is the question Mr. Wolfe's petition presents.
As a general proposition crimes by Indians against Indians or their property in
Indian country is within the jurisdiction of the tribal courts. The exception to that general

rule is the Indian Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153, which enumerates fourteen crimes

UU0086

over which the federal courts are vested exclusive jurisdiction. United States v. Johnson
637 F2d 1224.1231 (9 th Cir. 1980).

The acts .read as follows:

Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general laws of the United
States as to the punishment of offenses committed in any place within the sole and
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, except the District of Col'Umbia1 shall
extend to the Indian country. This section shall not extend to offenses committed
by one Indian against the person or property of another Indian, nor to any Indian

committing any offense in the Indian country who has been punished by the local
law of the tribe, or to any case where, by treaty stipulations, the exclusive
jurisdiction over such offenses is or may be secured to the Indian tribes
respectively.
The Supreme Court described the Act as a '"carefully limited intrusion of federal
power into the otherwise exclusive jurisdiction of the Indian tribes to punish Indians for
crimes committed on fudian land." United States v. Wheeler 43J U.S. 313, 325 n. 22.
This Act was originally passed in 1817 to fill jurisdictional gaps in Indian
territory. It has been applied more recently to exclude state court jurisdiction when a
crime occurs in Indian country and an Indian is involved. Williams v. United States, 327
U.S. 711 (1946) (federal court not Arizona court had exclusive jurisdiction over crime
committed by non-Indian against an Indian in Indian country).
State jurisdiction over Indians an.d Indian country was expanded in 1953 with the
passage of Public Law 280. Pub. L. No. 280, § 7, 67 Stat. 588 (1953). Public Law 280
conferred exclusive state jurisdiction over fudians and Indian CoUJltry in six states and

granted other states, including Idaho, permission to assume jurisdiction over Indian

o·u"
0 n r.
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1
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affairs by affirmative legislative action. Id. The statute was amended in 1968 with the
passage of the Indian Civil Rights Act which added the requirement of tribal consent
before a state can assume jurisdiction. 25 U.S.C. § 1321.
In 1963, pursuant to Public Law 280, Idaho enacted I.C. § 67-5101, assuming

limited jurisdiction over Indians and Indian country.
67-5101 State jurisdiction for civil and criminal enforcement concerning
certain matters arising in Indian country.

The state ofldaho, in accordance with the provisions of 67 Statutes at Large, page
589 (Public Law 280) hereby assumes and accepts jurisdiction for the civil and
criminal enforcement of state laws and regulations concerning the following
matters and purposes arising in Indian country located within this state, as Indian
country is defined by title 18 1 United States Code 1151, and obligates and binds
this state to the assumption thereof:
A. Compulsory school attendance

B. Juvenile delinquency and youth rehabilitation
C. Dependent, neglected and abused children

D. Insanities and mental illness
E. Public assistance
F. Domestic relations
G. Operation and management of motor vehicles upon highways and roads
maintained by the county or state, or political subdivisions thereof.
I.C. 67-5101 clearly did not confer general criminal jurisdiction or jurisdiction in

particular over homicide to the state courts. In State v. Matthews, 133 Idaho 300 (1999),

() ".
-un u!· f'!u 0 0~

the Idaho Supreme Court found that state court jurisdiction and the execution of a state
court search warrant on the reservation were proper in a murder case where both the

defendant and victim were Indians but the crime occurred off of the reservation in
Lewiston. However, the court stated in dictum that "It is noteworthy that the State of
Idaho, under I.C. § 67-5101, did not assume jurisdiction over murder crimes or the

execution of state court search warrants within Indian country." Matthews, 133 Idaho at
311.
There appears to be little doubt that the federal courts had exclusive jurisdiction
over Mr. Wolfe's offense. "Crime in which the victim, but not the perpetrator, is Indian
are subject to (a) federal jurisdiction under§ 1152, as well as pursuant to federal criminal

law of general applicability, and (b) state jurisdiction where authorized by Congress."

United States v. Bruce, 394 F3d 1215, 1222 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Johnson, 637
F2d 1224, 1232 n. 11; see, Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 698, 699 (1990). Unlike some
states, where jurisdiction over all offenses involving Indians was either granted or
assumed, Pub. L. No. 280, § 7, Idaho limited its jurisdiction to the offenses itemized in
IC.§ 67~5101. Murder is not included.

Mr. Wolfe's argument that the State did not have jurisdiction to convict h:im of
murder has merit under 18 U.S.C. § 1152. Settjng aside a conviction for first-degree
murder is serious business and should not be lightly undertaken. As a :result I want this
issue to be fully briefed and argued before I make a decision. I, therefore, am going to
require the State and request the Nez Perce Tribe to submit briefs on this issue.

I
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Order
The State is ordered and the Nez Perce Tribe is requested to file briefs within
forty-five (45) days of today's date addressing whether or not the Idaho district court has
jurisdiction over Mr. Wolfe, a non-Indian defendant, who murdered an Indian victim,
Scott Gold, an enrolled member of the Nez Perce Tribe, in Indian Country. Mr. Wolfe
will then have twenty-one (21) days to file a reply brief. Oral argument will follow.
It is so Ordered this

7-

day of May, 2005.
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P.O. Box 70010
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Kirk MacGregor
Idaho County Prosecutor,
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Daren Fales
Public Defender,
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Nez Perce Tribe
Office of Legal Counsel
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PROSECUTING ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
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DEPUTY

KIRKA. MACGREGOR· PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
DENNIS ALBERS • DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY

5
6

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO

7
8
9

)

WILLIAM WOLFE,
10
Petitioner,
11
12
vs.

13
14

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

15

)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR 18290
PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT
OF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR

16
COMES NOW, Kirk A. MacGregor, the Idaho County Prosecuting Attorney and petitions the

17
court, pursuant to Idaho Code Section 31-2603(a), for the appointment of a special prosecutor to
18
prosecute the above-entitled and numbered matter.
19
A Memorandum Decision and Order regarding a Post Conviction Relief filed by WILLIAM
20
WOLFE has been forwarded to the Idaho County Prosecuting Attorney's Office. Upon review of the
21
same, the Idaho County Prosecuting Attorney believes there is a conflict of interest in its prosecution

22
of this case due to the Idaho County Prosecutor being a member in the firm ofW. C. MacGregor, Jr.
23
who has represented the Petitioner in a prior post conviction case and, therefore, has confidential
24
information on the said Petitioner which was gathered during his representation of the said William
25

Wolfe.
26

27
28

PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT
OF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR - 1

oooos:

//

. 1

The Idaho County Prosecuting Attorney requests that the Court appoint a special prosecutor

2

within Idaho County to prosecute this matter and make all prosecutorial decisions regarding this case.

3

DATED this / / day of May, 2005.

4
A. MacGREGOR, ISB #3880
I aho County Prosecuting Attorney

5
6
7
8
9

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
10
11
12

The undersigned hereby certifies that a true
and correct c.opy of the foregoing document
was served upon the following pers7(s) in the
day
manner indicated below on the /,
of May, 2005:

13
14
15

Daren W. Fales
204 West North 2nd
Grangeville, ID 83530

U.S. Mail, First Class, Postage Prepaid
Courthouse Tray
Hand Delivered
Via Facsimile

_x_

16
17
18
19
20

21

22
23

24
25

26

27
28

PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT
OF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR - 2
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND ruDICIAL D.ISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO
WITLIAM WOLFE,
Petitioner,
vs.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CR 18290

.lVIEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

)

This case comes before me on William Wolfe's Petition for Post Conviction
Relief.
Facts
Jn.1982 an Idaho County jury convicted William Wolfe of murdering Scott Gold
at Stites, which is situated within the reservation of the Nez Perce Tribe.

See, Appendix

1. He was sentenced by Judge George Reinhardt August 5, 1982 to a fixed term oflife
imprisonment. Mr. Wolfe appealed. The conviction and sentence were affirmed in

November 1984.
On December 2, 2004, Mr. Wolfe filed a Motion for Rule 35 Relief from an

Illegal Sentence and Memorandum and Affidavit in Support. He claimed his conviction

was unlawful because the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the
murder of an Indian within the boundaries of the reservation. In an order signed ·
December 14, 2004, I summarily dismissed the m.otion as untimely. I did not reach tlle

merits ofMr. Wolfe's olaim at that time.
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On December 27, 2004, Mr. Wolfe filed a motion to reconsider my order. On
February 11, 2005 Mr. Wolfe filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief with an
accompanying affidavit and memorandum.
Contentions
Mr. Wolfe contends that because his victim, Mr. Gold, was an enrolled member

of the Nez Perce Tribe and the crime occurred at Stites, which is within the boundaries of
the Nez Perce Indian Reservation, the district court lacked jurisdiction to try him for
murder. He asserts that the Indian Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153, grants the
federal government exclusive jurisdiction over his offense.
Discussion
Indian Country is defined in part as "all land within the limits of any Indjan
reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States government notwithstanding the
issuance of any patent, and , including rights-of-way running through the reservation.''

1s use § 11s1.
Jurisdiction in Indian Country depends on the nature of th.e offense and status of
the offender and the victim. Jurisdiction over crimes between non-Indians in Indian
country is vested in the state courts, which is knoVV'.Il as the McBratney RuJe. United

States v. McBratney 104 U.S. 621 (1881). Mr. Gold was an enrolled member of the Nez
Perce Tribe. What courts have jurisdiction over crimes by non-Indians against Indians in
Indian Country is the question Mr. Wolfe's petition presents.
As a general proposition crimes by Indians against Indians or their property in

Indian country is within the jurisdiction of the tribal courts. The exception to that general
rule is the Indian Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153, which enumerates fourteen crimes

OUUU9c
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over which the federal courts are vested exclusive jurisdiction. United States v. Johnson
637 F2d 1224.1231 (9 th Cir. 1980).

The acts read as follows:

Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general laws of the United
States as to the punishment of offenses committed in any place within the sole and
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, except the District of Columbia, shall
extend to the Indian country. This section shall not extend to offenses committed
by one Indian against the person or property of another Indian, nor to any Indian

committing any offense in the Indian country who has been punished by the local
law of the tribe, or to any case where, by treaty stipulations, the exclusive
jurisdiction over such offenses is or may be secured to the Indian tribes
respectively.
The Supreme Court described the Act as a "carefully limited intrusion of federal
power in.to the otheiwise exclusive jurisdiction of the Indian tribes to punish fudians for
crimes committed on Indian land.", United States v. Wheeler 43J U.S. 313, 325 n. 22.
This Act was originally passed in 1817 to fill jurisdictional gaps :in Indian
territory. It has been applied more recently to exclude state court jurisdiction when a
crime occurs in Indian country and an Indian is involved. Williams v. United States, 327
U.S. 711 (1946) (federal court not Arizona court had exclusive jurisdiction over crime
committed by non-Indian against an Indian in Indian country).
State jurisdiction over Indians an.d Indian country was expanded in 1953 with the
passage of Public Law 280. Pub. L. No. 280, § 7, 67 Stat. 588 {1953). Public Law 280
conferred exclusive state jurisdiction over Indians and Indian Country in six states and

granted other states, including Idaho, permission to assume jurisdiction over Indian

/'

affairs by affirmative legislative action. Id. The statute was amended in 1968 with the
passage of the Indian Civil Rights Act which added the requirement of tribal consent
before a state can assume jurisdiction. 25 U.S.C. § 1321.
In 1963, pursuant to Public Law 280, Idaho enacted I.C. § 67-5101, assuming

limited jurisdiction over Indians and Indian country.
67-5101 State jurisdiction for civil and criminal enforcement concerning
certain matters arising in Indian country.

The state of Idaho, in accordance with the provisions of 67 Statutes at Large, page
589 (Public Law 280) hereby assumes and accepts jurisdiction for the civil and
criminal enforcement of state laws and regulations concerning the following
matters and purposes arising in Indian country located within this state, as Indian
country is de.tined by title 18, United States Code 1151, and obligates and binds
this state to the assumption thereof;
A. Compulsory school attendance
B. Juvenile delinquency and youth rehabilitation
C. Dependent, neglected and abused children
D. Insanities and mental illness
E. Public assistance
F. Domestic relations

G. Operation and management of motor vehicles upon highways and roads
maintained by the county or state, or political subdivisions thereof.

r.c. 67-5101 clearly did not confer general criminal jurisdiction or jurisdiction in
particular over homicide to the state courts. In State v. Matthews, 133 Idaho 300 (1999),

--

/

the Idaho Supreme Court found that state court jurisdiction and the execution of a state
court search warrant on tb.e reservation were proper in a murder case where both the
defendant and victim were Indians but the crime occurred off of the reservation in
Lewiston. However, the court stated in dictum that "It is noteworthy that the State of
Idaho, under I.C. § 67-5101, did not assume jurisdiction over murder crimes or the
execution of state court search warrants within Indian country." Matthews, 133 Idaho at
311.

There appears to be little doubt that the federal courts had exclusive jurisdiction
over Mr. Wolfe's offense. "Crime in which the victim, but not the perpetrator, is Indian
are subject to (a) federal jurisdiction llllder § 1152, as well as pursuant to federal criminal

law of general applicability, and (b) state jurisdiction where authorized by Congress."
United States v. Bruce, 394 F3d 1215, 1222 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Johnson, 637
F2d 1224, 1232 n. 11; see, Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 698, 699 (1990). Unlike some

states, where jurisdiction over all offenses involving Indians was either granted or
assumed, Pub. L. No. 280, § 7, Idaho limited its jurisdiction to the offenses itemized jn
LC.§ 67~5101. Murder is not included.

Mr. Wolfe's argument that the State did not have jurisdiction to convict him of
murder has merit under 18 U.S.C. § 1152. Setting aside a conviction for first-degree
murder is serious business and should not be lightly undertaken. As a result I want this
issue to be fully briefed and argued before I make a decision. I, therefore, am going to
require the State and request the Nez Perce Tribe to submit briefs on this issue.

141007

Order
The State is ordered and the Nez Perce Tribe is requested to file briefs within
forty-five (45) days of today's date addressing whether or not the Idaho district court has

jurisdiction over Mr. Wolfe, a non-Indian defendant, who murdered an Indian victim,
Scott Gold, an enrolled member of the Nez Perce Tribe, in Indian Country. Mr. Wolfe
will then have twenty-one (21) days to file a reply brief. Oral argument will follow.
It is so Ordered this

7-

day of May, 2005.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify t.bat a true copy of the foregoing :tvIEMORANDUM AND
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William Wolfe
Inmate# 18593
ICCH211B
P.O. Box 70010
Boise, ID 83707
Kirk MacGregor
Idaho County Prosecutor,
Delivered to tray

Daren Fales
Public Defender,
Delivered to tray
Nez Perce Tribe
Office of Legal Counsel
P.O.Box305
Lapwai, ID 83540-0305

Clerk ofthe District Court
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KIRK A. MACGREGOR • PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
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DENNIS

L.

ALBERS • DEPUTY PROSECUTING A1TORNEY

5
6
7

8

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

9

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO

10
11

12

WILLIAM WOLFE,
Petioner,

13

14

vs.

15
STATE OF IDAHO,

16
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR 18290
ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT
OF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR

17
18

The Idaho County Prosecuting Attorney's Office has, pursuant to Idaho Code Section 31-

19

2603, (a) filed a petition seeking appointment of a special prosecutor to continue the prosecution

20

of the above-entitled and numbered matter and related matters.

21

Upon considering the petition:

22

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that Jeff Payne, be appointed as Special Prosecutor in the

23

above-entitled and numbered case and related matters, in that he is a suitable person to perform the

24
25

26

27
28

ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT
OF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR - 1
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1 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2
3
4

The undersigned hereby certifies that a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document
was served upon the following person(s) in the
manner indicated below on the \ Q.\\IL day
of May, 2005:

5
6

Jeff P. Payne
114 South Idaho Avenue
Grangeville, ID 83530

U.S. Mail, First Class, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered -.J:::::::::"Courthouse Tray
Via Facsimile

Daren Fales
204 West North Street
Grangeville, ID 83530

U.S. Mail, First Class, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered v- Courthouse Tray
Via Facsimile

Kirk A. MacGregor
Idaho County Prosecuting Attorney
PO Box463
Grangeville, ID 83530

U.S. Mail, First Class, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered _::::.. Courthouse Tray
Via Facsimile

7
8
9

10
11
12

ROSE GEHRING,
Idaho County District Court Clerk

13

14
By:
15
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16

17
18
19

20

21
22
23

24
25
26

27
28

ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT
OF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR - 2
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FILED
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OF

JN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF

!DAHO

--- ·-w·---------------~--------)
)

)

WILLIAM F. WOLFE

)
)

Plaintiff,

vs.

CASE: NO. CV 05-36455
ORDER

)

STATE OF IDAHO
Defendant.

)

)
)

Petitioner William Wolfe p~~titions and supporting documents seeking relief from
his conviction for first degree murder should have bean filed separately as a civil case
for rellaf und~r Rule 35 or for post eonviction relief as the fapts and law warrant. Copies

of those pf eadings shall be fiied in Case No. 18290 and the original pleadings .shall he
filed in the clvll case.
Jeff Payne is appointed as special prosecutor and Daren Pales is appointed as

public defender in the civil case.

It is so ordered this

~1 _ day of May 2005
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Mailing Certificate
l, the undersigned Deputy Clerk, do hereby certify that I mailed or delivered a copy
of the foregoing document to the following persons en _6, ~ ,~ ·

Jeff Paynei delivered to tray
Daren Fales, daflvered to tray
William Wolfe
Inmate #18593
ICC H21118

P.O. Box: 70010

Boise, 10 83707
ROSE E. GEHRING, CL.ERK
BY:~~

KathyJoson
Deputy Clerk
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IDAHO COUNTY
PROSECUTING A TI0RNEY'S OFFICE
POBOX463
41 6 WEST MAIN
GRANGEVILLE, ID 83530
PHONE: (208) 983-01 66
FAX: (208) 983-391 9

2

3
4

KIRK A. MACGREGOR • PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
DENNIS L. ALBERS • DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY

5

6

7

8
9

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO

10
STATE OF IDAHO,
11

Plaintiff,
12
VS.

13
14

15
16
17
18
19
20

WILLI.AM: DANIEL RITTEL,
Defendant.

Co [} <"

)
)
)

Case No.

)

CRJMINAL COMPLAINT

Q\

'
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)
)
)
)
)

)

PERSONALLY APPEARED before me this

·/c;.t...

day o f ~ 0 0 5 , Idaho County

Prosecuting Attorney, KIRK A. MacGREGOR, who being duly sworn, on oath, complains arid says:
On or about December 18, 2005, in the County of Idaho, State of Idaho, the crime of

V..A 'YHEM, a felony; was comJ.nitted by the above-na.i."l'led defendant, as follows:

22

That the Defendant, on or about the 18th day of December, 2005, in Stites, County o~
Idaho, State ofidaho, did unlawfully and maliciously bite off a portion of the ear of
JARROD CARTER, a human being, permanently disfiguring the said JARROD
CARTER, a felony in violation- of Idaho Code Section 18-5001.

23

contrary to the form, force and effect of the statute. in such case made and provided, and against the

24

peace and dignity of the State ofldaho, and this Complainant, upon oath, accuses the said defendant

25

of having committed such crimes and prays that he · e dealt with according to law.

21

26
KIRK A. MacGREGOR, ISB#3880
Idaho County Prosecuting Attorney
Complain!lnt

27

28
CRIMINAL COMPLAINT - 1

''/3

;'I

1
2

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me t h i s ~ day of December, 2005.

4
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JUDGE
/

5
6
7

8 .

9
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11
12
13

14
15
16
17

18

19
20
21
22

23
24
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26
27

28
CRIMINAL COMPLAINT - 2
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! hereby certify that the following named individual is listed on the officia! records of this ofiice:

GOLD.

SCOTT RICHARD
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U.S. District Court
District of Idaho (LIVE Database)Version 3.0.5 (Moscow)
CRIMINAL DOCKET FOR CASE#: 3:06-cr-00150-EJL All Defendants
Internal Use. Only

Date Filed: 07/18/2006
Date Terminated: 10/12/2006

Case title: USA v. Rittel

Assigned to: Honorable Edward J. Lodge
Defendant
William D Rittel (1)
TERMINATED: 10/12/2006

represented by James Edward Siebe
SIEBE LAW OFFICES
PO Box 9045
Moscow, ID 83843 ·
(208) 883-0622
Fax: 1-208-882-8769
Email: jsiebe@moscow.com
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORJvEY TO BE NOTICED
Designation: CJA Appointment

Kathleen Moran
· FEDERAL DEFENDER'S OFFICE
10 N Post St #700
Spokane, WA 99210
(509) 624-7606
Fax: 1-509-747-3539
Email: kailey_ moran@fd.org
TERMINATED: 08/21/2006
LEAD ATTORNEY
Designation: CJA Appointment

Disposition

Pending Counts
None

Highest Offense Level (Opening)
None
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Terminated Counts
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Not Guilty

Highest Offense Level (Terminated)
Felony

Complaints

Disposition

None

Plaintiff
represented by Joshua B. Taylor
United States Attorney's Office
205 N. 4th Street
Room306
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 814
(208) 667-6568
Fax: (208) 667-0814
Email: josh.taylor@ag.idaho.gov
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
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Date Filed
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#

Docket Text

07/18/2006

~I INDICTMENT (Notice sent to USP & USM) as to William D Rittel (1)
count(s) 1. (Attachments:# l Cover Sheet# 'J_ Foreperson's signature) Ga,)
(Entered: 07/20/2006)

07/20/2006

Q2 *SEALED* Arrest Warrant Issued in case as to William D Rittel. (Notice
sent to USM) Ga, )

08/04/2006

~3 MOTION to Quash WARRANT AND ISSUE SUMMONS by USA as to
William D Rittel. (Taylor, Joshua)

08/04/2006

Q4 ORDER granting J_ Motion to Quash warrant and to issue summons (Notice
sent to USM) as to William D Rittel (1). Signed by Judge Edward J. Lodge.
(caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on
the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by dks, )

08/04/2006

Q5 Summons Issued in case as to William D Rittel Arraignment/Initial
Appearance set for 8/14/2006 03:30 PM in Moscow, ID before Honorable
Larry M. Boyle. (dks, )

08/08/2006

Q6 Arrest Warrant Returned Unexecuted in case as to William D Rittel. (wm,)
(Entered: 08/09/2006)
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08/14/2006

Q7 Minute Entry for proceeding$ held before Judge Larry M. Boyle
:Arraignment as to William D Rittel (1) Count 1 held on 8/14/2006 Plea
entered Not Guilty (Notice sent to USP & USM), Initial Appearance held on
8/14/2006 Plea entered Not Guilty (Notice sent to USP & USM) Jury Trial
set for 10/10/2006 09:30 AM in Coeur d Alene, ID before Honorable
Edward J. Lodge. (Court Reporter Nar1cy Persinger.) (le,) (Entered:
08/15/2006)

08/14/2006

(lg CJA 23 Financial Affidavit by William D Rittel (elks,) (Entered:
08/15/2006)

08/14/2006

(;)9 PROCEDURAL ORDER as to William D Rittel . Signed by Judge Larry M.

Boyle. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses
listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by dks,) (Entered:
08/15/2006)
08/14/2006
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~10
- ORDER Setting Conditions of Release as to William D Rittel (1) PR (Notice
sent to USP & USM) . Signed by Judge Larry M. Boyle. (caused to be
mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of
Electronic Filing (NEF) by dks, ) (Entered: 08/15/2006)

08/14/2006

(Court only) Terminate Deadlines and Hearings as to William D Rittel: arr
held 8/14/06 Ga) (Entered: 08/16/2006)

08/14/2006

(Court only) ***Procedural Interval start P2 8/14/06 as to William D Rittel
Ga, ) (Entered: 08/16/2006)

08/16/2006

@11 RESPONSE by USA as to dft William D Rittel GOVERNMENT'S
DISCOVERY RESPONSE (Taylor, Joshua)

08/16/2006

@12 MOTION for Discovery GOVERNMENT'S DISCOVERY REQUEST by
USA as to William D Rittel. (Taylor, Joshua)

08/16/2006

@13

08/17/2006

@14 RESPONSE by USA as to dft William D Rittel GOVERNMENT'S
SUPPLEMENTAL DISCOVERY RESPONSE (Taylor, Joshua)

08/21/2006

@15 MOTION CJA Appointment by William D Rittel. (Moran, Kathleen)

08/21/2006

@16 ORDER granting 11_ Motion for CJA Counsel as to \Villiam D Rittel (1).
CJA Attorney James Siebe substituted for Kathleen Moran. Signed by Judge
Edward J. Lodge. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the
addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by j a, ) (emailed to
J. Siebe by ja).

08/24/2006.

Q17 RESPONSE by USA as to dft William D Rittel GOVERNMENT'S
SUPPLEMENTAL DISCOVERY RESPONSE (Taylor, Joshua)

08/30/2006

@18 RESPONSE by dft William D Rittel to Discovery (Siebe, James)

08/31/2006

Q19 RESPONSE by USA as to dft William D Rittel GOVERNMENT'S
SUPPLEMENTAL DISCOVERY RESPONSE (Taylor, Joshua)

-

Summons Returned Unexecuted in case as to William D Rittel (Notice sent
to USP) Ga)

-
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09/11/2006

Q21 Proposed Jury Instructions by William D Rittel (Siebe, James)
-

09/11/2006

@22 MOTION to Vacate and Continue Trial Setting by William D Rittel. (Siebe,
James)

09/11/2006

Q23 MOTION in Limine by USA as to William D Rittel. (Taylor, Joshua)
-

09/11/2006

Q24
- MOTION in Lirnine by USA as to William D Rittel. (Taylor, Joshua)

09/11/2006

<J25 MOTION in Limine by USA as to William D Rittel. (Taylor, Joshua)
-

09/13/2006

Q26 MEMORANDUM in Opposition by William D Rittel re 24 MOTION in
Limine, 25 MOTION in Limine, 23 MOTION in Limine (Siebe, James)

09/14/2006

Q27 NOTICE of Withdrawal ofMotion for Vacation and Continuance of Trial
Setting by William D Rittel re 22 MOTION to Vacate and Continue Trial
Setting (Siebe, James)

09/15/2006

Q2s Sealed Document (Attachments:# l # ~ # l # 1)(Siebe, James)

V//VV/,t...,VVV
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09/15/2006

Q CORRECTIVE ENTRY -The entry docket number 27 Notice (Other) filed
by William D Rittel, was filed using the incorrect docket event. The filing
party shall re-submit their filing using "Withdrawal of Motion" located
under Other Documents. Ga,)

09/15/2006

Q29 WITHDRAWAL of Motion by William D Rittel re 22 MOTION to Vacate
and Continue Trial Setting filed by William D Rittel, (Siebe, James)

09/18/2006

Q30 EX PARTE ORDER as to William D Rittel re 28 Sealed Document (Notice
sent to USM) (SEALED). Signed by Judge Edward J. Lodge. Ga,)

09/18/2006

(Court only) ***StaffNotes as to William D Rittel: subpoenas issued &
given to USMS as per Court's Order dkt #30 Ga,)

09/18/2006

(Court only) ***StaffNotes as to William D Rittel: mailed ex parte order
dkt #30 to Jame$ Siebe Ga, )

09/19/2006

Q31 RESPONSE by USA as to dft William D Rittel GOVERNMENT'S
SUPPLEMENTAL DISCOVERY RESPONSE (Taylor, Joshua)

09/20/2006

Q32 REPLY TO RESPONSE to Motion by USA as to William D Rittel re 24
MOTION in Limine, 25 MOTION in Limine, 23 MOTION in Limine
(Taylor, Joshua)

09/21/2006

Q33 Sealed Document (Attachments:# l)(Siebe, James)

09/22/2006

Q34 EXP ARTE ORDER (SEALED) as to William D Rittel re 33 Sealed
Document (Notice sent to USM). Signed by Judge Edward J. Lodge.
(Court only) ***Staff Notes as to William D Rittel: issued subpoena and
gave to USMS for service (SEALED) Ga,)

09/22/2006
09/25/2006

1f7

MOTION in Limine by William D Rittel. (Siebe, James)

Q35 TRIAL BRIEF by William D Rittel (Siebe, James)

-
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~36 RESPONSE to Motion by USA as to William D Rittel re 20 MOTION in
Limine (Taylor, Joshua)

09/29/2006

Q37 Docket Entry NOTICE OF HEARING as to William D Rittel (Notice sent to
USP & USM) PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the TIME for the Jury Trial set
for Tuesday, October 10, 2006 in Coeur d Alene, Idaho before the Honorable
Edward J. Lodge, HAS BEEN CHANGED from 9:30 am to 1:30pm.
(caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on
the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by cv,)

10/02/2006

038 RESPONSE by USA as to dft William D Rittel GOVERNMENT'S
SUPPLEMENTAL DISCOVERY RESPONSE (Taylor, Joshua)

10/03/2006

039
- Sealed Document (Attachments:# D(Siebe, James)

10/03/2006

Q40
- RESPONSE by dft William D Rittel to Discovery (Supplemental) (Siebe,
James)

10/03/2006

041 EXHIBIT LIST by William D Rittel (Siebe, James)
-

10/03/2006

042 Proposed Jury Instructions by USA as to William D Rittel (Taylor, Joshua)

10/03/2006

043 Proposed Voir Dire by USA as to William D Rittel (Taylor, Joshua)
-

10/03/2006

044 TRIAL BRJEF by USA as to William D Rittel (Taylor, Joshua)
-

10/03/2006

()45 EXHIBIT LIST by USA as to William D Rittel (Taylor, Joshua)
-

10/03/2006

Q46 EY..HIBIT LIST by USA as to William D Rittel (Taylor, Joshua)

10/04/2006

Q47 EX PARTE ORDER as to William D Rittel re 39 Sealed Document (Notice
sent to USM) (SEALED). Signed by Judge Edward J. Lodge. Ga) Modified
on 10/4/2006 (ks): copy emailed to J. Siebe.

10/04/2006

(.)43 RESPONSE by USA as to dft William D Rittel GOVERNMENT'S
SUPPLEMENTAL DISCOVERY RESPONSE (Taylor, Joshua)

10/04/2006
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(Court only) ***StaffNotes as to William D Rittel: Certified copy of Order
#47 provided to USM; Subpoena provided to USM by J. Angelo (ks)

10/04/2006

Q49 EXHIBIT LIST by William D Rittel (Siebe, James)
-

10/04/2006

050
- Proposed V oir Dire by William D Rittel (Siebe, James)

10/04/2006

Q51
- Objection by William D Rittel to 43 Proposed Voir Dire filed by USA,
(Siebe, James)

10/04/2006

Q52 Objection by William D Rittel to 42 Proposed Jury Instructions filed by
USA, (Siebe, James)

10/05/2006

Q53 MOTION for Individual Voir Dire by William D Rittel. (Siebe, James)

10/05/2006

Q54 Proposed Jury Instructions by William D Rittel (Siebe, James)

10/05/2006

Q55 WITNESS LIST by William D Rittel (Siebe, James)

10/06/2006

·Q56 Proposed Jury Instructions by USA as to William D Rittel (Taylor, Joshua)

UU011~
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@57 EXHIBIT LIST by USA as to William D Rittel (Taylor, Joshua)
-

10/09/2006

(;}53 WITNESS LIST by USA as to William D Rittel (Taylor, Joshua)
-

10/10/2006

Q59 Proposed Jury Instructions by USA as to William D Rittel (Taylor, Joshua)
-

-""""'10/10/2006
-

@65 STIPULATION as to dft's Indian blood and place of offense by USA Glg,)
(Entered: 10/16/2006)

10/10/2006

Q66 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Edward J. Lodge :Pretrial
Hearing as to William D Rittel held on 10/10/2006, granted 20 MOTION in
Limine filed by Willian1 D Rittel, granted 53 MOTION for Individual Voir
Dire filed by William D Rittel. Stipulation 65 put on the record. (Court
Reporter Lisa Yant.) Qlg, ) (Entered: 10/16/2006)

10/10/2006

Q67 Sealed Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Edward J. Lodge
:Voir Dire begun on 10/10/2006 William D Rittel (1) on Count 1, Jury
Selection as to William D Rittel held on 10/10/2006 (Court Reporter Lisa
Yant.) Qlg,) (Entered: 10/16/2006)

10/10/2006

Q68 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Edward J. Lodge :Jury Trial
(Day 1) as to William D Rittel held on 10/10/2006 (Court Reporter Lisa
Yant.) Glg,) (Entered: 10/16/2006)

10/11/2006

Q69 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Edward J. Lodge: Jury
Trial (Day 2) as to William D Rittel held on 10/11/2006 (Court Reporter
Lisa Yant.) Qlg,) (Entered: 10/16/2006)

10/12/2006

Q70 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Edward J. Lodge :Jury Trial
(Day 3 - Final Day) as to William D Rittel held on 10/12/2006. Defendant
found not guilty. (Court Reporter Lisa Yant.) Glg,) (Entered: 10/16/2006)

10/12/2006

()71 WITNESS LIST by USA as to William D Rittel Qlg, ) (Entered: 10/16/2006)

10/12/2006

()72 EXHIBIT LIST by USA as to William D Rittel Qlg, ) (Entered: 10/16/2006)

10/12/2006

Q73 WITNESS LIST by William D Rittel Qlg, ) (Entered: 10/16/2006)

10/12/2006

Q74 EXHIBIT LIST by William D Rittel Glg,) (Entered: 10/16/2006)
-

10/12/2006

Q75 Jury Instructions as to William D Rittel Glg, ) (Entered: 10/16/2006)

10/12/2006

·7

-

-

Q76
-

JURY VERDICT as to William D Rittel (1) Not Guilty on Count I. (Notice
sent to USP) Glg, ) (Entered: 10/16/2006)

10/12/2006

Q77 JUDGMENT of Acquittal as to William D Rittel (1), Count(s) 1, Not Guilty
(Notice sent to USP and USM). Signed by Judge Edward J. Lodge. (caused
to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the
Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by jlg, ) (Entered: 10/16/2006)

10/13/2006

Q60 Subpoena Returned Un-Executed, Service un-exexuted as to Bernie York
Qlg,) (Entered: 10/16/2006)

10/13/2006

'361 Subpoena Returned Executed served Janie Wilkins on 10/4/2006. (Notice
- sent to USM) Glg, ) {Entered: 10/16/2006)
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@62 Subpoena Returned Executed served Colleen Baker on 10/4/2006. (Notice
sent to USM) Qlg, ) (Entered: 10/16/2006)

10/13/2006

063 Subpoena Returned Executed served Brian Wilkins on 10/4/2006. (Notice
sent to USM) Qlg,) (Entered: 10/16/2006)

10/13/2006

064 Subpoena Returned Executed served MaryAnn York on 10/4/2006. (Notice
serit to USM) Qlg, ) (Entered: 10/16/2006)

10/23/2006

<l78 Subpoena Returned Executed served Missy Clark on 10/6/2006. (Notice sent
to USM) Glg, ) (Entered: 10/25/2006)

03/23/2007

Q79
- CIA 20 as to William D Rittel: Appointment of Attorney James Edward
Siebe for William D. Rittel. Signed by Judge Larry M. Boyle. Qlg,)
(Entered: 03/26/2007)
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Michael McNichols
CLEMENTS, BROVIN & McNICHOLS, P.A.
Attorneys at Law
P.O. Box 1510
321 13 th Street
Lewistown, ID 83501
(208) 743-6538
(208) 746-9295 (Facsimile)
ISB No. 993

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO

WILLIAM WOLFE,
Petitioner,
VS.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CR 18290
BRIEF OF NORTH CENTRAL
IDAHO JURISDICTIONAL
ALLIANCE, AMICUS CURIAE,
LIMITED IN SCOPE, IN SUPPORT
OF THE IDAHO COUNTY
PROSECUTOR

I.
The North Central Idaho Jurisdictional Alliance (Alliance) submits this brief,

amicus curiae, limited in scope, to address the reservation disestablishment issue in
support of the position of the Idaho County Prosecutor.
The Alliance is an unincorporated association; its members include 2 counties, 9
cities, 3 school districts and 7 highway districts in north central Idaho, whose
geographical boundaries include land which was within the Nez Perce Indian reservation

BRIEF OF NORTH CENTRAL IDAHO
JURISDICTIONAL ALLIANCE, AMICUS
CURIAE; LIMITED IN SCOPE, IN SUPPORT
OF THE IDAHO COUNTY PROSECUTOR
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as it existed prior to 1894. This area is now ninety percent (90%) owned and populated
by non-members of the Nez Perce Tribe.
The purpose of the Alliance is to provide an organization to foster cooperation
between its members and to focus their efforts toward obtaining a resolution of their
jurisdictional authority in relationship to the jurisdictional authority of the United States
and the Nez Perce Tribe.
The issue of the reservation status of the original 1863 Nez Perce Reservation is
important to the Alliance, the State of Idaho, the Nez Perce Tribe and the United States.
The Alliance supports the rationale and holding of the opinion of the District Court in the
Snake River Basin Adjudication (SRBA). In two Orders in that case, Presiding Judge
Barry Wood made clear that the original 1863 Nez Perce Reservation was disestablished
by a subsequent act of Congress. Order on Motion to Strike, Motion to Supplement the
Record and Motions for Summary Judgment, In re SRBA (No. 39576) (5th Jud. Dist.
County of Twin Falls) (Nov. 10, 1999); Order on United States' Motion to Alter or
Amend Judgment or Alternatively for an Evidentiary Hearing, In re SRBA (No. 39576)
(5 th Jud. Dist. County of Twin Falls) (Jan. 21, 2000). Further, the Alliance agrees with
and also supports the reservation disestablishment argument set forth in the briefs of
Respondent State ofidaho filed in that same case.
II.

A.

In re SRBA 1s the most recent case to squarely address the Nez Perce

Reservation status issue. In two separate Orders (in the context of addressing exclusive
fishing and related water rights), Judge Wood details the support for his conclusion that
BRIEF OF NORTH CENTRAL IDAHO
JURISDICTIONAL ALLIANCE, AMICUS
CURIAE/ LIMITED IN SCOPE, IN SUPPORT
OF THE IDAHO COUNTY PROSECUTOR
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the original 1863 Nez Perce Reservation was disestablished by a subsequent act of
Congress.
Under the subheading entitled "South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux - The Subsequent
Effect of the 1893 [cession] Agreement," Judge Wood describes the "unanimous"
opinion of the United States Supreme Court in State of South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux
Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998), which interpreted the "very same statute in which Congress
approved the 1893 Agreement between the United States and the Nez Perce Tribe
relating to the cession and sale of surplus tribal lands. Act of Aug. 15, 1894, 28 Stat.
286." Order on United States' Motion at 41, In re SRBA (No. 39576) (Jan. 21, 2000)
(emphasis added). Judge Wood noted that the 1894 Act incorporated both "the 1892
Agreement with the Yankton Sioux in its entirety and the 1893 Agreement with the Nez
Perce in its entirety and, in accordance with both Agreements, Congress expressly
appropriated the necessary funds to compensate the Tribes for the ceded lands, to satisfy
the claims for scout pay, and to award the commemorative 20-dollar gold pieces." Order
at 41.
In the process, Judge Wood also stated that the United States Supreme Court in
Yankton Sioux Tribe expressly noted that the 1894 Act which ratified the 1892
Agreement between the United States and the Yankton Sioux, contained "'similar surplus
land sale agreements between the United States and the Siletz and Nez Perce Tribe'."
Order at 43 (emphasis added). Judge Wood then reviewed the balance of the Supreme
Court's Opinion in Yankton Sioux Tribe. In general terms, the Court found the analysis
"compelling." Order at 48.
BRIEF OF NORTH CENTRAL IDAHO
JURISDICTIONAL ALLIANCE, AMICUS
CURIAE/ LIMITED IN SCOPE, IN SUPPORT
OF THE IDAHO COUNTY PROSECUTOR
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For a number of different reasons, Judge Wood declined to follow a previous
federal district court decision in a District ofidaho case No. 98-80-N-ELJ (Jan. 12, 1999)
in United States v. Webb. Judge Wood expressly noted that he disagreed substantively
with the Webb opinion. Order on Motion to Strike at 47, In re SRBA (No. 39576) (Nov.
10, 1999). Judge Wood concluded that Webb ignored the "plain meaning of the statutory
language and also the historical circumstances following the Treaty of 1855." For the
convenience of the Court, the Order of Judge Wood dated November 10, 1999, is
attached as Appendix A.
B. Two weeks later, the United States moved the district court to alter or amend
its judgment of November 10, 1999, regarding reservation status. In the alternative, the
United States requested an opportunity to submit testimony, documentary evidence and
legal authorities on the issue of reservation disestablishment. The motion of the United
States was supported by a memorandum. The State of Idaho subsequently filed a written
response in support of the conclusion of Judge Wood that the original 1863 Nez Perce
Reservation was disestablished. On January 21, 2000, Judge Wood denied the motion of
the United States. Order on United States' Motion, In re SRBA (No. 39576) (Jan. 21,
2000). This Order of Judge Wood is attached as Appendix B.
In this twenty-nine (29) page Order, Judge Wood addressed and rejected all of the
arguments of substance submitted by the United States.

In the process, the Court

repeatedly cited additional documentation to substantiate the validity of the original
Order regarding reservation disestablishment. Moreover, the Court set forth a detailed
analysis and express comparison of the Nez Perce Agreement with the "similar" cession
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agreement recently construed in Yankton Sioux Tribe (that the United States Supreme
Court held disestablished the original Yankton Reservation). In fifteen (15) pages, Judge
Wood itemized ten (10) specific points in support of the conclusion that the Nez Perce
Act and Y ank::ton Act were functional twins. The Alliance supports that conclusion.

III.
As background, the role of the United States in reservation status cases is
deserving of special consideration in this case. 1 For that reason, the Brief of North
Central Idaho Jurisdictional Alliance, Amicus Curiae, in Support of Respondent State of
Idaho, filed in the Idaho Supreme Court in In re SRBA, that recounts, in summary
fashion, the position of the United States in each of the reservation status cases decided
by the United States Supreme Court is also appended to this Brief for the convenience of
the Court. Appendix C. The points are documented with citations to the briefs of the
United States and the transcripts of oral q.Igument in the United States Supreme Court.
That review establishes, among other things, that the United States has repeatedly
conceded, generally, the reservation disestablishment issue in this case. And there is
nothing in the Nez Perce documentation to limit that general concession. In short, the
Alliance submits that the arguments of the United States have been largely responsible
for the conflict and confusion in this area of the law since 1962.
The Brief of the Alliance in In re SRBA summarizes the history of the arguments
of the United States, the history of the cases litigated and the history of the general

1 References

to the "United States" include only the Department of Justice and the Office
of the Solicitor General in Washington, D.C., not the Offices of the United States'
Attorneys in the individual States.
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legislation enacted to achieve the result Congress intended. Appendix C. In this respect,
the SRBA Alliance Brief is desirable and relevant to the disposition of this case because
these issues are issues of the law not addressed in any other brief. The SRBA Alliance
Brief also clearly establishes that since 1975 the United States Supreme Court has
repeatedly rejected the arguments of the United States, with one exception. And the
concession that the United States made in that case makes that exception meaningless
with reference to the issue presented in the Nez Perce case. In other words, cessions
disestablish Indian reservations.
We should mention that some of the members in the Alliance have expended
substantial time and resources on this issue of reservation status for a number of years,
commencing in 1995.

Counties and other units of local government have normally

participated in reservation status litigation for decades. This issue is as important to the

Alliance, as it is to the other governments participating in this litigation. In addition, the
unusual manner in which this issue was addressed in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
further supports the legitimacy of a motion to participate as amicus curiae in this case at
the present time. It is significant that for all practical purposes, the Alliance has been
effectively precluded by the United States from participating in the recent arguments
regarding reservation status in the federal district court.
To date, the role the United States has played in the Nez Perce reservation status
litigation has been truly remarkable. For that reason, it is recounted here in summary
fashion.
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IV.
A. In the beginning, the reservation status issue was presented in the federal
district court in United States v. Scott, No. CR98-001-N-EJL (D. Idaho, May 27, 1998),
without any notice to the State of Idaho or any of the Counties or any other local
governmental unit within the area in dispute (except the Nez Perce Tribe). 2 At that time,
the United States told the district court that the United States Supreme Court in Yankton
Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998) had made an "incorrect assumption" regarding the
significance of cession terminology. Mem. in Supp. of Resp. at 26-27, United States v.
Scott, No. CR98-001-N-EJL (D. Idaho May 27, 1998). According to the United States,
the 1863 Nez Perce reservation continues to exist.
At the conclusion of the Scott hearing, the United States moved to seal the
historical record and historical reports submitted by the United States in support of the
1863 Nez Perce reservation. Petitioner Scott did not object.
The federal district court granted the Motion of the United States to seal the
historical record and the historical reports. The Scott opinion cited and relied on this
documentation in holding that a former allotment (fee-land) was within the Nez Perce
reservation. There was no appeal in Scott.
B. In U.S. v. Webb, Memorandum Decision and Order, No. CR98-80-N-EJL (D.
Idaho, Jan. 12, 1999), again without notice to the State or any of the local governments

2

In the August, 1999 executive order on federalism, the President directed that "[w]hen

an agency foresees the possibility of a conflict between State law and Federally protected
interests within its area of regulatory responsibility, the agency shall consult, to the extent
practicable, with appropriate State and local officials in an effort to avoid such conflict."
Executive Order 13132 of August 4, 1999.
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affected, the Nez Perce reservation issue was presented to the same district court. At the
conclusion of the Webb hearing, the United States again moved to seal the historical
record and the historical reports. And, again, Petitioner Webb did not object and the
district comi granted the motion to seal the historical record and historical reports.
Shortly thereafter, the district court adopted the arguments of the United States in the
process of resurrecting the 1863 boundaries of the Nez Perce Reservation.
Incredibly, following the argument of the United States, the Webb court described
the analysis and holdings of the United States Supreme Court in DeCoteau v. District
County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975) and State of South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe,

522 U.S. 329 (1998) as "illogical." Webb, Memo Dec. at 7 (emphasis added). The
United States obtained the "historical record" and the "reports" from the Nez Perce Tribe.
With the exception of the lower courts in Yankton Sioux Tribe (over one dissent) (since
reversed) no judge ever questioned the fundamental principles recognized in DeCoteau
since 1975, when three justices initially dissented.

Moreover, these principles were

unanimously reiterated in Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977), repeatedly
and unanimously concurred in and conceded in Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984)
and Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994), and they have now been confirmed again by a
unanimous Court in Yankton Sioux Tribe. In other words, until Webb, the only decisions
that have held that sum certain cessions did not disestablish reservations have been
quickly reversed. As a result, the district court in Webb could not cite even one decision
to squarely support the argument the United States submitted, in any court, at any time.
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After the decision of the district court in Webb, the United States adopted this
course of action:
1. The United States vigorously opposed every motion to unseal the historical
record and the historical reports, both in the district court and in the court of appeals:
The pivotal issue on appeal is the question of jurisdiction. The sealed
exhibits and transcripts are sensitive materials that relate to the Nez Perce
Tribe and their reservation, the very heart of the jurisdictional issue. By
ordering the opening of these sealed documents, solely for the benefit of a
non-party, this Court would cause a dramatic effect upon the status of the
appeal.
Government's Opposition to Mot. Filed July 29, 1999, at 3, United States v. Webb, No.
CR98-80-N-EJL (D. Idaho Aug. 20, 1999) (emphasis added).

(The important

background for the motions to unseal is set forth in the last motion to unseal, dated
September 19, 2000, Motion ofNCIJA as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant Webb
to Unseal Historical Exhibits and Transcripts for Review, US. v. Webb, No. CR 98-80-NEJL (D.Idaho Aug. 20, 1999) (No. 99-30155).)
2. The United States also vigorously opposed all amicus participation including
participation by the units of local governments directly affected by the decision. At one
point the district court rejected the opposition of the United States, but the court of
appeals did not.

In a series of orders in the Webb case, the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals denied every motion to unseal and every motion to participate amicus curiae.

United States v. Webb, 219 F.3d 1127 (9 th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1200 (2001).
In the past, counties from other states have expressed concern over the "litigating
position" of the United States in cases of this kind involving the resurrection of Indian
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reservation boundaries. See also South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 697 (1993)
("[g]ovemment' s litigating position").
Most recently, in Yankton Sioux Tribe, Charles Mix County, South Dakota,
submitted briefs in the United States Supreme Court that summarize and track the
conflicting reservation status arguments submitted by the United States in that Court
since 1962 (arguments, for the most part, repeatedly rejected by the United States
Supreme Court since 1975). 3
Significantly, in Yankton Sioux Tribe, the Court granted certiorari without inviting
the United States to submit its views, even though the United States had briefed and
argued the case in the court of appeals as amicus curiae. On the merits, the United States
Supreme Court rejected the arguments of the United States. The Alliance brief in In re

SRBA highlights those arguments.
The issue in Webb was congressional intent. At the very least, the United States
should not have been allowed to seal the historical documents and historical reports
submitted by the United States to courts in the process of resurrecting an Indian
reservation long deemed disestablished. The district court and the court of appeals in

3 See

Briefs of Charles Mix County, South Dakota, in Support of Petitioner, State of South
Dakota, South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998) (No. 96-1581), May
7, 1997, and August 7, 1997. The Brief of Cities, Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners,
State of South Dakota, Charles Mix County and Southern Missouri Waste Management
District, South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1261 (2000) (No.
99-1490), appends all of the briefs and oral arguments of the United States. The Cities
brief also summarizes the shifting nature of the arguments submitted by the United States
to date. The Alliance will file copies of these briefs with the Office of the Clerk.
If the United States is requested to respond in this case, the perspective set forth in
these briefs should be significant. The Alliance relied extensively on the same arguments
in the SRBA Alliance brief filed in the Idaho Supreme Court in, Appendix C.
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Webb expressly relied on this documentation. The court of appeals never mentioned the
fact that the historical records and reports relied upon in the decision were sealed and
that a series of motions to unseal were denied. Significantly, both the result and the
procedure in Scott and Webb are wholly unprecedented. This fact supports the motion of
the Alliance to participate, amicus curiae, in the instant case. Moreover, the precedent
value of Webb is undermined by the fact that the historical records and reports were
wrongfully sealed and amicus participation was not allowed.
C.

In addition, on June 26, 2000, the United States Supreme Court denied

certiorari in Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Gaffey, 188 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. denied,
530 U.S. 1261 (2000) (Yankton JI). In this remand of Yankton Sioux Tribe, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the 1858 Yank.ton Sioux
reservation had been similarly disestablished.
The Ninth Circuit in Webb summarily rejected the Yankton II analysis in a
footnote (one sentence). United States v. Webb, 219 F.3d 1127, 1134 n.9 (9th Cir. 2000).
As a result, the decision of the court of appeals conflicts with this Yankton JI decision in
the Eighth Circuit. See also Bruguier v. Class, 599 N.W.2d 364 (S.D. 1999), (where the
Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota agreed with the analysis of the Eighth
Circuit with reference to the non-reservation status of all fee lands (and further concluded
that the Yankton reservation had been effectively disestablished)).
The Webb decision in the district court was decided prior to both of these cases.
In fact, in Webb, the district court cited and relied upon the Yankton 11 opinion of the
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federal district court in South Dakota, which was squarely reversed by the court of
appeals in Yankton II, and rejected by the State Supreme Court in Bruguier.
Moreover, although the Court of Appeals in US. v. Webb, 219 F.3d 1127, 11331134 (9 th Cir. 2000), ultimately affirmed the district court, it did expressly state that both
Webb and the district court failed to make a "critical distinction" between "unallotted,

surplus land ceded back to the government" - which were not directly at issue in Webb,
and lands "allotted in severalty to the Nez Perce," - which were directly involved in
Webb. In this respect, the holding of Webb is limited to "lands allotted in severalty to the

Nez Perce."
D. Although the United States consistently and successfully opposed all amicus
curiae participation in Webb (a criminal case), the desirability of amicus curiae

participation to support the disestablishment argument is highlighted by the wholly
unprecedented nature of the Webb decision. In the entire history of this type of litigation,

no court has ever been upheld when concluding that an Indian reservation, subject to a
cession statute like this, remains intact. Nor has any court of appeals, other than the
Webb panel, ever held that in this situation, the former allotted fee lands retain

reservation status. See United States v. Stands, 105 F.3d 1565 (8th Cir. 1997).
The only other federal district court and court of appeals decisions, all in the
Eighth Circuit, that briefly supported the view adopted by the court of appeals in Webb,
were immediately and squarely rejected by the United States Supreme Court. United
States, ex rel. Feather V. Erickson, 489 F.2d 99

csth Cir. 1973), rev'd DeCoteau V. District

County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975); South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 890 F.Supp.
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878 (D.S.D. June 14, 1995), aff'd 99 F.3d 1439 (8th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 522 U.S. 329
(1998). In both instances, amicus curiae support was substantial.
E. When this issue was first presented in the United States District Court for the
District of Idaho, the Hon. Edward J. Lodge, United States District Court Judge, granted
the Alliance leave to appear as amicus curiae on the 17th of June, 1998, after the hearing,
but before the decision. United States v. Scott, Order, Case No. CR98-01-N-EJL (June
25, 1998). In Webb, the Alliance did not receive notice of the issue until after the issue
was decided by the district court. Thereafter, all motions and briefs in the Ninth Circuit
and in the United States Supreme Court were filed in a timely fashion.
F. The Idaho Supreme Court in In re SRBA allowed all parties to the action to
respond to the motion and brief of the Alliance in a timely fashion, pursuant to the Idaho
Appellate Rules. The United States and the Nez Perce Tribe could not really claim to be
surprised by the arguments in the Brief of North Central Idaho Jurisdictional Alliance,
Amicus Curiae, in Support of Respondent State of Idaho. The Alliance brief in In re
SRBA simply summarized the legal arguments the United States has previously
submitted, in briefs and in oral arguments, when similar issues of law regarding
reservation status were presented to the United States Supreme Court. Moreover, for the
most part, every argument of substance in the SRBA Alliance brief was previously
submitted in the amid curiae briefs in Scott and Webb, which were served on the United
States and the Nez Perce Tribe at the time.
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V.
Lorraine Nightingale, former Lewis County Commissioner, also filed a motion
and brief to participate as amicus curiae in support of Respondent State of Idaho in the
Idaho Supreme Court in In re SRBA (No. 39576) (5th Jud. Dist. County of Twin Falls).
in support of Respondent State of Idaho. The Alliance has also appended that brief for
the convenience of the Court. Appendix D. Importantly, the Nightingale brief focuses
on more specific concerns and approaches the question of reservation disestablishment
from a different perspective. In this respect, the Nightingale brief supplements the efforts
of the Alliance.
CONCLUSION

This Court should reaffirm the conclusion of Judge Wood in In re SRBA that the
original 1863 Nez Perce Reservation has been disestablished.
Dated this 31st day of August, 2006.
Respectfully submitted,
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS

In Re SRBA
Case No. 39576

)
)
)
)

Consolidated Sub case 03-10022
(Nez Perce Tribe Instream Flow Claims)

ORDER ON MOTION TO STRIKE TESTIMONY OF DENNIS C. COLSON
ORDER ON UNITED STATESD AND NEZ PERCE TRIBE OS JOINT MOTION
TO SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD IN RESPONSE TO THE OBJECTORS'
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT, I.R.C.P. 56(f)
ORDER ON MOTION TO STRIKE EXHIBIT TRANSCRIPTION OF LETTER
FROM GENERAL PALMER TO GEORGE MANYPENNY, COMMISSIONER
OF INDIA.i'J AFFAIRS
ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IDAHO POWER, POTLATCH CORPORATION, IRRIGATION
DISTRICTS, AND OTHER OBJECTORS 1 WHO HAVE JOINED AND/OR
SUPPORTED THE VARIOUS MOTIONS

There are a large number ofidaho cities (61), entities, and/or individuals who have joined and/or supported the ·
various motions for summary judgment and/or motions to strike. Because their individual identities are not relevant to
these orders, they are not separately listed here.

ORDER ON MOTIONS TO STRIKE, MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT
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I.
APPEARANCES 2
Mr. Albert Barker, Esq., Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, Boise, Idaho, for the Boise
Kuna Irrigation District, Federal Claims Coalition, et al.

Mr. Steven Strack, Esq., Boise, Idaho, Deputy Attorney General for the State ofldaho
Mr. Michael Mirande, Esq., Miller Bateman LLP, Seattle, Washington, for the Ida]:io
Power Company
Mr. Peter Monson, Esq., Denver, Colorado, for the United States Department of Justice,
Bureau of Indian Affairs
Mr. Steven Moore, Esq., Native American Rights Fund, Boulder, Colorado, for the Nez
Perce Tribe
Mr. Douglas B.L. Endreson, Esq., Sonosky Chambers Sachse & Endreson, Washington,
D.C., for the Shoshone-Bannock Tribe

n.
MATTER DEEMED FULLY SUBMITTED FOR DECISION
These motions for summary judgment were argued in open court on October 13, 1999, in
Boise, Idaho. On October 15, 1999, the Court, by letter, informed counsel that it had requested a
transcript of the hearing to aid the Court in writing this decision. The Court informed the parties
that it had given the Reporter until November 3, 1999, to prepare the transcript. Therefore, this
matter is deemed fully submitted for decision on the next business day, or November 4, 1999.

Ill.
ORDER ON MOTION TO STRIKE TESTIMONY
OF DENNIS C. COLSON
On September 7, 1999, a number of objectors filed a motion renewing their Motion to
Strike the Testimony of Dennis C. Colson. The stated basis of the motion is:

2

There are multiple counsel ofrecord representing the various parties in this consolidated subcase. Only those
who actually argued the motions for summary judgment on October 13, 1999, are listed under the Appearances.
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Colson does not qualify as an expert witness, and because the conclusions drawn in
his testimony are legal, not historical, they are inadmissible under Idaho Rules of
Evidence 702.
The Court heard this motion on September 20, 1999. After the hearing, and by written
order dated October 5, 1999, the Court announced that it was deferring its ruling on this motion
until after the Court heard the oral arguments on summary judgment (which were then scheduled
to be heard October 13, 1999). The basis of the Court's action in this regard was that the Court
needed to h~ar the oral arguments on summary judgment before it could determine whether the
testimony of Mr. Colson was even legally relevant to the issues on summary judgment. If Mr.
Colson's testimony was legally relevant, depending upon the Court's determination of the
substantive issues on summary judgment, the Court would then rule on the issues raised in the
motion to strike.
Based upon the rulings which follow it is not necessary to rule on whether Professor.
Colson's testimony and conclusions are admissible, and therefore, no further ruling under this
motion is required. To be clear, this Court is not ruling one way or the other on whether
Professor Colson qualifies as an expert or whether his conclusions are legal in nature and not
historical.

IV.
ORDER ON UNITED STATESD AND NEZ PERCE TRIBEDS
JOINT MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD IN RESPONSE
TO THE OBJECTORSD MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT
I.R.C.P. 56(t)
On October 23, 1998, the United States and the Nez Perce Tribe filed a joint motion
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56(f) to supplement the record in response to the Objectors' motions for
summary judgment. The motion was supported by a joint memorandum lodged October 23,
1998.
This motion was filed in response to Judge Hurlbutt's oral ruling on October 13, 1998
(order entered October 15, 1998) to the effect that the Court granted a motion to strike Professor
Colson's "first" affidavit. The motion to supplement seeks to add affidavits and/or documents to
the record because Professor Colson's "first" affidavit was stricken, i.e. in place of Professor
Colson's stricken affidavit. However, the United States and the Nez Perce Tribe have now filed
ORDER ON MOTIONS TO STRIKE, MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT
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-Professor Colson's February 1999 expert report which is the subject of section III of this Order
(Motion to Strike Testimony of Dennis C. Colson). The motion to supplement is in the
alternative, in the event the Court strikes the "testimony" (February 1999 Report) of Professor
Colson. See transcript of September 20, 1999, p. 88, 11. 14-24.
Because this Court has not stricken the testimony of Professor Colson (his February 1999
Report) as stated in paragraph III above, this alternative relief is denied.

V.

ORDER ON MOTION TO STRIKE EXIDBIT TRANSCRIPTION
OF LETTER FROM GENERAL PALMER TO
GEORGE MANYPENNY, COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS
On August 31, 1999, Mr. Peter Monson, on behalf of the United States, filed with this
Court a First Supplemental Declaration. Attached to this Declaration are three documents:
(1) letter from James Doty to Isaac Stevens, dated March 26, 1855 (Exhibit 21); (2) a letter from
General Joel Palmer, Superintendent of the Oregon Territory, to George Manypenny,
Commissioner ofindian Affairs, dated April 13, 1855 (Exhibit 22); and (3) a transcript ofletter
from Palmer to Manypenny (also marked as Exhibit 22).
On September 10, 1999, Mr. Albert Barker, on behalf of the Objectors, comprising the
Federal Claims Coalition and Idaho Power, filed a Motion to Strike the exhibit transcription
(item 3 of the First Supplemental Declaration) of the letter from Palmer to Manypenny.
The stated basis of the motion is that the transcription of the letter is not properly'
authenticated under I.RE. 901 and is not self-authenticating under I.R.E. 902 and, therefore,
moves that it be stricken from the record.
Based upon this Court's ruling on the dispositive summary judgment motions as
hereinafter stated, no ruling on this motion to strike is necessary.
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VI.

THE ISSUES STATED IN THE MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND THE RESPONSES THERETO
IDAHO POWER COMPANY (Hereinafter "IPCo")

IPCo states this motion presents six issues:

(1) Whether the geographic scope of the "exclusive" "on-reservation" fishing
right reserved in the Treaty With The Nez Perce of 1855 was reduced
commensurately with the reduction of the Tribe's reservation under the Treaty With
The Nez Perce of 1863 and the Agreement With The Nez Perce of 1893, and if so,
whether the "off-reservation "in common" fishing right contained in the Treaty of
1855 is therefore the sole basis upon which the Tribe can seek in-stream flows on the
main stem of the Snake River?
(2) Vlhether the Tribe's right, set forth in the Treaty of 1855, to fish "in
common" with non-treaty fishers at usual and accustomed fishing places off the
reservation can serve successfully as the basis for the Tribe's claims for in-stream
fisheries-flows in the Snake River?
(3) Whether, on the basis of the legal determinations and final judgment in
Nez Perce Tribe v. Idaho Power Company, 847 F. Supp. 791 (D. Idaho 1994)
("Idaho Power"), the Tribe and the United States should be estopped from pursuing
their fisheries flow claims predicated on the Tribe's off-reservation treaty fishing right?
(4) Alternatively, whether the Tribe's 1863 and 1893 land cessions resulted
in the cession of all water rights -- including any flow rights -- appurtenant to the
ceded lands?
(5) Whether recognition of the Tribe's in-stream fisheries-flows predicated
on the off-reservation fishing right would violate the equal protection guarantee of the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution?
(6) Whether the course of the Nez Perce Tribe's legal interaction with IPCo,
which includes the lengthy pursuit and settlement in 1980 of proceedings before the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, as well as the ultimate resolution of Nez
Perce Tribe v. Idaho Power Company, 847 F. Supp. 791 (D. Idaho 1994), forecloses
in whole or in part the Tribe's in-stream flow claims as against IPCo?
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In perhaps an abundance of caution, IPCo and the objectors state at the outset
that the foregoing issues do not embrace the question of the mutual intent of the
parties to the 1855 Treaty regarding the Tribe's on-reservation fishing right. For
purposes of this motion -- and solely for purposes of this motion -- we will assume
for the sake of argument that the Tribe's original, exclusive, treaty right to fish on its
reservation could have included a reserved fisheries flow right appurtenant to its
reservation lands. The focus, rather, is upon the implications of subsequent actions
for whatever rights the Tribe may have possessed under the Treaty of 1855.
IP Co Brief at 4 and 5.

POTLATCH CORPORATION

(Hereinafter "Potlatch")

In Potlatch's Opening Brief in Support of Summary Judgment, it states:
The pending motion raises essentially one question: Did the Nez Perce Tribe and the
United States, in entering the 1855 Treaty [footnote 1 cited], the 1863 Treaty
[footnote 2 cited], and the 1893 Agreement [footnote 3 cited] (collectively, the ''Nez
Perce Treaties"), intend that the express recognition of tribal fishing rights would, by
implication, reserve to the Tribe preemptive federal water rights for virtually the entire
flow of the Snake River?

Footnote 1 provides:
Treaty with the Nez Perce, June 11, 1855, 12 Stat. 957 (ratified
Mar. 8, 1859).
Footnote 2 provides:
Treaty with the Nez Perce, June 9, 1863, 14 Stat. 647 (ratified
Apr. 17, 1867).
Footnote 3 provides:
Agreement with the Nez Perce, May 1, 1893, 28 Stat. 326 (ratified
Aug. 15, 1894). This agreement is not labeled a "treaty," because in
1871 Congress forbade further treaties with Indian tribes. Act of
Mar. 31, 1871, 16 Stat. 566, codified at 25 U.S.C. § 71. Thereafter,
all dealings with tribes were in the form of agreements approved by
Congress and the Executive in the form of statutes.
Potlatch Brief at 6 and 7.
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STATE OF IDAHO

In its Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, the State of Idaho
states:
The issue presented is whether, under the implied-reservation-of-water doctrine, the
United States and Nez Perce Tribe are entitled to instream flow water rights, for the
purposes stated on the face of their claims, when the claimed water rights are for
streams that are not appurtenant to lands currently reserved by the United States for
the exclusive use of the Nez Perce Tribe or its members. The larger issue
incorporates the following sub-issues:
1. Whether, under the implied-reservation-of-water doctrine, federal reserved
instream flows are implied by the provisions of the 1855 Nez Perce Treaty securing
the right of tribal members to fish at usual and accustomed places outside the Nez
Perce Reservation.
2. Whether the United States otherwise intended to reserve instream flows for the
benefit of the Nez Perce Tribe on lands outside the Reservation established in the
1855 Treaty.
3. Whether the lands ceded in the 1863 Treaty and 1893 Agreement ceased to be
part of the Nez Perce Reservation, and if so, whether the fishing rights applicable to
the ceded lands are derived from the exclusive on-reservation right provided in Article
3 of the 1855 Treaty, or the non-exclusive, in-common right to fish at usual and
accustomed fishing places provided in Article 3 of the 1855 Treaty.
4. Whether, under the implied-reservation-of-water doctrine, federal reserved
instream flows are implied by the fishing rights secured to the Nez Perce Tribe for
exercise on lands ceded in the 1863 Nez Perce Treaty and the 1893 Nez Perce
Agreement.
5. \Vhether the United States otherwise intended to reserve instream flows for
the benefit of the Nez Perce Tribe on lands ceded in the 1863 Nez Perce Treaty and
the 1893 Nez Perce Agreement.
6. Whether under federal law and policy the United States may impliedly reserve
water for instream flows when such water is not appurtenant to a reservation of land.
Memorandum of the State ofldaho at 7.
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lRRIGATION DISTRICTS

A coalition oflrrigation Districts filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on June 2, 1998,
in which they listed six (6) issues. Subsequently, on July 20, 1998, they filed a Notice of Partial
Withdrawal of Motion and withdrew (without waiving their rights) issues 4 and 5. The Irrigation
Districts then filed a Joint Brief in Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment with IPCo.
Then on October 19, 1998, the Irrigation Districts filed their own Reply Brief in which they state:
Idaho Power and Objectors' motion for summary judgment is directed only at the
United States' and Tribe's claims for water rights outside the Tribe's present
Reservation (off-reservation claims) [footnote 2 cited]. It is undisputed that these offreservation claims are claims to an environmental condition which the Tribe's current
experts assert is necessary to "guarantee" to restore a "sustainable" fish harvest
population. As they have described their own claims, under oath:
The instream flow claims are ecosystem based and are focused on
protecting and in some cases restoring habitats necessary for the long
term propagation of fish populations. . . . These claims seek to
guarantee available habitats of suitable quantity and quality to allow
for the production and restoration of sustainable fish populations....
The amount of habitat that would be provided by the Tribe's instream
flow claims is the amount necessary to provide the full range of
natural variability and diversity of habitat conditions around which the
subject species has evolved. A lesser amount of habitat would not
provide that full range and would not fulfill the Treaty fishing rights.
Tribe's Supplemental Responses to Idaho's Second Discovery Requests (Tucker Aff.
Ex. 1).
The inevitable conclusion of their position is that the United States and the Tribe have
an ever-changing, implied water right to require the elimination of any dam, structure,
condition or development of any kind (including agriculture and timber sales) off the
reservation which would affect the "guarantee" of necessary habitat conditions and
viability of every species offish, bird, mammal, plant or insect which the Tribe deems
important.
The issue before this Court in this motion is whether such "ecosystem-based" or
habitat-driven water rights were legally reserved to the Tribe over 140 years ago as
part of an off-reservation :fishing right which the Tribe held "in common" with the
citizens of the Territories. The law is clear. The Tribe has no such off-reservation
implied reserved water right [footnote 3 cited].
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Footnote 2 provides:
The State and Potlatch motions are broader than those filed by Idaho
Power and these objectors. Much of the factual record relied on by
the Tribe and United States admittedly is directed to those other
motions. Whatever factual issues might exist in those motions cannot
be allowed to distract this Court from dealing with the more narrowly
drawn issues in this motion.
Footnote 3 provides:
Objectors offer no opinion on whether on-reservation exclusive fishing
rights are sufficient to impliedly reserve a water right. Merely for the
purposes of this motion, Objectors will assume such a reservation is
possible.
Irrigation District's Reply Brief at 2 and 3 (emphasis theirs).

UNITED STATES AND THE NEZ PERCE TRIBE

In their Joint Memorandum in Opposition to Objectors' Motions for Summary Judgment,
lodged September 18, 1998, the United States and the Nez Perce Tribe state the following issues:

1. Does Article 3 of the Nez Perce Treaty ofJune 11, 1855, 12 Stat. 957, 2 Kappler
702, (hereinafter referred to as the "1855 Treaty") [footnote omitted]contain a
reservation by the Tribe of "[t]he exclusive right of taking fish in all the streams where
running through or bordering said reservation * * * as also the right of taking fish at
all usual and accustomed places in common with citizens of the Territory" and is
fishing the purpose of that reservation?

2. Did the Tribe's reservation of the fishing right in the 1855 Treaty impliedly reserve
a water right for instream flows? In other words, is it necessary that some quantity
of water be left in the stream in order to fulfill the fishing purpose of the treaty
reserved fishing right, such that without any water in the streams, the purpose of the
fishing reservation would be "entirely defeated?"
3. Has the reservation of a fishing right in the 1855 Treaty been abrogated, in
whole or in part, by any subsequent treaty, agreement, or statute?
Joint Memorandum at 6.
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SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES

The Shoshone-Bannock Tribes lodged a Brief in Response to Summary Judgment on
September 18, 1998. This brief does not specifically delineate the "issues" before the Court on
summary judgment, at least not in the format set out in the briefs noted heretofore. The opening
paragraph of the brief states:
The present summary judgment motions involve only the rights of the United States
and Nez Perce Tribe to instream flows for Nez Perce off-reservation treaty fishing
rights. While they do not directly involve such rights for the Shoshone-Bannock
Tribes of the Fort Hall Reservation (hereafter "Shoshone-Bannock"),' we set forth in
this brief our response to these motions because their disposition may constitute
precedent for resolution of similar Shoshone-Bannock rights.
Footnote 1 indicates:
The Shoshone-Bannock Tribes are involved in this subcase as
objectors to a portion of the rights asserted by the Nez Perce Tribe
but have not objected to the majority of the claims.
Shoshone-Bannock Tribe Brief at 1.
In their brief, the Shoshone-Bannock list and discuss the five (5) following assertions.
1.

Every case to consider the question has concluded that treaty fishing rights do
imply a reserved water right to instream flows to protect the fishery.

2.

The cases relied upon by the State and other proponents of summary judgment
do not justify denying the Nez Perce Tribe any right at all to instream flows.

3.

The preservation of off-reservation fisheries is a "primary" purpose of treaties
with Idaho tribes.

4.

Tribes can have reserved water rights to instream flows for fishing sites
outside reservations they do not "own."

5.

The Tribes and the State share the water and fisheries as "quasi-cotenants" and
state action to divert the instream flow would constitute enjoinable waste.

Shoshone-Bannock Brief, Table of Contents at v.
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VII.
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A motion for summary judgment shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P.
56 (c); Olsen v. J.A. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706, 791 P.2d 1285 (1990). All controverted facts
are liberally construed in favor of the nonmoving party. Tusch Enterprises v. Coffin, 113 Idaho
37, 740 P.2d 1022 (1987). The burden at all times is upon the moving party to prove the absence
of a genuine issue of material fact. Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal Company, 92 Idaho 865,
452 P.2d 362 (1969). The moving party's case must be anchored on something more than
speculation, and a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue. R. G. Nelson,

A.IA. v. Steer, 118 Idaho 409, 797 P.2d 117 (1990). All doubts are to be resolved against the
moving party, and the motion must be denied if the evidence is such that conflicting inferences
may be drawn therefrom and if reasonable people might reach different conclusions. Doe v.

Durtschi, 101 Idaho 466, 716 P.2d 1238 (1986). The court is authorized to enter summary
judgment in favor ofnonmoving parties. Barlow's Inc. v. Bannock Cleaning Corp., 103 Idaho
310,647 P.2d 766 (Ct. App. 1982).
Justice McDevitt in Harris v. Dept. ofHealth and Welfare, 123 Idaho 295, 847 P.2d 1156
(1993), stated the standard ofreview for summary judgment this way:
Rule 56(c) of the Idaho rules of Civil Procedure states that summary judgment is to
be "rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to a material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
A strong line of cases weaves a tight web of authority that strictly defines and.
preserves the standards of summary judgment. The reviewing court must liberally
construe disputed facts in favor of the non-moving party and make all reasonable
inferences in favor of the party resisting the motion. If the record contains any
conflicting inferences upon which reasonable minds might reach different conclusions,
summary judgment must be denied. Nevertheless, when a party moves for summary
judgement, the opposing party's case must not rest on mere speculation because a
mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue of fact.
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The burden of proving the absence of a material fact rests at all times upon the
moving party. This burden is onerous because even "circumstantial" evidence can
create a genuine issue of material fact. However, the Court will consider only that
material contained in affidavits or depositions which is based upon personal
knowledge and which would be admissible at trial. Summary judgment is properly
issued when the nonmoving party bearing the burden of proof fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's cases.

Id. at 297-98, 847 P.2d at 1158-59 (citations omitted).
For water rights based on federnl law, the Director of the Idaho Department of Water
Resources abstracts the claim. The abstract does not constitute prima facie evidence of the water
right. The claimant of a water right based on federal law has the ultimate burden of persuasion on
each element of the water right. LC.§ 42-1411A(12).

VIII.
SCOPE OF THESE SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROCEEDINGS
The scope of this Court's ruling on these summary judgment proceedings is strictly limited
to off-reservation instream water right claims for the Nez Perce Tribe or for the United States
as trustee for the Tribe.
This Court's ruling on these summary judgment proceedings does not involve onreservation water rights of any kind, nature, or description.
"Reservation" in this context means the present boundaries of the Nez Perce Reservation.

In this regard, and as the Court clarified with the parties at the oral arguments on summary
judgment on October 13, 1999, these water right claims come before this Court as "Consolidated
Subcase No. 03-10022." See Second Amended Case Management Order, filed April 26, 1996. In
that order, at page 3, the following appears:
All subcases arising under tribal instream flow claims are consolidated into the following
categories:
1. Nez Perce Claims.
All instream flow claims filed by the United States as trustee for the benefit of
the Nez Perce Tribe and all claims filed by the Nez Perce Tribe on its own behalf
Lead subcase is 03-10022.
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It is this Court's understanding that the parties are not in agreement as to the present
boundaries of the Nez Perce Reservation. In fact, as a point of interest (and as will be discussed
in greater detail later in this decision) the United State;' (as trustee on behalf of the Nez Perce
Tribe) Notice of Claim to A Water Right Reserved Under Federal Law, executed on March 23,
1993, and filed with the Court, sets forth, in paragraphs 8 and 11, the "Legal Description of the
Nez Perce Indian Reservation" and "List of Documents Creating Reservation." Affidavit of
Steven W Strack, Exhibit 1, pages 10 and 11. These two paragraphs in this original claim
mention only the 1855 Treaty and the 1863 Treaty with the Nez Perce. Neither mention the
Agreement with the Nez Perce of May 1, 1893, 28 Stat. 326 (ratified August 15, 1894).
Also, by this Court's reading of the Standard Form 4, "Motion to File: Amended Notice of
Claim" of the United States and the Nez Perce Tribe, this document does not address the
reservation boundaries, past or present. Affidavit of Steven W. Strack, Exhibit 2.
In any event, the "Summary of Amended Instream Flow Water Right Claims" contains the
following language:
In March of 1993, the United States submitted 1133 and the Nez Perce Indian Tribe
submitted 1134 water rights claims in the Snake River Basin Adjudication (SRBA)
for stream reaches located within the Salmon, Cleaiwater, Weiser, Payette, and Snake
River drainage. This submittal amends those claims. Through this amendment, the
United States and the Nez Perce Tribe are withdrawing claims for 20 and 21 stream
reaches, respectively and are modifying the original claims for the remaining 1113
stream reaches. These instream flows are claimed to provide fish habitat and the longterm maintenance of that habitat. The original flow claims that were submitted in
1993 included three components: :fish habitat, channel maintenance, and riparian
maintenance. These amended claims contain only the first two of these components
with consideration for the riparian maintenance contained in the channel maintenance
component.
Monthly fish habitat flow claims are submitted for each of the 1113 stream reaches.
These claims are for the instantaneous flows from the first day to the last day of each
month. The channel maintenance claims are made-for 38 stream reaches within the
claim area. These claims are made only when the natural unimpaired streamflow is
at or above the identified channel maintenance flow. These two types of claims are
not additive. The total instream flow claim in a given reach at a specific time is the
larger of the two types of claims.
The attached table summarizes the amended claims and provides a comparison with
the original flow claims submitted in 1993. Further explanation of the claims and
definitions of terms in the attached table are provided below.
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Definition/Explanation
Stream Reach:

The name of the stream section as identified on
USGS 7.5 or 15-minute quadrangle maps.

Tributary to:

The name of the stream to which the subject stream
flows

Reach Number:

An identifying number used by the United States and
the Nez Perce Tribe to refer to each stream reach.
The numbers are identical to those presented in the
location map submitted in 1993 with the original
claims.

From:

Hydrologic node identifying the upstream extent of
the stream reach.
Hydrologic node identifying the downstream extent
of the stream reach.
The Water Right Number (WRN) assigned by the
Idaho Department of Water Resources (IDWR) to
the corresponding 1993 flow claim made by the Nez
Perce Tribe for this stream reach.

BIA#:

The WRN assigned by the IDWR to the
. corresponding 1993 flow claim made by the United
States for this stream reach.

Upstream Location:

Legal Description of upstream point of stream reach
for which instream flows are claimed.

Downstream Location:

Legal Description of downstream point of stream
reach for which instream flows are claimed.

Fish Habitat:

These claims are made for instream flow to provide
suitable fish habitat flows in the reach. The claims
are monthly values representing the instantaneous
flow in cubic feet per second claimed from the first
day to the last day of each month.

New Claim:

These are the amended monthly flow claims for each
reach and channel maintenance claim if included.
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For the 20 withdrawn claims, the table shows new
claims of zero flow.

Old Claim

These are the original monthly flow claims submitted
in 1993. These claims are superseded by the
amended "new claims."

C.M.:

Channel maintenance claims are made for 38 stream
reaches in the claim area. For a specific stream
reach, a number in the C.M. column of the table
indicates that a channel maintenance claim is made
for that reach. The number in the column is the
channel maintenance flow in cubic feet per second.
The channel maintenance claim is for all of the
natural flow in the stream when the natural flow is at
or above the channel maintenance flow. When the
natural flow is below the channel maintenance flow,
no claim is made for channel maintenance.

Affidavit of Steven W. Strack, Exhibit 2, pages 24 and 25.
Because there is no agreement on the location of the present reservation boundaries, and
because these water rights claims are based upon "stream reaches," this Court does not decide the
issues presented herein on the basis of, or with reference to, individual water right claim numbers
or the location of a particular stream reach or portions thereof. Rather, the issues presented
herein are decided generically on the basis of whether the instream water is located off, or outside,
the present reservation boundaries, whatever they may be. In other words, the legal concept of
instream-flow water rights off-reservation is what is decided and not each individual amended
claim.
Lastly, all parties to these proceedings agree that this is the so-called "entitlement phase"
and no issues of "quantity" are presently before the Court, i.e., "entitlement" meaning the
existence of, or non-existence of, off-reservation instream-flow water rights of the Nez Perce
Tribe or for the United States as trustee for the Tribe.
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IX
BRIEF CHRONOLOGY OF TREATIES, AGREElVIENTS, LEGISLATION, AND
LITIGATION AFFECTING THE WATER RIGHT CLAIMS AT ISSUE HEREIN
Where the existence and scope of claimed treaty rights are not clear from the face of the
respective treaty, they are to be determined by examining the treaties, legislative history,
surrounding circumstances, subsequent history, and subsequent interpretative litigation. Solem v.
Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463,471, 104 S. Ct. 1161, 1166, 79 L.Ed. 2d 443 (1984); Rosebud Sioux
Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 587-88, 97 S. Ct. 1361, 1363-64, 51 L.Ed. 2d 660 (1977).
The Court finds the following brief chronology of the above factors helpful in determining
the existence or non-existence of the claimed off-reservation instream flow water right claims at
issue in this case.

Pre-185 5 Pre Treaty Era
In their Joint Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment, lodged September 18,
1998, the United States and the Tribe state: "Since 'time immemorial,' the Nez Perce Indians
occupied a large geographic area encompassing parts of what is today central Idaho, northeastern
Oregon, and southeastern Washington." Id. at 10.
And, "fishing provided over half of the subsistence needs of the Nez Perce Tribe and it
was unthinkable to either the tribe or the federal negotiators that fish -- much less water -- would
become so scarce." Id. at. 7.
The Nez Perce aboriginal territory consisted of over 13 million acres. Ex. 12, United
States v. Scott, et al., Case No. CR 98-01-N-EJL, (D. Idaho) (Order Re: Jurisdiction, entered
August 12, 1998, unsealed by Order dated August 17, 1998).

1855 Treaty of 1855 at the Walla Walla Council
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On June 11, 1855, Isaac Stevens and other representatives of the United States entered
into a treaty with representatives of the Nez Perce Tribe whereby the Tribe ceded approximately
6.5 million acres to the United States in return for, among other things, being secured in
possession of a reservation of approximately 7.5 million acres. Treaty with the Nez Perce Indians,
12 Stat. 957, 2 Kappler 702 (June 11, 1855). This Treaty was ratified by the Senate of the United
States on March 8, 1859, and proclaimed by the President on April 29, 1859.
Article 3 of the 1855 Nez Perce Treaty provides in pertinent part, as follows:
The exclusive right of taking fish in all the streams where running through or
bordering said reservation is :further secured to said Indians; as also the right of taking
fish at all usual and accustomed places in common with the citizens of the Territory;
***

1863 Treaty of 1863 at the Lapwai Treaty Council
On June 9, 1863, representatives of the Unites States entered into a treaty whereby the
Nez Perce ceded an additional 6 million acres ofland to the United States. The 1863 Treaty
reduced the Nez Perce Reservation to approximately 750,000 acres. Article 8 of the 1863 Treaty
provided that "all the provisions of said treaty which are not abrogated or specifically changed by
any article herein contained, shall remain the same to all intents and purposes as formerly, -- the
same obligations resting upon the United States, the same privileges continued to the Indians
outside of the reservation, and the same rights secured to citizens of the U.S. as to right of way
upon the streams and over the roads which may run through said reservation, as are therein set
forth." i:e., as is relevant here, the "fishing in common" right, off-reservation remained intact. In
other words, the hunting and fishing rights retained on the lands ceded in the 1863 Treaty are
identical to the hunting and fishing rights retained outside the 1855 Reservation. 14 Stat. 647
(ratified April 17, 1867).

1887 Indian General Allotment Act
In 1887 Congress passed the General Allotment Act, popularly known as the Dawes Act,
ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 331 et seq.) which authorized division of
Indian reservations into separate parcels for individual Indians. The purpose of the act was to
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encourage individual agricultural pursuits among the Indians \vith the surplus lands (non-allotted)
to be sold to non-Indians.

By the tenns of the General Allotment Act, each member of a tribe -- man, woman or
child -- could be allotted one-eighth of a section of land (80 acres) for farming purposes, or oneforth of a section ofland (160 acres) for grazing purposes. Act of February 8, 1887, 24 Stat. 388;

as amended by Act of February 28, 1891, 01, 26 Stat. 794. Following allotment, the Secretary
of Interior was authorized to negotiate for the "purchase and release" of all reservation lands not
allotted to tribal members. Act of February 8, 1887, § 5, 24 Stat. 388.
Pursuant to the General Allotment Act, the Secretary of Interior ordered the allotment of
the Nez Perce Reservation, and lands were allotted to individual Nez Perce during the years 1889
to 1892. Thereafter a Commission was appointed by the United States which was authorized to
negotiate an agreement for the cession of the remaining surplus lands (all unallotted lands).

1893 Agreement with the Nez Perce
On May 1, 1893, the Nez Perce Tribe and the United States entered into an agreement
wherein the Tribe agreed to "cede, sell, relinquish, and convey to the United States all their claim,
right, title and interest" to the unallotted portions of the then existing Reservation, save for some
32,020 acres of timberland to be set aside for the common use of tribal members. 1893
Agreement, Art. 1. For the cession of their lands the Tribe received consideration in the amount
of $1,626,222. Id., Art. 3.
The 1893 Agreement was ratified by Congress on August 15, 1894, 28 Stat. 326 and the
unallotted lands of the fonner Reservation were opened to non-Indian settlement by Presidential
Proclamation on November 8, 1895. Id.
The 1893 Agreement contained Article XI, a savings clause, which provides: "The existing
provisions of all former treaties with said Nez Perce Indians not inconsistent with the provisions
of this agreement are hereby continued in full force and effect. 11
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1905 United States v. Winans
In 1905, the United States Supreme Court decided United States v. Winans, 198 U.S.
3 71, a case dealing with treaty language regarding "the right of taking fish at all usual and
accustomed places in common with the citizens of the territory." In part, the case held "that a
treaty was not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant of rights from them -- a reservation of
those not granted." Id. at 379.

1908 United States v Winters
In 1908 the United States Supreme Court decided United States v. Winters, 207 U.S. 564.
In this seminal case, the Court established the implied federal reserved water right commonly
referred to as the "Winters" doctrine. It is arguable that this "doctrine" sets out no substantive
rule of law, but is merely a special rule of construction used to divine original intent with respect
to water rights on federal reservations where the organic document is silent on the subject. In any
event, the doctrine is sensibly applied where century-old treaties, legislation, or executive orders
left a gap which, if not filled through an implied right, would destroy an essential purpose of a
reservation of federal land.

1987 SRBA General Adjudication is Commenced
In 1987, a petition was filed by the State ofidaho, ex rel. A. Kenneth Dunn in his official
capacity as Director of the Idaho Department of Water Resources, for the general adjudication of
all water rights in the Snake River Basin pursuant to LC. §§ 42-1406(A) and 42-1407. The water
right claims at issue herein were thereafter filed in this case.

1994 Nez Perce Tribe v. Idaho Power Company
On March 21, 1994, Nez Perce Tribe v. Idaho Power Company, 847 F. Supp. 791
(D. Idaho 1994), was decided. The Nez Perce Tribe had brought an action against Idaho Power
Company seeking monetary damages for reduction in numbers of fish in fish runs its members had
treaty rights to fish.
Among other things, the Court sustained the finding that:
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(T]he tribes do not own the fish but only have a treaty right which provides an
opportunity to catch fish if they are present at the accustomed fishing grounds.
In the Court's view, monetary damages for loss of property cannot be awarded for
injury to a fish run in which the plaintiff tribe owns only an opportunity to

exploit.

Id. at 795, 796 (emphasis added).
1998 South Dakota v. YanI"ton Sioux Tribe
On January 26, 1998, the United States Supreme Court issued its unanimous decision in

South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, et al., 118 S. Ct. 789 (1998). This case interpreted the Act
of August 15, 1894, 28 Stat. 286, the common statute in which Congress considered and ratified
the Siletz, Nez Perce (1893 Agreement), and Yankton surplus land sale agreements. The Court
expressly held that the unallotted, ceded lands were severed from the Yankton Reservation and
the reservation was diminished (diminished meaning the boundaries of the reservation as
delineated in the previous treaties were reduced to pie lands retained in the 1894 Act).

X.
FINDINGS OF FACT FOR PURPOSES OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Although not mandatory, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are encouraged in
Summary Judgment cases. Keesee v. Fetzck, 111 Idaho 360,361, 723 P.2d 904,905 (Ct. App.
1986). Based on affidavits filed in this action, and talcing into account the historical background
surrounding the Treaties, as well as the Treaty negotiations, this Court finds the following facts
for purposes of summary judgment. These facts are either uncontroverted, or if controverted, are
found to exist. By this the Court means that the Nez Perce assert these are the facts, and for
summary judgment purposes only, the Court accepts these as accurate to determine whether even
under these set of facts the Court can render summary judgment, i.e., assuming the asserted facts
to be true, is there a water right? While several of these were mentioned in the last section, they
have been repeated here.
1.

Since "time immemorial," the Nez Perce Indian Tribe historically occupied a
geographic region consisting of between 13-14 million acres located in what today
consists of central Idaho, northeastern Oregon and southeastern Washington.
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2.

Historically, Nez Perce sustenance consisted of fish, roots, berries, game, and other
plant products. Fish comprised up to one-half of the Tribe's total food supply with
each tribal member consuming between 300 to 600 lbs. of salmon per year. In
addition to sustenance, fish and fishing were important to the spiritual well being,
culture, and traditions of the Nez Perce. This importance remains to the present day.

3.

In 1848 the Oregon Territorial Act was passed creating the Oregon Territory. The
Washington Territory Act was passed in 1853.3· Both Acts expressly recognized
Indian title to lands. In 1850, Congress enacted the Oregon Donation Act which gave
non-Indian settlers title to land. As a result, a conflict arose between the Indian
inhabitants and the non-Indian settlers.

4.

In 1853, Isaac Stevens was appointed as the first governor of the Washington
Territory. The position also carried with it the superintendancy oflndian affairs for
the territory. In 1854, Stevens lobbied Congress for appropriations for the purpose of
negotiating treaties with the various indigenous tribes. Stevens prepared a "model
treaty" to be used at the various treaty councils .

. 5.

In 1855, the Walla Walla Treaty Council was convened. The Council involved
various Indian Tribes including the Nez Perce Tribe. Minutes were kept of the
negotiation proceedings. See Certified Copy of the Original Minutes of the Official
Proceedings at the Council in Walla Walla Valley, Which Culminated in the Stevens
Treaty of 1855. The Treaty was subsequently ratified by the United States Senate in
1859. See Treaty of 1855, 12 Stat. 957 (June 11, 1855).

6.

Pursuant to the 1855 Treaty, the Nez Perce Tribe agreed to cede approximately 6.5
million acres of aboriginal territory to the United States. In exchange, the Nez Perce
Tribe reserved approximately 7.5 million acres for an Indian reservation. Various
rights and privileges were also reserved to the Nez Perce Tribe. However, neither the
Nez Perce Tribe or the United States government specifically intended to reserve an
in-stream flow water right Article III of the 1855 Treaty provided, among other
things, as follows:
The exclusive right of taking fish in all the streams where running
through or bordering said reservation is further secured to said Indians;
as also the right of taking fish at all usual and accustomed places in
common with the citizens of the Territory; * * *.
This treaty language was not unique to the Nez Perce Treaty. The identical or
substantially similar language was contained in other Steven's treaties, as well as the

3 Between 1853 and 1863, the Washington Territory included portions of present day Idaho.
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model treaty. Both the Treaty and the minutes from the Treaty negotiation were
silent on the issue of water rights for fish preservation.
7.

In 1863, the Nez Perce entered into the Treaty of Lapwai with the United States.
This treaty came about as a result of the discovery of gold on lands under control of
the Nez Perce Tribe. Because of tensions between trespassing prospectors and the
Nez Perce people, treaty negotiations were reopened. Pursuant to the 1863 Treaty,
the Nez Perce Tribe relinquished additional lands reserving approximately 750,000
acres of the former Reservation as the new Indian Reservation. See Treaty with Nez
Perce, June 9, 1863, 14. Stat. 647 (ratified April 17, 1867). This Treaty was also
silent as to the reservation of an in-stream flow water right. Article VIII of this
Treaty also provided:
[A ]11 the provisions of the said treaty which are not abrogated or
specifically changed by any article herein contained, shall remain the
same to all intents and purposes as formerly, -- the same obligations
resting upon the United States, the same privileges continued to the
Indians outside the reservation.

8.

On May 1, 1893, the Nez Perce Tribe and the United States entered into an
agreement for the cession of the unallotted lands in accordance with the General
Allotment Act. Pursuant to Article I of the 1893 Agreement, the Nez Perce agreed
to:
[C]ede, sell, relinquish, and convey to the United States all their claim,
right, title and interest in and to all the unallotted lands within the limits
of said reservation, saving and excepting the following described tracts
of lands, which are hereby retained by the Indians....
The Nez Perce Tribe retained 32,020 acres ofland to be held in common by the
members of the Tribe. 1893 Agreement, Art. 1. For the cession of their former
lands, the Tribe received consideration in the amount of $1,626,222.00. 1893
Agreement, Art. III. The agreement also provided that:
The existing provisions of all former treaties with said Nez Perce
Indians not inconsistent with the provisions of this agreement are
hereby continued and in full force and effect.

1893 Agreement, Art. XI.

XI
BASIS OF THE NEZ PERCE CLAIMS:
FEDERAL RESERVED WATER RIGHT V. INDIAN RESERVED WATER RIGHT
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The Objectors (movants in these summary judgment proceedings) in this case have
challenged or put at issue, among other things, the viability of the legal theory on which the Nez
Perce claims are predicated. The Nez Perce Tribe and the United States (collectively "Nez Perce"
or "Claimants"), as the non-moving parties, must provide evidence in the record in support of
each element comprising the Nez Perce claims. See Thomson v. Idaho Insurance Agency, Inc.,
126 Idaho 527,531, 887 P.2d 1034, 1038 (1994); Snap on Tools, Inc. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct.
1045, 1052 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S. Ct 2548, 91 L.Ed. 2d 265
(1986)) (applying summary judgment standard to treaty interpretation) .

1.

THE LEGAL ELEMENTS OF THE NEZ PERCE CLAIMS

The legal cause of action on which the Nez Perce claims are predicated is referred to as an
Indian reserved water right. The Claimant's have made it clear and explicit to the Court through
both briefing and at oral argument that they are not claiming an implied federal reserved water
right, sometimes referred to as the "Winters Doctrine.',4 The Nez Perce and the United States
state in their joint memorandum "here the reservation at issue is the Tribe's reservation of a fishing
right from those lands ceded in 1855, not a 'reservation' ofland from the public domain, as is the
case with the non-Indian federally reserved water right." United States' and Nez Perce Tribes'

Joint Memorandum in Opposition to Objectors' Motions for Summary Judgment ("Joint
Ji.,femorandum ") at 85. The Claimant's frame the elements as follows:
1) Did the Nez Perce Tribe reserve in the 1855 treaty the right of taking fish?
2) Has that right been exhausted?
3) Is some quantity of water necessary to fulfill that right?
In setting forth the elements that comprise an Indian reserved water right, a distinction
between the two concepts (Indian v. Federal) is necessary because unfortunately the legal
precedent upon which this Court must rely for guidance has a tendency to blur the distinction.

4

Again, this Court is using the term "doctrine" as descriptive of the legal precedent but recognizing that
there is a difference of opinion as to whether the "doctrine" is a rule of law or merely the application
of a judicial cannon of interpretation.
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A.

The Federal Reserved Water Right.

The federal government has generally deferred to state law with respect to establishing
water rights. Stated another way, a state generally has plenary control over water located within
its boundaries. See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 86 (1907). An exception to that general
rule is recognized when the federal government withdraws land from the public domain, either
through legislation, executive order, treaty or other agreement. Reserved water rights may be
either express or implied. See United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 699-700, 98 S.Ct.
3012, 3013-3014 (1978). Where the withdrawal of the public land is silent as to the issue of
water rights, the law will imply that the government intended to reserve the necessary amount of
appurtenant water so as to effectuate the purpose for which the land was withdrawn. Cappaert v.

United'States, 426 U.S. 128, 138, 96 S.Ct. 2062, 2069 (1976). The purpose being effectuated
must be determined to be a primary purpose of the withdrawal as opposed to a secondary
purpose. United States v. New Mexico at 715-716, 98 S.Ct. at 3021-3022. A federal reserved
water right, under the prior appropriation doctrine, takes a priority date corresponding to the date
the land was withdrawn from the public domain. Cappaert. 426 U.S. at 138, 96 S.Ct. at 2069.
Idaho has recognized and followed this legal precedent in acting on water rights. United States v.

State, 131 Idaho 468, 469-70, 959 P.2d 449, 450-51 (1998).

B.

The Indian Reserved Water Right.

In contrast to an implied federal reserved water right, an Indian reserved water right is the
recognition by the federal government of an aboriginal right (i.e. hunting or fishing) either
reserved by the Indians or not expressly ceded by the Indians through a respective treaty or other
agreement. The existence of the right rests on the interpretation of the treaty so as to ascertain
the intent of the parties. Interpretation of the treaty is governed by the application of various
I

established canons or principles of Indian treaty interpretation. The foremost principle being the
recognition that the Indian Tribe and the United States are independent sovereigns and that a
treaty with an Indian Tribe constitutes a grant of rights to the United States from the Indians, not
a grant of rights from the United States to the Indians. Thus any rights not expressly granted in
the treaty by the Indians are reserved to the Indians. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 373,
25 S.Ct. 662, 664 (1905); United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1413 (9th Cir. 1984); State v.
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McConville, 65 Idaho 46, 50 (1943). Any rights reserved to the Indians can only be tenninated
by acts of Congress. South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 118 S.Ct. 789, 798 (1998)(citing

Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1677, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978).
Another canon is that Indian treaties must be interpreted as the Indians themselves would have
understood them. This canon results from the disparity between the parties with respect to
understanding the English language. Washington v. Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S.
658, 676, 99 S. Ct. 3055, 3069, 61 L.Ed. 2d 823 (1979). Any ambiguities must be resolved in
favor of the Indians. Id. at 675-76, 99 S. Ct. at 3069-70. Treaties are construed more liberally
than private agreements and to ascertain their meaning courts may look beyond the writing itself
to the history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by the parties.

United States v. Washington, 135 F.2d 618, 630 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Eastern Airlines, Inc. v.
Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 535 (1991)). Indian rights have been "confrrmed" through treaty
interpretation based on the application of the foregoing canons. See Winans, supra, at 373, 25
S.Ct. at 664 (reserved right of access to fishing grounds); United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394
th

(9 Cir. 1983)(reserved on-reservation water right for fishing);. McConville, supra at 50.
(recognizing reserved right to fish); Montana v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 712
P.2d 754 (Mont. 1985)(distinguishing between federal and Indian reserved water rights).
Unlike an implied federal reserved right, the priority date of an Indian reserved water right
is predicated on the historical use by the respective Tribe and can relate back to "time
immemorial." Adair, supra at 1414.

C.

Distinguishing Between the Two Theories.

Although the implied federal reserved water right can apply where land is withdrawn from
the public domain for the purpose of an Indian Reservation, the two types of rights are
fundamentally different. The confusion results not only from the seminal case, Winters v. United

States, 207 U.S. 564, 28 S.Ct. 207 (1908), which established the implied federal reserved water
right, but also in the manner in which the courts have blurred the distinction between the two
concepts. In Winters, supra, the federal government, by agreement with the Indians, created the
Fort Belknap Indian Reservation in 1888. The purpose of the reservation was to convert the
Indians to an agrarian culture. The agreement, however, was silent as to the water rights
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necessary for irrigation. Thereafter, conflict over water arose between the Indians and non-Indian
settlers.
The United States Supreme Court ruled that the Indian Tribe on the Fort Belknap Indian
Reservation had a water right with a priority date coinciding with the date the reservation was
created. Id. at 569, 28 S.Ct. at 212. The United States Supreme Court, however, was ambiguous
as to how the water right was created. The Winters court first appeared to be asserting the
reasoning set forth in an earlier 1905 decision of United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
In Wincms, the court acknowledged that a treaty was not a grant of right to the Indians, but rather
a grant from them to the United States, thereby reserving any of those rights not expressly
granted, which is the basis of the Indian reserved right. Winans, 198 U.S. at 373, 25 S.Ct. at 664.
The Winters court, however, shifted its discussion to the federal government's authority to
reserve waters at the time of the establishment of the reservation. Id. at 569, 28 S.Ct. at 212.
Ultimately, the basis for the Supreme Court's decision turned on the federal government's implied
reservation of the water right. Although many commentators have argued that Winters was
merely a canon of interpretation as to the federal government's intent and was limited to the facts,
that concept was subsequently rejected by the United States Supreme Court. Fifty years later in
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 83 S. Ct. 1468 (1963), the Supreme Court held that the
federal government had reserved water in the creation of five Indian reservations. The Court's
analysis, however, focused solely on the federal government's power to reserve water for the
Indians, rather than looking to ancient water rights that were never relinquished by the Tribes. As
such, the tribal water rights took a priority date coinciding with the establishment of the
respective Indian reservation.
In Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 96 S.Ct. 2062 (1976), the United States
Supreme Court applied the federal reserved rights doctrine beyond an Indian reservation. In
finding a water right, the Court reviewed the basis of the implied federal reserved right:
This Court has long held that when the Federal Government withdraws its land from
the public domain and reserves it for a federal purpose, the Government, by
implication, reserves appurtenant water then unappropriated to the extent needed to
accomplish the purpose of the reservation.
In determining whether there is a federally reserved water right implicit in the
reservation of public land, the issue is whether the Government intended to reserve
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unappropriated and thus availabl·e water. Intent is implied if the previously
unappropriated waters are necessary to accomplish the purposes for which the
reservation was created.

Id. at 139, 96 S.Ct. 2069-70.
In a subsequent case, United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 98 S. Ct 3012 (1978), a
case involving the reservation of water for a national forest, the United States. Supreme Court
held that federal reserved water rights could only be established for primary rather than secondary
purposes of the reservation of land.
In sum, the confusion arises because the reservation of water rights for Indian
Reservations arose out of the implied federal reserved water right doctrine, rather than a
reservation of rights by the Indians via treaty. Unfortunately, the trend in the courts is to merge
the two concepts into the same category of implied reserved water rights despite the concepts
being distinct from one another.

D. The Origination of the Nez Perce Reserved Water Right Claims.
The Nez Perce claims originate from the 1855 Treaty language together with reliance on
the application of the principles of treaty interpretation to establish the Indian reserved water right
claimed here. Again, both the Nez Perce and the federal government have stated in briefing and
at oral argument that they are not contending the existence of an implied federal reserved water
right in either party to the Treaty. In Article I of the 1855 Treaty, the Nez Perce ceded their
"right, title and interest" in their aboriginal grounds subject to certain enumerated reservations.
The reservation giving rise to the claimed water rights is contained in Article III of the Treaty,
which states in relevant part as follows:
The exclusive right of taking fish in all streams where running through or bordering
said reservation is secured to the Indians; as also the right of taking fish at all usual
and accustomed places in common with the citizens of the territory ....
Treaty with Nez Perce, June 11, 1855, 12 Stat 957.
The foregoing treaty provision does not expressly reserve or otherwise create a water
right in either party to the Treaty. Further, the Nez Perce, as well as the federal government, both
concede that neither party intended to either reserve or create a water right to protect fish habitat
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because the degradation offish habitat was simply not contemplated back in 1855. Rather, the
Nez Perce rely on the application of subsequently adopted principles ofindian treaty construction
as applied to the treaty language. Such principles take into account the aboriginal importance of
fishing to the Nez Perce culture, the history surrounding the 1855 treaty, the treaty negotiations,
as well as the treaty language for purposes of establishing the claimed Indian reserved water right.
The Nez Perce argue that an in-stream flow water right necessarily accompanies or is otherwise
integral to the preservation of their reserved fishing right and without it that right becomes a
"hollow promise."5 The argument is predicated on the reasoning that since fish require water, in
order to give meaningful effect to that fishing right, a wat~r right must have also been necessarily
implied, i.e. reserved to the Tribe. Further, because of the importance of fish and the act of
engaging in fishing, to the Nez Perce culture, the Tribe would not have intentionally surrendered
those water rights necessary to maintain its fishing right. The Nez Perce cite authority wherein it
was held that an implied water right was reserved for maintaining a hunting or fishing right. See

Joint Board of Control of the Flathead Irrig. Dist. v. United States, 832 F2d 1127 (9 th Cir.
1987), cert. denied 486 U.S. 1007 (1988); Kittitas Reclamation Dist. V. Sunnyside Valley Irrig.

Dist., 763 F.2d 1032 (9 th Cir. 1985); United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394 (9 th Cir 1983) cert.
denied, 467 U.S. 1252 (1984); Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42 (9 th Cir.
1981); United States v. Anderson, 591 F. Supp. 1 (1982).
The Nez Perce further argue that the distinction between "on-reservation11 and "offreservation" water rights is legally irrelevant, because the water right does not originate from a
reservation or withdrawal of land, rather the right originates from the reservation of a fishing right
pursuant to the 1855 Treaty. Lastly, the Nez Perce assert, that since intent is at issue and
evidence is required for the purpose of construing intent under principles of treaty interpretation,
that genuine issues of material fact exist and therefore the case cannot be decided on summary
judgment.

2.

IN APPLYING THE MOTION.FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD, THE ISSUE OF INTENT
CAN BE DECIDED AS A MATTER OF LAW.

5

The scope of this decision does not consider or othen,vise take into account whether or not existing instream
flow levels have threatened the Nez Perce's off reservation fishing rights.
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Indian Treaty Interpretation is a Question of Law, if the Terms of the Treaty
are Clear and Unambiguous, or have a Settled Legal Meaning, then
Summary Judgment is Appropriate.
In opposition to the motions for summary judgment, the Nez Perce argue that this Court
cannot rule on the issues presented on summary judgment because Treaty interpretation requires
reliance on the consideration of the history surrounding the Treaty, an understanding of the
importance of fishing to the Nez Perce culture, as well as examination of the Treaty negotiations
in order to arrive at the intent of the parties. Specifically, the Nez Perce state: "[T]he Nez
Perce's understanding of the reserved fishing right, and by extension, the right to water implied
by that reservation, cannot be discerned without an understanding of the culture which the treaty
negotiators represented, the history of the Tribe's reliance on its fishery, the historical context of
the Treaty negotiations, and other purely factual issues." See Nez Perce Tribe's Joint

Memorandum at 80. Thus the contention is that genuine issues of material fact exist. Further,
the Nez Perce have filed affidavits in support of their opposition. The Nez Perce contend
further that these affidavits remain uncontroverted by the Objectors, and therefore the case is
not ripe for summary judgment. This Court disagrees.
Treaty interpretation is similar to contract interpretation. Bonanno v. United States, 12
Cl. Ct. 769, 771(1987). However, unlike contract interpretation, the interpretation of a treaty,
including an Indian treaty, is a question of law for the Court to decide. Cayuga Indian Nation

ofNew Yorkv. Cuomo, 758 F. Supp. 107, 110 (N.D.N.Y. 1991)(citing United States ex rel.
Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9 th Cir. 1986). The examination of a treaty's
negotiating history and purpose does not render its interpretation a matter of fact, but merely
serves as an aid to the legal determination which is at the heart of all treaty interpretation.

Bonanno at 772. Stare decisis applies to questions oflaw. Id. at 771. Further, in the realm of
contract law, the initial determination whether a contract term is ambiguous is a question oflaw.

City ofPocatello v. City of Chubbuck, 127 Idaho 198,201, 899 P.2d 411,414 (1995). If the
terms of the contract are clear and unambiguous, or have a settled legal meaning, the
interpretation of the meaning of the contract is a question oflaw. Id. In this case, since treaty
interpretation is a question oflaw, much like statutory interpretation, the case can necessarily be
decided on summary judgment. Additionally, however, the meaning of the subject "fishing in
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common" treaty language has already been construed by the United States Supreme Court and is
therefore unambiguous. Consequently, there are no genuine issues of material fact to be
resolved by the Court.
Finally, in drawing inferences in favor of the Nez Perce (the non-moving party) there are
still no genuine issues of material fact. This Court's analysis begins with the premise that neither
the United States government nor the Nez Perce Tribe specifically intended to reserve a water
right because the issue of water was never contemplated in 1855. Both parties have identified this
in briefing and at oral argument. Thus, this Court is not being asked to construe actual intent.
Accordingly, nothing in the record is submitted as being probative of actual intent. Rather, this
Court is being asked to view the history of the Treaty, the Nez Perce culture, the Treaty
negotiations, and then imply that the Nez Perce reserved a water right as a necessary component
of their reserved fishing right or to otherwise give effect to that right. The affidavits submitted by
the Nez Perce are probative of the importance of fish and fishing to the Nez Perce culture, as well
as the importance of water to the fish habitat. However, whether the Court draws all favorable
inferences from the facts in favor of the Nez Perce, or accepts the Nez Perce's facts as
uncontroverted, because the subject Treaty language has a well settled legal meaning and is. not
ambiguous, resolution on summary judgment is appropriate. In sum, even if this Court assumes
that all the Nez Perce's factual allegations are true as to the historical importance of the fish runs,
the Court can still rule on this issue as a matter oflaw. See Nez Perce Tribe v. Idaho Power

Company, 847 F. Supp. 79, 796 (D. Idaho 1994).

B.

The "Fishing in Common" Treaty Language Has Settled Legal Meaning.

The heart of the issue in this case is interpretation of the 1853 Treaty language "the right
of taking fish at all usual and accustomed places in common with the citizens of the territory .... "
This is the only language in the Treaty which secures to the Nez Perce an off-reservation fishing
right. However, since the meaning and scope of this language has already been interpreted by the
United States Supreme Court, the language has a settled legal meaning. In Washington v.

Passenger Vessel Fishing Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 99 S. Ct. 3055, 61 L.Ed 2d 823 (1979), at issue
was the scope of the fishing right reserved to various Indian Tribes created by operation of the
following similar treaty term: "[T]he right of taking fish and all usual and accustomed grounds and
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stations ... in common with the citizens of the territory." The subject treaty language was
contained in a series of six Steven's treaties negotiated between various Indian Tribes located west
of the Cascades and Isaac Stevens on behalf of the United States. Specifically, at issue in Fishing
Vessel was whether the "fishing in common" language reserved to the Indians merely a right of
guaranteed access across private ground to exercise their off-reservation fishing rights or whether
the language conferred on the Indians the broader right to harvest a share of the anadromous fish
runs. Because of the conflicting interpretations regarding the meaning of the "fishing in common"
language as between the state and federal courts, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari "to interpret this important treaty provision." Id. at 674.
In interpreting the Treaty language, the Supreme Court took into account the vital
importance which fish had to the Indians. Id. at 667, 99 S. Ct. at 3065. The Court also
concluded that because of the abundance of fish at the time the treaty was executed, neither party
to the treaty contemplated a need for future regulation or allocation. Id. at 668-69, 99 S. Ct. at
3066. In defining the Treaty language, the Supreme Court held:
In our view, the purpose and language of the treaties are unambiguous; they secure
the Indians' right to take a share of each run of fish that passes through tribal areas.
The purport of our cases is clear. Non-treaty :fishermen may not rely on property law
concepts, devices such as the fish wheel, license fees, or general regulations to deprive
the Indians of a fair share of the relevant runs of anadromous fish in the case area.
Nor may treaty fishermen rely on their exclusive right of access to the reservations to
destroy the rights of other "citizens of the Territory. 11 Both sides have a right,
secured by treaty to take a fair share of the available fish. That, we think is
what the parties to the treaty intended when they secured to the Indians the
right of taking fish in common with other citizens.

Id. at 679, 684-85, 99 S.Ct. 3071, 3074 (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court, however, also makes it clear the fishing right is a limited, rather than
an absolute guarantee or entitlement. In setting up the percentage allocations for the fish run
harvest, the Court set maximums, but not minimums. The Court also noted that the maximum
could also be modified in response to changing circumstances. Id at 687, 99 S. Ct. at 3075. The
Court stated:
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We need not now decide whether priority for [ceremonial and subsistence needs]
would be required in a period of short supply in order to carry out the purposes of the
treaty.

Id. at 688, 99 S. Ct. at 3076.
Although the Nez Perce were not parties to treaties at issue in Fishing Vessel, because of
the similarities between the Steven's treaties, and the use of almost identical language, when
interpreting Steven's treaties, the Untied States Supreme Court has looked to cases construing
other Steven's treaties for guidance. The Ninth Circuit also follows this approach. See Nez Perce

Tribe v. Idaho Power Co., 847 F. Supp. 791 (D. Idaho 1994) (citing United States v. Oregon,
718 F.2d 299, 301-02 & n.2 (9 th Cir. 1983); Sohappy v. Smith, 529 F.2d 570, 573-74 (9 th Cir.
1974). Fishing Vessel is analogous to the instant case in several important respects. First, the
importance of fish and engaging in fishing was vitally important to the Indians in Fishing Vessel.
The Supreme Court began its analysis with that premise in construing the parties' intent, noting
that the religious rites of the Indians were intended to insure the return of the salmon and that fish
constituted a major part of the Indian diet. In fact, the Indians west of the Cascades were known
as the "fish eaters." Id. at 665, n. 6. The importance of anadromous fish runs could not have
been of any less significance than the. fish runs were to the Nez Perce. Stated another way, the
importance of the anadromous fish runs to the Nez Perce could not have been of greater
significance than it was to the "fish eaters" west of the Cascades.6
Next, the "right to fish in common" provision contained in the 1855 Nez Perce Treaty is
essentially the same as the treaty language contained in the series of treaties at issue in Fishing

Vessel. This language is also essentially the same language that is contained in the model treaty
which Stevens prepared for negotiations with the various Indian Tribes in the Washington
Territory, including the Nez Perce. Lastly, the parties to the treaties in Fishing Vessel did not
contemplate that their fishing right would be impeded by subsequent technology (fishing wheels),
property law concepts (right of access), or regulation (conservation laws) at the time the treaty
was being negotiated. Likewise, the parties to the 1855 Nez Perce Treaty did not intend to

6 Again, this Court recognizes that the extent of the fish's importance to the Nez Perce is
disputed by the Objectors.
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reserve an instream flow water right because neither party to the Treaty contemplated a problem
would arise in the future pertaining to fish habitat.
In this regard, the Fishing Vessel decision is decisive in several respects. First, the
Supreme Court holds that the meaning of the "fishing in common language" is unambiguous. As
such, this Court is required to follow the Supreme Court's interpretation under principles of stare
decisis. The Supreme Court interprets the subject language as granting (reserving) an offreservation fishing right. The scope of that right includes the larger right to a proportionate share
of the fish run. The contention in Fishing Vessel was that the language merely conferred a right
of access to exercise tribal fishing rights. The Supreme Court held the right is broader and
actually means a proportionate right to the share of the harvest. Now the Nez Perce asks this
Court to take the additional leap and by judicial fiat declare a water right for that purpose. The
Supreme Court's interpretation does not support that contention. Nowhere in the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the language is a water or other property right greater than an access or
allocation right mentioned for purposes of giving effect to the fishing right, or as being within that
scope of the fishing right. In fact, the entire decision is a remedy predicated on the assumption
that the fluctuations in the fish population is completely out of the control of the parties.
Second, the Supreme Court's interpretation is inconsistent with the creation of a water
right. The off-reservation fishing right does not guarantee a predetermined amount of fish,
establish a minimum amount of fish, or otherwise require maintenance of the status quo. Rather,
the right extends to a proportionate share of the available fish run, whatever that run may be.
Implicit in the ruling is the recognition the fish runs will vary or even be subject to shortages.
This recognition is therefore inconsistent with the assertion that a water right is necessary for
maintenance of fish habitat or fish propagation. Simply put, the Nez Perce do not have an
absolute right to a predetermined· or consistent level of fish. In times of shortages, the Supreme
Court noted that it may be necessary to reaUocate proportionate shares to meet the subsistence or
ceremonial needs of the Tribe. Consequently an implied water right is not necessary for the
maintenance of the fishing right as it has been defined by the Supreme Court.
The Fishing Vessel decision also embraces earlier rulings of the United States Supreme
Court which hold that off-reservation treaty fisherman are subject to state regulation imposed for
purposes of species conservation. This regulation places further limitations on the scope of the
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off-reservation fishing right. In Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game of Washington, 391 U.S.
392, 88 S. Ct. 1725 (1968), (Puyallup I), the Supreme Court addressed the issue regarding the
ability of the State of.Washington to regulate the off-reservation fishing right of the Indians. The
fishing rights at issue were derived from the "right of taking fish at all usual and accustomed
places in common with the citizens of the territory" language contained in the Treaty of Medicine
Creek, which was also one of the treaties at issue in Fishing Vessel. The Treaty fishermen were
using nets for the commercial fishing of salmon, which was prohibited by state law. In
determining the scope of the fishing right, the Supreme Court began its analysis with the
assumption that fishing with nets by the Indians was customary at the time of the Treaty. Also,
that traditionally there were commercial aspects to the fishing at that same time. However, the
Supreme Court reasoned that because the right was a nonexclusive right, and because the Treaty
was silent as to whether the Indians could exercise the right in their "usuai and accustomed
manner," the State could regulate the manner and purpose of fishing. The Supreme Court held
that although the "right" to fish could not be qualified by the State, "the manner of fishing, the
size of the take, the restriction of commercial fishing, and the like may be regulated in the interest
of conservation by the State in the interest of conservation, provided the regulation meets
appropriate standards and does not discriminate against the Indians." Id. at 398, 88 S. Ct. at
1728.
In Puyallup Tribe v. Dept. of Game of Washington, 433 U.S. 173, 97 S. Ct. 2616
(1977)(Puyallup III), the Supreme Court stated that the power of the State was adequate for
protection of the fish. Referring to an earlier case, the Supreme Court stated:
Speaking for the Court, :Mr. Justice Douglas plainly stated that the power of the State
is adequate to assure the survival of the steelhead:
We do not imply that these fishing rights persist down to the very last steelhead in the
river. Rights can be controlled by the need to conserve a species; and the time may
come when the life of a steelhead is so precarious in a particular stream that all fishing
should be banned until the species regains assurance of survival. The police power
of the State is adequate to prevent the steelhead from following the fate of the
passenger pigeon; and the Treaty does not give the Indians a federal right to
pursue the last living steelhead until it enters their nets.
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Id. at 176, 97 S. Ct. at 2623 (citing Wash. Dept. of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44, 49, 94
S. Ct. 330, 333 (1973)(Puyallup II))(emphasis added).
Consequently, the scope of the subject fishing rights is further limited in that the State can
regulate the right for conservation purposes. In fact, the State is essentially charged with
imposing regulations for conserving the fish. The converse is not true in that the Indians cannot
impose regulations on the non-treaty off reservation fisherman for purposes of conservation. See,

e.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 101 S. Ct. 1245, 67 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1981) (holding
Crow Tribe could not regulate non-tribal hunters and fishermen on land owned in fee by nontribal members).
Further support can be found in Nez Perce Tribe v. Idaho Power Company, 847 F. Supp
791 (D. Idaho 1994), in which the Federal District Court ofldaho construed the scope of the
fishing right reserved to the Nez Perce both on and off-reservation. However, unlike the treaties
at issue in Fishing Vessel, Nez Perce Tribe involved construction of the Article III of the exact
treaty which is the subject of this case. At issue was whether the Nez Perce Tribe's fishing rights
were being violated by Idaho Power as a result of three dams being operated by Idaho Power
which allegedly reduced the number of fish on the annual runs. The Nez Perce Tribe sought
monetary damages. In holding that the Tribe was not entitled to monetary damages, the Court's
interpretation of the scope of the fishing right is dispositive of the issues in this case. The Court
acknowledged that the fishing rights were aboriginal in origin and confirmed by the 1855 Treaty.

Id. at 800.
In Nez Perce, the Nez Perce Tribe contended that without monetary damages, their treaty
fishing rights would be meaningless. 7 In concluding that the Nez Perce were not entitled to
monetary compensation, the District Court concluded:
[T]he .primary reason that Indian tribes have not been awarded damages for their
treaty fishing rights in the past is because the tribes do not own the fish, but only
have a treaty right which provides an opportunity to catch fish !f they are

present at the accustomed fishing grounds.

;
Similarly, iri this case, the Nez Perce contend that without water rights, their Treaty rights would be
meaningless.
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Id. at 795(emphasis added). Further, the Court held that neither the Nez Perce Tribe nor any of
its enrolled members have a property interest in any particular number of fish in the runs unless
the fish are actually present in the river and can be caught . Id. at 811-12. The Court also held
that the Tribe's fishing rights would not be meaningless or nullified because of "hatchery facilities
and other mitigation and protection programs." Id. at 796.
The Court went on to note that consistent with the holding in Fishing Vessel, "[I]n
interpreting the several Steven's treaties, the courts have consistently held that the reserved fishing
rights grant the Indians 'an opportunity to take, by reasonable means, a fair and equitable share of
all fish from any given run."' Id at 806 (citing United States v. Oregon, 769 F.2d 1410, 1416
(9 th Cir. 1985)(emphasis added). The Court also noted that the right is limited by the need to
protect fish runs from over harvest through state and federal regulation. Id. ( citing Sohappy v.
Smith, 302 F. Supp. at 908; United States v. Oregon, 769 F.2d at 1416; United States v. Oregon,

657 F.2d 1009, 1016-17 (1981); Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dept. of Game v. US., 433 U.S. 165,
i 76-177, 97 S. Ct. 2616, 2623 53 L. Ed.2d 667 (1977)).

Lastly, and most importantly, the Court answered the "ultimate issue" as to whether the
1855 Treaty provided the Tribe with an absolute right to preservation of the fish runs in the
condition then existing in 1855, free from environmental damage caused by a changing and
developing society. The Court held that the Tribe does not have an absolute right to the
preservation of the fish runs in their original 1855 condition, free from all environmental damage
caused by the migration of increasing numbers of the settlers and the resulting development of the
land. Id. at 808.
Further, that established treaty rights to catch and harvest fish are subject to outside
changing circumstances. The Court stated:
Having concluded that Indian treaties must be interpreted in light of new, and often
changing, circumstanQes including conditions which limit the available quantity of fish,
it is not surprising that the courts have not awarded monetary damages to Indian
tribes for the depletion or destruction of fish and game caused by development.
This Court is not able to agree with the Tribe's contention that if Indian treaties are
subject to changing circumstances, the treaties are therefore 'an impotent outcome to
negotiations and a convention, which seemed to promise more and give the word of
the Nation for more.'[citations omitted]
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In the scope of this action, the Tribe's right to fish pursuant to the 1855
Stevens treaty only guarantees access to certain off-reservation fishing grounds and
the right to attempt to catch available fish. The treaty does, however, require
assurance that the Tribe will have a 'fair share' of the available fish. The law requires
the various states, and private parties in certain circumstances such as those presented
here, to take remedial actions should their development of the rivers or the
surrounding land injure the fish runs. The Stevens treaties require that any
development authorized by the states which injures the :fish runs be non-discriminatory
in nature, see Fishing Vessel 443 U.S. 658, 99 S. Ct. 3055, 61 L. Ed. 2d 823 but

does not however, guarantee that subsequent development will not diminish or
eventually, and unfortunately, destroy the fish runs.

Id. at 814 (emphasis added). This decision was never appealed.
In taking into account the established authority defining the scope of the off-reservation
fishing right, this Court's ruling can be summarized as follows. The Nez Perce contend that a
water right must necessarily be implied to give effect to the Tribe's off-reservation fishing right.
The Nez Perce admit that the Tribe did not intend to reserve a water right in 1855 because fish
habitat was not contemplated. As such, the scope of the treaty fishing right must be ascertained
to determine whether the application of canons of treaty interpretation imply a water right
necessary to give effect to that treaty right. Established precedent has defined the scope of the
right. The fishing right is non-exclusive and shared with non-Indians. The right is essentially a
right to a share of the fish harvest. The right is not to an absolute entitlement. Nor does it
guarantee a set amount of fish. The right is subject to State regulation for purposes of conserving
the species. In fact, the State, not the Nez Perce, has the authority to regulate off-reservation
fishing for purposes of conservation. The Nez Perce do not have a property interest in the fish.
Further, fishing rights are subject to changing circumstances incurred by settlement and
development, which is what has occurred in this case. Lastly, there are other measures in place,
such as regulation, to protect the fish run.
Based on the scope of the Nez Perce fishing right, there is no legitimate basis from which
to infer that a water right is necessary to· the preservation of that limited right. The Nez Perce do
not have anything akin to a fish propagation right. Accordingly, this Court cannot conclude, as a
matter oflaw, that the Nez Perce or the federal government reserved an instream water right for
fish.
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C.

The Nez Perce's (and the United States') Admission as to Intent as Well as
the Purpose of the 1855 Treaty Is Inconsistent with an Indian Reserved
Water Right.

The Nez Perce and the United States agree that neither intended to reserve an instream
flow water right in connection with its fishing right at the time the 1855 treaty was executed. This
aspect also has independent legal significance as to whether the 1855 Treaty impliedly reserved a
water right. Unlike the situation in Fishing Vessel, it would be repugnant to the purpose of the
treaty negotiations to imply that the Indians reserved an off-reservation instream flow water right.
The purpose of the Stevens Treaties was to resolve the conflict which arose between the Indians
and the non-Indian settlers as a result of the Oregon Donation Act of 1850 which vested title to
land in settlers. It is inconceivable that the United States would have intended or otherwise
agreed to allow the Nez Perce to reserve instream flow off-reservation water rights appurtenant
to lands intended to be developed and irrigated by non-Indian settlers. Although, the construction
of a treaty focuses on what the Indians would have understood at the time the treaty was
negotiated, the Nez Perce and the United States both admit that neither contemplated reserving an
off-reservation water right at the tim"e the treaty was being negotiated and executed. At most, the
Nez Perce intended that the off-reservation fishing rights (as opposed to a water right) secured by
the Treaty would be absolute and free from impediment. However, it defies reason to imply the
existence of a water right that was both never intended by the parties and inconsistent with the
purpose of the Treaty. The Nez Perce submit that the issue pertaining to the quantity of water
reserved is beyond the scope of these proceedings. However, for illustrative purposes it is helpful
to point out that the Nez Perce's amended instream claim for the lowermost point on the Snake
River is for 105% of the average annual flow of the Snake, Clearwater, and Salmon Rivers
combined. It was also asserted by the State in oral argument on October 13, 1999, and as
illustrated on demonstrative exhibits used therein, that many of the Nez Perce's claims are for
waters outside their aboriginal territory. Tr. p. 26, L. 22, Tr. p. 27, L. 2 .. Because one of the
admitted purposes of the Treaty was to extinguish aboriginal title to make the lands available for
settlement, it is inconceivable that either the United States or the Tribe intended or even
contemplated that the Tribe would remain in controi of the water.
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Essentially, what the Nez Perce Tribe is seeking by way of a water right is a remedy for an
unforeseen consequence which it now believes stands to threaten its fishing right. Historically, the
right of access threatened the fishing right, then the over-allocation of fish by non-treaty fishermen
interfered with the right, at present it is the scarcity of water (among other things), and in the
future there will unquestionably emerge other unforeseen factors which may also pose a threat to
fish habitat. However, at some point only so many interpretations can be exacted from the Treaty
language. It is also a canon of treaty interpretation that Indian treaties cannot be re-written or
expanded beyond their clear terms to remedy a claimed injustice. Choctaw Nation ofIndians v.

United States, 318 U.S. 423,432, 63 S.Ct. 672,678 (1943).

D.

Adair and Related Authority Does Not Support an "Off-Reservation"
Reserved Indian Water PJght.

This Court recognizes, and the Nez Perce have cited authority wherein, some courts have
implied a reserved water right for purposes ~f maintaining an Indian Tribe's reserved fishi.t"1g right.
However, these cases differ in either of two respects. Either the genesis of the water right was a
federal reserved water right and, thus, was appurtenant to the Indian Reservation -- the right was
limited to the on-reservation, or the right was not derived from the "fishing in common" language
which is the claimed origin of the Nez Perce's off-reservation fishing rights. See, e.g., United

States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394 (9 th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1282, 104 S. Ct. 3536, 82
L.Ed 2d 841 (1984)(reserving water for protection of on-reservation fishing right); Kittitas

Reclamation District v. Sunnyside Valley Irrigation Dist., 763 F.2d 1032 (1985) cert. denied,
474 U.S. 1032 (1985) (court does not decide issue of scope of fishing right); Coleville

Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42 (9 th Cir. 1981) cert denied, 454 U.S. 1092, 102 S.Ct.
657, 70 L. Ed.2d 630 (1981) (federal reserved water right for maintaining on-reservation fishing
right.); United States v. Anderson, 591 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Wash. 1982) (federal reserved water
right to preserve fishing); Joint Board of Control ofFlathead Irrigation Dist. v. United States,
832 F.2d 1127 (9 th Cir. 1987) (right created by "exclusive right of taking fish in all streams
running through and bordering reservation."); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 83 S. Ct.
1408 (1963) (federal reserved water right).
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The distinction is important because this Court's ruling is limited to claimed water rights
appurtenant to off-reservation lands, as the boundaries exist at present. The front runner case
which appears to create an off-reservation water right for fishing is United States v. Adair, 723
F.2d 1394 (1983). In Adair, at issue was whether hunting and fishing rights reserved by the
Klamath Tribe in an 1864 treaty also implied the reservation of a water right. 8 Although the
Court held that the Tribe had reserved a water right to maintain the tribe's hunting and fishing
rights, the water rights at issue were clearly limited to on-reservation lands and, therefore, the
decision is not applicable to this case .. The language reserving the water right reserved to the
Tribe "exclusive use and occupancy of the lands." The Court held:
There is no indication in the treaty, express or implied, that the Tribe intended to cede
any of its interest Jin those lands it reserved for itself. (citations omitted]
[We] agree with the district court that within the 1864 Treaty is a recognition of the
Tribe's aboriginal water rights and a confirmation to the Tribe of a continued water
right to support its hunting and fishing lifestyle on the Klamath Reservation.

Id. at 1414 (emphasis added).
The Court's reasoning was based on the finding that the Klamath Tribe reserved exclusive
use and occupation on the reserved lands and that there was no express or implied indication that
the tribe intended to cede any interest in those reserved lands. Id at 1414.
As such, the most Adair can stand for in this case is that the Nez Perce reserved water
rights on the reserved lands, however that issue is not before this Court and is not decided. Adair
does not extend to off-reservation water rights. In the instant case, the Nez Perce's claim for offreservation water rights is predicated on the "fishing in common" language, the meaning and
scope of which have been defined and limited to less than a water right.

2. The Subsequent Effect of the 1863 Treaty of Lapwai.
In 1863, the Nez Perce entered into a subsequent treaty with the United States. Pursuant
to the 1863 Treaty of Lapwai, the Nez Perce agreed to relinquish additional lands to the United
States. In exchange, the Tribe reserved certain defined lands for a new reservation. The 1863
Treaty reduced the boundaries of the former reservation from approximately 7 million acres to
Also at issue was the effect of the Klamath Tennination Act on the water right.
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approximately 750,000 acres. The ceded land was opened up to non-Indian settlement. Article
VIII of the 1863 Treaty provided, inter alia, as follows:
[A]nd further, that all the provisions of said treaty which are not abrogated or
specifically changed by any article herein contained, shall remain the same to all
intents and purposes as formerly, -- the same obligations resting upon the United
States, the same privileges continued to the Indians outside of the reservation ....
Treaty of 1863, 14 Stat. 647.
As a result, the issue is raised regarding the effect of the subsequent diminishment of the
reservation on the Tribe's fishing rights. Stated another way, did the "exclusive" on-reservation
fishing rights continue to apply within the 1855 reservation boundaries or did the "exclusive"
rights extend only to the 1863 boundary of the new reservation? 9 This issue, however, does not
need to be decided because the subsequent 1893 Agreement made by the Nez Perce, a.11d the
subsequent legislation ratifying the Agreement, essentially subsumes the issue.
3. S.outh Dakota v. Yankton Sioux-The Subsequent Effect of the 1893 Agreement.
In 1998, a unanimous United States Supreme Court decided South Dakota v. Yankton
Sioux Tribe, et al., 118 S. Ct. 789 (1998), a suit over who had regulatory jurisdiction over a

proposed waste site (landfill), the Tribe and the United States, or the State of South Dakota. Of
major significance to the issues before this Court on summary judgment is the fact that the United
States Supreme Court interpreted the very same statute in which Congress approved the 1893
Agreement between the United States and the Nez Perce Tribe relating to the cession and sale of
surplus tribal lands. Act of Aug. 15, 1894, 28 Stat. 286.
The 1894 Act incorporated (among other things) both the 1892 Agreement with the
Yankton Sioux in its entirety and the 1893 Agreement with the Nez Perce in its entirety and, in
accordance with both Agreements, Congress expressly appropriated the necessary funds to
compensate the Tribes for the ceded lands, to satisfy the claims for scout pay, and to award the
commemorative 20-dollar gold pieces. Congress also prescribed the punishment for violating a

This distinction is important for two reasons. First, this opinion is limited to off-reservation water rights.
Second, because the opinion is limited to off-reservation water rights, this opinion does not interpret whether or not the
"exclusive" fishing right confers a water right on the reservation.

9
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liquor prohibition included in the agreement and reserved certain sections in each township for·
common-school purposes. Finally, each Agreement contained a saving clause. Id.
In Yankton Sioux, both the Federal District Court and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the 1894 Act (1892 Agreement with the Yankton Sioux) did not diminish the boundaries
of the reservation as delineated in the 1858 Treaty between the United States and the Yankton
Sioux Tribe and, consequently, that the subject waste site lies within an Indian Reservation where
federal government regulations would apply, i.e., that the Yankton Sioux had sold their surplus
lands to the government, but not their governmental authority over it.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict between the
Court of Appeals and a number of decisions of the South Dakota Supreme Court which had
declared that the Reservation had been diminished.
The first paragraph of the Supreme Court's opinion reads:

This case presents the question whether, in an 1894 statute that ratified an
agreement for the sale of surplus tribal lands, Congress diminished the

boundaries of the Yankton Sioux Reservation in South Dakota. The reservation
was established pursuant to an 1858 treaty between the United States and the
Yankton Sioux Tribe. Subsequently, under the General allotment Act of 1887, Act
of Feb. 8, 1887, 24 Stat. 388, 25 U.S.C. § 331 (the Dawes Act), individual members
of the Tribe received allotments of reservation land, and the Government then
negotiated with the Tribe for the cession of the remaining, unallotted lands. The issue
we confront illustrates the jurisdictional quandaries wrought by the allotment policy:
We must decide whether a landfill constructed on non-Indian fee land that falls with
the boundaries of the original Yankton Reservation remains subject to federal
environmental regulations. If the divestiture of Indian property in 1894 effected
a diminishment of Indian territory, then the ceded lands no longer constitute
"Indian country" as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a), and the State now has
primary jurisdiction over them. In light of the operative language of the 1894 Act,
and the circumstances surrounding its passage, we hold that Congress intended to
diminish the Yankton Reservation and consequently that the waste site is not
in Indian country.

Id. at 793 (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court found that the land in question was deeded to a non-Indian under the
Homestead Act of 1904, i.e., consisted of unallotted land ceded in the 1894 Act. Here, it was no
longer on the reservation.
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The Supreme Court also stated that the Act of Aug. 15, 1894, which ratified the 1892
Agreement between the United States and the Yankton Sioux, contained "similar surplus land sale
agreements between the United States and the Siletz and Nez Perce Tribe." Id. at 796.
In setting the stage for its analysis, the Supreme Court stated the rules of interpretation as
follows:
States acquired primary jurisdiction over unallotted opened lands where "the
applicable surplus land Act freed that land of its reservation status and thereby
diminished the reservation boundaries." Solem, 465 U.S., at 467, 104 S. Ct., at 1164.
In contrast, if a surplus land Act "simply offered non-Indians the opportunity to
purchase land within established reservation boundaries," Id., at 470 104 S. Ct., at
1166, then the entire opened area remained Indian country. Our touchstone to
determine whether a given statute diminished or retained reservation
boundaries is congressional purpose. See Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S.
584, 615, 97 S. Ct. 1361, 1377, 51 L.Ed.2d 660 (1977). Congress possesses
plenary power over Indian affairs, including the power to modify or eliminate
tribal rights. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56, 98 S. Ct.
1670, 1677, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978). Accordingly, only Congress can alter the
terms of an Indian treaty by diminishing a reservation, United States v. Celestine,
215 U.S. 278,285, 30 S. Ct. 93, 94-95, 54 L.Ed. 195 (1909), and its intent to do
so must be clear and plain," United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738-739, 106 S.
Ct. 2216, 2219-2220, 90 L.Ed.2d 767 (1986).
Here we must determine whether Congress intended by the 1894 Act to
modify the reservation set aside for the Yankton Tribe in the 1858 Treaty. Our
inquiry is informed by the understanding that, at the tum of the century, Congress did
not view the distinction between acquiring Indian property and assuming jurisdiction
over Indian Territory as a critical one, in part because "[t]he notion that reservation
status of Indian lands might not be coextensive with tribal ownership was unfamiliar,"
Solem, 465 U.S. at 468, 104 S. Ct., at 1164, and in part because Congress then
assumed that the reservation system would fade over time. "Given this expectation,
Congress naturally failed to be meticulous in clarifying whether a particular piece of
legislation formally sliced a certain parcel ofland off one reservation." Ibid.; see also
Hagen, 510 U.S., at 426, 114 S. Ct., at 973 (Blaclanun, J., dissenting) ("As a result
of the patina history has placed on the allotment Acts, the Court is presented with
questions that their architects could not have foreseen"). Thus, although "[t]he
most probative evidence of diminishment is, of course, the statutory language
used to open the Indian lands," we have held that we will also consider "the
historical context surrounding the passage of the surplus land Acts," and, to a lesser
extent, the subsequent treatment of the area in question and the pattern of settlement
there. Id., at 411, 114 S. Ct., at 965. Throughout this inquiry, "we resolve any
ambiguities in favor of the Indians, and we will not lightly find diminishment."
Ibid.
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Article I of the 1894 Act provides that the Tribe will "cede, sell, relinquish,
and convey to the United States all their claim, right, title, and interest in and to all the
unallotted lands within the limits of the reservation"; pursuant to Article II, the United
States pledges a fixed payment of $600,000 in return. This "cession" and "sum
certain" language is "precisely suited" to terminating reservation status. See
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 445, 95 S. Ct., at 1093. Indeed, we have held that when a

surplus land Act contains both explicit language of cession, evidencing "the
present and total surrender of all tribal interests," and a provision for a fixedsum payment, representing "an unconditional commitment from Congress to

compensate the Indian tribe for its opened land," a "nearly conclusive," or
"almost insurmountable," presumption of diminishment arises. Solem, supra,
at 470, 104 S.Ct., at 1166; see also Hagen, supra, at 411, 114 S.Ct., at 965.
The terms of the 1894 Act parallel the language that this court found
terminated the Lake Traverse Indian Reservation in DeCoteau, supra, at 445, 95
S.Ct., at 1093, and as in DeCoteau, the 1894 Act ratified a negotiated agreement
supported by a majority of the Tribe. Moreover, the Act we construe here more
clearly indicates diminishment than did the surplus land Act at issue in Hagen, which
we concluded diminished reservation lands even though it provided only that "all the
unallotted lands within said reservation shall be restored to the public domain. 11 See
510 U.S., at 412, 114 S.Ct., at 966.

Id. at 797, 798 (emphasis added).
Like the 1892 Yankton Agreement, the 1893 Nez Perce Agreement contains nearly
identical explicit language of cession, evidencing the "present and total surrender of all tribal
interests" (except specifically enumerated and legally described tracts), and a fixed sum payment,
representing "an unconditional commitment from Congress to compensate the [Nez Perce] tribe
for its opened land." See Articles I, II, and III of the 1893 Nez Perce Agreement.
Turning to the savings clause in each of the two respective agreements, Article XVIII of
the Yankton Sioux Agreement states (with emphasis):
Nothing in this agreement shall be construed to abrogate the treaty of April 19th,
1858, between the Yankton tribe of Sioux Indians and the United States. And after
the signing of this agreement, and its ratification by Congress, all provisions of the
said treaty of April 19th, 1858, shall be in full force and effect, the same as though this
agreement had not been made, and the said Yankton Indians shall continue to
receive their annuities under said treaty of April 19th, 1858.
28 Stat.326 (August 15, 1894).
Article XI of the 1893 Nez Perce Agreement provides:
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The existing provisions of all former treaties with said Nez Perce Indians not
inconsistent with the provisions of this agreement are hereby continued in full force
and effect.
In Yankton Sioux, the United States Supreme Court, in addressing the savings clause,
stated:
The Yankton Tribe and the United States, appearing as amicus for the Tribe, rest their
argument against diminishment primarily on the saving clause in Article XVIII of the
1894 Act. The Tribe asserts that because that clause purported to conserve the
provisions of the 1858 Treaty, the existing reservation boundaries were
maintained. The United States urges a similarly "holistic" construction of the
agreement, which would presume that the parties intended to modify the 1858 Treaty
only insofar as necessary to open the surplus lands for settlement, without
fundamentally altering the Treaty's terms.
Such a literai construction of the saving dause as the South Dakota Supreme
Court noted in State v. Greger, 559 N.W.2d 854, 863 (S.D. 1997) would "impugn
the entire sale." The unconditional relinquishment of the Tribe's territory for
settlement by non-Indian homesteaders can by no means be reconciled with the
central provisions of the 1858 Treaty, which recognized the reservation as the
Tribe's "permanent" home and prohibited white settlement there. See Oregon
Dept. of Fish and Wildlife v. Klamath Tribe, 473 U.S. 753, 770, 105 S.Ct. 3420,
3430, 87 L.Ed.2d 542 (1985) (discounting a saving clause on the basis of a "glaring
inconsistency" between the original treaty and the subsequent agreement).· Moreover,
the Government's contention that the Tribe intended to cede some property but
maintain the entire reservation as its territory contradicts the common
understanding of the time: that tribal ownership was a critical component of
reservation status. See Solem, supra, at 468, 104 S.Ct., at 1164-1165. We "cannot
ignore plain language that, viewed in historical context and given a fair appraisal,
clearly runs counter to a tribe's late claims." Klamath, supra, at 774, 105 S.Ct., at
3432 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Rather than read the saving clause in a manner that eviscerates the agreement
in which it appears, we give it a "sensible construction" that avoids this "absurd
conclusion." See United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 56, 114 S.Ct. 1259,
1268-1269, 127 L.Ed.2d 611 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). The most
plausible interpretation of Article XVIII revolves around the annuities in the form of
cash, guns, ammunition, food, and clothing that the Tribe was to receive in exchange
for its aboriginal claims for 50 years after the 1858 Treaty. Along with the proposed
sale price, these annuities and other unrealized Yankton claims dominated the 1892
negotiations between the Commissioners and the Tribe.
Id. at 799 (emphasis added).
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In this case, the conclusion that the Nez Perce Tribe ceded all its interest in all unallotted land
not expressly reserved by the 1893 Agreement and its subsequent ratification by Congress is equally
compelling. The savings clause contained in Article XI of the 1893 Agreement, would be in direct
contravention of Articles I and II of the Agreement if the Reservation boundaries were not diminished
by operation of the savings clause. To conclude otherwise would not only eviscerate the purpose of
the 1893 Agreement and its subsequent congressional ratification, but would also be inconsistent with
the plain meaning of the 1855 Treaty wherein the Nez Perce Tribe also agreed to "cede, relinquish
and convey" to the United States all of its "right, title, and interest" in its aboriginal lands. Stat~d
another way, if the cession language contained in the 1893 Agreement is not to be given literal effect,
then the sanctity of the of the 1855 Treaty language can also be called into question. However, by
strongly urging the operation of the Indian reserved rights doctrine, the Tribe necessarily admits those
aboriginal lands not reserved were ceded pursuant to the 1855 Treaty.
In this Court's view, pursuant to the holding in Yankton Sioux, the boundaries of the Nez
Perce Reservation was diminished to the extent of all unallotted lands not expressly reserved in the
1893 Agreement. 10 The boundaries of the reservation are important because this ruling is limited to
claimed in-stream flow water rights outside of the current boundaries of the Reservation. Consistent
with the savings clause of the 1893 Agreement and the 1863 and 1855 Treaties, the Tribe did reserve
its off-reservation "right to fish in common." The scope of this right, however, does not include an
instream flow water right.
This Court recognizes the holding in United States v: Webb, District ofidaho Case No. 9880-N-EJL (January 12, 1999), which is currently on appeal. Webb raised the issue of criminal
jurisdiction on previously allotted lands of the Nez Perce Reservation. The District Court ruled that
pursuant to the 1893 Agreement the unallotted lands continued to be within the boundaries of the
Reservation by operation of the savings clause. This Court declines to follow the ruling for several
reasons. First, the matter is currently on appeal and therefore not fmal. Next, both the government
and the defense stipulated in the case that the offense took place on previously allotted land.
Therefore, since the status of the unallotted land was not at issue, the decision pertaining to the status
of the same is dicta and in all likelihood may not be revisited by the Court of Appeals on that basis.

l O Yankton Sioux specifically did not answer whether allotted lands, now in non-Indian ownership were part of the
Reservation.
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Further, this Court disagrees substantively with the opinion. The Court's analysis erroneously
focuses on the intent of the Nez Perce, rather than Congressional intent. Next, the conclusion that
Congress did not intend the cession of unallotted lands not specifically reserved to the Tribe in
common, not only ignores the plain meaning of the statutory language but also the historical
circumstances following the Treaty of 1855. Namely, the influx of settlers on Reservation land and
the related policies of alleviating conflict between the Indians and the settlers, settling the west, and
extinguishing Indian title.

XII
Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, this Court rules as follows: 1) That pursuant to the 1855
Treaty, the Nez Perce Tribe reserved among other things, the "right of taking fish at all usual and
accustomed places in common with the citizens of the territory;" 2) that the Nez Perce Tribe or
the United States did not specifically intend to reserve an off-reservation instream flow water right
for purposes of maintaining said fishing right; 3) that the scope of the "right of taking fish in
common" does not also confer an off-reservation instream flow water right, and; 4) that pursuant
to the 1893 Agreement and its subsequent congressional ratification, the Nez Perce Tribe ceded
all interest in unallotted lands not expressly reserved to the Tribe, 5) that by the savings clause the
Tribe again reserved its off-reservation in common fishing rights. Therefore, the Nez Perce do
not have Indian reserved instream flow water rights extending beyond the boundaries of the
present Reservation, where ever those boundaries may be. This Court makes no ruling on the
extent of on-reservation water rights of any kind. Summary judgment is therefore granted.
Additionally, based upon the ruling herein, the Court determines that it is unnecessary to
address other/additional issues raised in some of the Objectors' Motions for Summary Judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED

DATED November 10, 1999.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS

In Re SRBA
Case No. 39576

____________

Consolidated Subcase No. 03-10022
Nez Perce Tribe Instream Flow Claims

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER ON UNITED STATES'
MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND
JUDGMENT OR ALTERNATIVELY
FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING

I.
Brief Procedural Background

On November 24, 1999, the United States of America moved this Court to alter or
amend its Judgment entered November 10, 1999, in this consolidated subcase to clarify
the extent of its ruling as to the boundaries of the Nez Perce Indian Reservation
diminished to the extent of all unallotted lands not expressly reserved in the 1893
Agreement. Specifically, the motion sought to amend the Judgment by revising the
second paragraph on page 2 of the Judgment, to read as follows:
In accordance therewith, and in accordance with I.R.C.P. 58(a), this
judgment grants those motions for summary judgment, limited in scope to

the rulings eontained in the Order of November 10, 1999: Specifieally as
deciding that the Nez Perce Tribe, and/or the United States of America on
behalf of the Tribe as Trustee, are not entitled to an off-reservation
instream flow water right as claimed.
(i.e., sought to eliminate :from the Judgment the lined-through material, which line is
theirs).
The Motion was made pursuant to Rule 59( e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure. In the alternative, the United States moved that if the Court intended by its
November 10, 1999, Judgment to rule upon the jurisdictional boundaries of the Nez Perce
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Indian Reservation, the United States requested an opportunity to submit testimony,
documentary evidence and legal authorities on that issue. The United States' Motion was
supported by a Memorandum, lodged of equal date, but no oral argument was requested
at the time of the filing of the Motion.
On December 7, 1999, the State ofidaho filed a written response to the United

States' Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment or Alternatively for an Evidentiary Hearing.
The State did not ask for oral argument.
On December 15, 1999, the United States lodged its Reply Memorandum in

Support of United States' Motion to Alter or Amend Judgement or Alternatively for an
Evidentiary Hearing. Also on December 15, 1999, the United States filed a written
request that a hearing on its Motion be set for December 21, 1999. This request for a
hearing was made pursuant to T.A.R. 13(b)(4) (which rule grants the District Court the
power and authority to rule upon a motion to amend the judgment during the pendancy of
an appeal). The Motion did not specifically request oral argument on the original Motion
to Alter or Amend.
No other party responded to the Motion of the United States.
At this Court's regular monthly status conference (akin to a law and motion
calendar) held on December 21, 1999, the following discussion took place:
THE COURT: Mr. Campbell?
MR. CAMPBELL: Thank you, Your Honor. I note for purposes of
proceeding with the 54(b) appeal and also the pending 59(e) motion to
alter or amend at the present time it's not my -- I don't have any
understanding as to when that motion to alter or amend is going to be set
for consideration by the court, if there's going to be a hearing or the court
will just render a decision based upon the papers filed.
And the reason that our clients are concerned, given the potential
ramifications depending upon how the court decides the issue of
jurisdiction,. we don't want to be in a position of dragging things out too
long. So. from the standpoint of resolution of the 59(e) motion, it would be
in our client's interests to have that set for hearing.
THE COURT:
Well, the reality is we're trying to get a number of
other things done, come up for air, if you will, before we even get a
chance to look at it, which hopefully will be in the next few days.
MR. CAMPBELL: I understand, Your Honor. I'm not trying to
pressure the court unduly, I just raise the issue from the standpoint of the
context of the various matters.
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THE COURT: Do I have a sense that all parties involved want it set
for oral argument?
MR MONSON: Your Honor, Peter Monson. As the court is aware,
we did file with our reply brief a motion for a hearing. However, we don't
have a strong preference that it be set for oral argument.
We would be willing to - given the court's calendar particularly in
January, I know it's quite heavy. If the court prefers to decide it on the
briefs, that would be amenable to us as well.
MR STRACK: Your Honor, the State was the only party that filed
an objection. And we would be glad to waive hearing if it would expedite
the court's consideration of it.
THE COURT: Well, we'll take a look at it in the next few days and
make a decision one way or the other.
·
MR STRACK: Thank you, Your Honor.
MR CAMPBELL: Thank you, Your Honor.
MR. MONSON: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Then we'll be in recess. Thank you.
(PROCEEDil~GS ADJOURNED)
Reporter's Transcript of Regular Monthly Status Conference Re: Nez Perce Motions,
December 21, 1999, p. 47, 1. 5 -p. 48, I. 25.

II.

Matter Deemed Fully Submitted for Decision

The last filing in this matter occurred on December 15, 1999. The last hearing in
this matter was December 21, 1999. Following that hearing, the Court was to initially
determine whether it would grant/request oral argument on the Motion to Alter or Amend
(Alternative Motions) of the United States filed November 24, 1999. I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3).
Based upon the above colloquy that neither party insists on oral argument on the Motion
to Alter or Amend and the Court having decided oral argument is not necessary to

resolution of the Motion, the matter is determined to be fully submitted for decision the
next business day, or December 22, 1999.

ORDER ON UNITED STATES' MOTION TO ALTER
OR AMEND JUDGMENT OR ALTERNAT!VEL Y
FOR .AJ,1 EVIDENTIARY HEARING
G:\Orders Pending\03-10022 Nez Perce alter amend Yankton.doc0l/21/00

(Ju. o·1·.n·
.lb..:;

Page 3 of29

Ill.

Standard of Review

In Lowe v. Lym, 103 Idaho 259,263,646 P.2d 1030 (Ct. App. 1982), the Idaho
Court of Appeals stated:
A Rule 59(e) motion to amend a judgment is addressed to the
discretion of the court. Cohen v. Curtis Publishing Co., 333 F.2d 974 (8 th
Cir. 1964): An order denying a motion made under Rule 59(e) to alter or
amend a judgment is appealable, but only on the question of whether there
has been a manifest abuse of discretion. Walker v. Bank ofAmerica
National Trust and Savings Association, 268 F.2d 16 (9th Cir. 1959), cert.
denied 361 U.S. 903, 80 S.Ct. 211, 4 L.Ed.2d 158 (1959). Rule 59(e)
proceedings afford the trial court the opportunity to correct errors both of
fact or law that had occurred in its proceedings; it thereby provides a
mechanism for corrective action short of an appeal. First Security Bank v.
Neibaur, 98 Idaho 598, 570 P.2d 276 (1977). Such proceedings must of
necessity, therefore, be directed to the status of the case as it existed when
the court rendered the decision upon which the judgment is based.
However, where as in this case - the motion for
"reconsideration" raises new issues, or presents new information, not
. addressed to the court prior to the decision which resulted in the judgment,
the proper analogy is to a motion for relief from judgment under Rule
60(b ). That rule requires a showing of good cause and specifies particular
grounds upon which relief may be afforded. Hendrickson v. Sun Valley
Corporation, Inc., 98 Idaho 133,559 P.2d 749 (1977). As with Rule 59(e)
proceedings, the right to grant, or deny, relief under the provisions of Rule
60(b) is a discretionary one with the trial court. Johnston v. Pascoe, 100
Idaho 414,599 P.2d 985 (1979).

In essence, the motion of the United States' is in the alternative, the first being a
Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgement entered on the summary judgment, or
in the alternative a motion for relief from the judgment under Rule 60(b) to present
information to the Court which the United States previously failed to present.

IV.
Issues Presented
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In its Memorandum in Support of United States' Motion to Alter or Amend
Judgment or Alternatively for an Evidentiary Hearing, the following issues/points are
identified.
1. The Judgment, When Read In Conjunction With the Orders On
Summary Judgment, Is Ambiguous.
2. The Question Whether the 1893 Agreement Diminished the Nez Perce
Reservation is a Disputed Fact and Cannot Be Decided on Motions for
Summary Judgment.
3. In the Alternative, The United States Moves the Court for An
Evidentiary Hearing to Present Testimony, Documentary Evidence, and
Legal Argument on the Diminishment Issue.
A. Only a Clear Expression of Congressional Intent Will Diminish
an Indian Reservation.
B. The 1893 Nez Perce Agreement and its Legislative History
Evidence a Clear Intent to Recognize and Continue the 1863
Reservation Boundaries.
C. Subsequent Jurisdictional History Also Supports a Finding of
No Diminishment.

V.
[Whether] The Judgment, When Read In Conjunction With the Orders On
Summary Judgment, Is Ambiguous.

The United States of America first argues that this Court's Judgment, when read in
conjunction with the Order on Summary Judgment, is ambiguous. The first assertion is
that it is unclear whether this Court intended to incorporate into the Judgment the
statement:
In this Court's view, pursuant to the holding in Yankton Sioux, the
boundaries of the Nez Perce Reservation was diminished to the extent of
all unallotted lands not expressly reserved in the 1893 Agreement.

Order on Motions for Summary Judgment, Etc. ("Order"), at 46 (November 10, 1999).
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This Court does not find the Judgment to be ambiguous, but if there is any doubt
by anyone, this Court intends the above quoted language to be a part of the Judgment.
The United States next asserts that it interprets the above quoted statement
regarding diminishment not to be this Court's holding, but instead to be obiter dicta; i.e.,
not necessary for the decision as to whether the off-reservation right of taking fish carries
with it a water right to instream flows as claimed off-reservation. The finding of
diminishment by this Court is not obiter dicta, but for reasons different than the one cited
by the United States' immediately above.
The United States is technically correct in one very narrow sense in that a finding
of diminishment is not absolutely necessary to make the decision as to whether the offreservation right of taking fish carries with it a water right to instream flows offreservation (and, as will be discussed in more detail later, whether this Court is correct or
incorrect as to diminishment, the issue of whether there is an off-reservation instream
flow water right is not affected, i.e., there is no off-reservation water right as claimed,
diminishment or not).
However, by asserting it is obiter dicta, the United States apparently misinterprets
this Court's November 10, 1999, ruling regarding diminishment in several major
respects. First, one of the direct issues variously presented by some of the different
motion~ for summary judgment was whether the geographic scope of the "exclusive"
"on-reservation" fishing right reserved in the 1855 Treaty was reduced commensurately
with the Tribe's Treaty of 1863 and the 1893 Agreement and/or whether the Tribe's 1863
and 1893 land cessions resulted in the cession of water rights. See issues 1 and 4 raised
by Idaho Power Company; issue addressed in Potlatch Corporation's Brief at pages 6 and
7; issues 3 and 5 raised by the State ofidaho; issue addressed in Reply Brief ofirrigation
Districts at pages 2 and 3; and issue 3 stated in the Joint Memorandum in Opposition to
Objector's Motions for Summary Judgment, lodged by the United States and the Nez
Perce Tribe on September 18, 1998. Thus, there is no legitimate question of whether the
legal effect (relating to reservation boundaries) of both the Treaty of 1863 and the
Agreement of 1893 as so enacted by Congress in 1894 were raised as material issues in
this case. Hence, the United States' assertion that it did not understand that the question
of diminishment was an issue pending before the Court on the Motions for Summary
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Judgment does not pass muster. See also pages 6 and 60-65 of the United States' and
Nez Perce Tribe's Joint 1vfemorandum, lodged September 18, 1998.
Secondly, because this Court's holding expressly distinguishes between onreservation and off-reservation water rights, it was necessary to address the effects of the
subsequent Treaty of 1863 and the Agreement of 1893.
Lastly, and as noted above, while a finding of diminishment is not necessary to the
legal conclusion that there is no off-reservation instream flow water right, the holding in
South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux, 188 S.Ct. 789 (1998), and a finding of diminishment,
clearly bolsters this Court's determination of the non-existence of the claimed offreservation water rights; i.e., it is inconceivable that the government would buy the ceded
land for the primary purpose of opening it up to settlement but intended to allow the
Tribe to reserve what would essentially be most of the water.
The United States also asserts that a ruling of diminishment would have profound
jurisdictional implications - both civil and criminal - within the affected area and is in
conflict with two recent decisions of the United States District Court, which held to the
contrary. See United States v. Webb, Case No. CR 98-80-N-EJL (D. Idaho) (January 12,
1999) on appeal, No. 99-30155 (9 th Cir.)-; United States v. Scott and Crowe, Case No. CR
98-01-N-EJL (D. Idaho) (Order Re: Jurisdiction entered August 12, 1998).
With respect to the profound implications a finding of diminishment may have is a
factor beyond the realm of this Court's control. It would necessarily be presumed that
Congress took this into account when the Agreement of 1893 was ratified in 1894. Many
Congressional Acts carry profound implications - both criminal and civil; but such a fact
cannot defeat what Congress intended.
Secondly, this Court is well aware of other Courts' holdings regarding a finding of
no diminishment under the Agreement of 1893 ratified by Congress in 1894. With all
due respect (and as will be explained in greater detail later in this Order) to these courts,
it seems to this Court that the Supreme Court of the United States of America has the
final say on the issue of diminishment and the affect of the Act as ratified by Congress in
1894. The 1998 Yankton Sioux decision would supercede all previous court decisions on
the topic, including (ifthere were one) previous United States Supreme Court decisions.
(And as pointed out by this Court in its November 10, 1999 Order on Summary
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Judgment, Yankton Siouxwas a unanimous decision by the United States Supreme Court
in January of 1998, and it interpreted this very piece oflegislation passed by Congress in
1894 which not only dealt with the 1892 Agreement with the Yankton Sioux Tribe but
also the 1893 Agreement with the Nez PerceTribe).

VI.
The Question Whether the 1893 Agreement Diminished the Nez Perce Reservation
is a Disputed Fact and Cannot Be Decided on Motions for Summary Judgment.

The question of whether the 1893 Agreement diminished the Nez Perce
Reservation boundaries is a question of Congressional intent, which in turn is a question
of law if eit.lier t.lie terms of the Agreement are clear and unambiguous, or if it has a

settled legal meaning; and can be properly decided on summary judgment.
First, as noted both above and in this Court's Order of November 10, 1999, the
question of what Congress intended regarding the purchase of these lands and whether
there was a diminishment of the reservation has been recently answered by a unanimous
United States Supreme Court. South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux, 188 S.Ct. 789 (1998). To
the contrary and to be very explicit, this determination is not some new or previously
unanswered issue which this Court decided as a case of first impression. More precisely,
Justice O'Connor wrote in this first paragraph of the Yankton Sioux decision:

This case presents the question whether, in an 1894 statute that
ratified an agreement for the sale of surplus tribal lands, congress
diminished the boundaries of the Yankton Sioux Reservation in South
Dakota. The reservation was established pursuant to an 1858 treaty
between the United States and the Yankton Sioux Tribe. Subsequently,
under the General Allotment Act of 1887, Act of Feb. 8, 1887, 24 Stat.
388, 25 U.S.C. § 331 (the Dawes Act), individual members of the Tribe
received allotments of reservation land, and the Government then
negotiated with the Tribe for the cession of the remaining, unallotted
lands. The issue we confront illustrates the jurisdictional quandaries
wrought by the allotment policy: We must decide whether a landfill
constructed on non-Indian fee land that falls within the boundaries of the
original Yankton Reservation remains subject to federal environmental
regulations. If the divestiture of Indian property in 1894 effected a
diminishment of Indian territory, then the ceded lands no longer
constitute "Indian country" as defined by 18 U.S.C. s 1151(a), and the
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State now has primary jurisdiction over them. In light of the operative
language of the 1894 Act, and the circumstances surrounding its passage,
we hold that Congress intended to diminish the Yankton Reservation and
consequently that the waste site is not in Indian country.
Id. at 793. (emphasis added).
Secondly, in Yankton Sioux, the United States Supreme Court held in part:
By March 1893, the Commissioners had collected signatures from 255
of the 458 male members of the Tribe eligible to vote, and thus obtained
the requisite majority endorsement. The Yankton Indian Commission
filed its report in May 1893, but congressional consideration was delayed
by an investigation into allegations of fraud in the procurement of
signatures. On August 15, 1894, Congress finally ratified the 1892
agreement, together with similar surplus land sale agreements
between the United States and the Siletz and Nez Perce Tribes. Act of
Aug. 15, 1894, 28 Stat. 286. The 1894 Act incorporated the 1892
agreement in its entirety and appropriated the necessary funds to
compensate the Tribe for the ceded lands, to satisfy the claims for scout
pay, and to award the commemorative 20-dollar gold pieces. Congress
also prescribed the punishment for violating a liquor prohibition included
in the agreement and reserved certain sections in each township for
common-school purposes. Ibid.
President Cleveland issued a proclamation opening the ceded lands to
settlement as of May 21, 1895, and non-Indians rapidly acquired them.
By the tum of the century, 90 percent of the unallotted tracts had been
settled. See Yankton Sioux Tribe v. United States, 224 Ct.Cl. 62, 623 F.2d
159, 171 (1980). A majority of the individual allotments granted to
members of the Tribe also were subsequently conveyed in fee by the
members to non-Indians. Today, the total Indian holdings in the region
consist of approximately 30,000 acres of allotted land and 6,000 acres
of tribal land. Indian Reservations: A State and Federal Handbook
260 (1986).
Id. at 796 (emphasis mine).
This same text, cited as persuasive authority by the United States Supreme Court
as noted immediately above, states with respect to the current Nez Perce Reservation
(current meaning following the 1893 Agreement as ratified by Congress in 1894):
NEZ PERCE RESERVATION
Nez Perce, Lewis, Clearwater, and Idaho Counties
Nez Perce Tribe
Tribal Headquarters: Lapwai, Idaho
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Land Status. Tribally-owned land: 33,642 acres. Allotted land:
54,237 acres. Total area: 87,879 acres.
Indian Reservations, A State and Federal Handbook 88, Compiled by The Confederation
of American Indians (1986).
The United States also asserts that.the record is clear that there is a disputed issue
of fact as to whether the 1893 Agreement diminished the exterior boundaries of the Nez
Perce Reservation, citing as support for this assertion the following colloquy between this
Court and Mr. Strack during oral argument on summary judgment, October 13, 1999, Tr.
at 44:
THE COURT: * * * So do the parties agree or disagree as to what the
current reservation boundaries are, number one? And if that's true, is
there an agreement that all of these claim numbers are on the ground or
relate to land or water off the reservation? Do you understand?
MR. STRACK: Yeah, I do, your honor. As I believe I've suggested
in the briefing, is that this would probably have to be a two-step
proceeding; that this court rule - if it does rule that off-reservation claims
are denied as a matter of law, then we would have to probably proceed
either by agreement or litigation, if necessary, to decide what claims are
on the reservation and what claims are off the current reservation. As you
noted, there is disagreement --Transcript of Hearing of October 13, 1999, p. 44, 11. 2-15.
As correctly pointed out by the State, however, this was not all of the discussion.
The remainder of the discussion was: .
THE COURT: So the answer to the question, then, simply is, as to the
ruling legal principle, we're not deciding each of these individual claims
because they may or may not be on or off the reservation.
MR. STRACK: That's entirely correct. I think we have to have a separate
proceeding in order to go through claim number by claim number and decide
which are on-reservation claims and which were ceded.
Transcript of Hearing of October 13, 1999, p. 44, 11. 16-24.
This Court readily recognized that the parties had no agreement on the location of
the present reservation boundaries, and that is, in part, why the issue regarding
diminishment was decided. However, as noted earlier, this is a legal determination. The
factual determination yet to be made is specifically where on planet earth are the
respective water right claims located. In other words, because the claims which are at
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issue are based upon 1,113 different "stream reaches," the factual question is whether a
particular stream reach (or portion thereof) is in or out of the present reservation
boundaries.

vn.
In the Alternative, The United States Moves the Court for An Evidentiary Hearing
to Present Testimony, Documentary Evidence, and Legal Argument on the
Diminishment Issue.
A. Only a Clear Expression of Congressional Intent Will Diminish an Indian
Reservation.
B. The 1893 Nez Perce Agreement and its Legislative History Evidence a

Clear Intent to Recognize and Continue the 1863 Reservation Boundaries.
C. Subsequent Jurisdictional History Also Supports a Finding of No
Diminishment.

Because the remainder of the assertions raised by the United States essentially
relate to this Court's interpretation of South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux, they will be
addressed without trying to separate them by topic category.
One legal principle the United States is absolutely correct about is that only a clear
expression of congressional intent will diminish an Indian Reservation. Id. at 798.
The United States Supreme Court found such a clear expression of Congressional
intent with respect to the Yankton Sioux Agreement of 1892. Thus, in reality, a
comparison between the 1892 Agreement with the Yankton Sioux and the 1893
Agreement with the Nez Perce is helpful.
This Court having already compared the two Agreements in its November 10,
1999, Orders on Summary Judgment, that discussion is incorporated herein by reference.
However, some additional comments may be helpful in clarifying this Court's reasoning
on the determination of diminishment of the reservation boundaries.
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The United States asserts at page 6 of its Memorandum in Support of United

States' Motion to Alter or Amend, lodged November 24, 1999, that in this case there has
been no review of the history and of the negotiations of the 1893 Agreement with the Nez
Perce. That statement simply is not true, as this Court has read and reviewed a significant
amount of historical documents included in the affidavits submitted by the various
counsel.
In Yankton Sioux, the United States Supreme Court interpreted the meaning of the
1892 agreement with the Yankton Sioux Tribe and focused its attention on different
provisions of the Agreement. The Supreme Court also noted that the Act of Congress of
August 19, 1894, which ratified the Yankton Sioux Agreement of 1892 also ratified
"similar surplus land sale agreements between the Siletz and Nez Perce Tribes." Id. at
796. One must keep in mind, there was but one Act of Congress that ratified and
approved these respective land purchases.
The Annual Report of the Commissioner oflndian Affairs for 1894 (to the two
houses of Congress), contained in Exhibit 16 of the Affidavit of Steven W. Strack, page
320 (citing volume 3306 of the Congressional Serial Set, published by the United States
Government Printing Office) states in relevant part:

AGREEMENTS WITH INDIANS.
Siletz, Yankton, and Nez Perces. -The agreement concluded with the
Siletz Indians in Oregon, October 1, 1892, that with the Yankton Sioux in
South Dakota, concluded December 31, 1892, and that with the Nez
Perces in Idaho, concluded May 1, 1893, referred to in my last annual
report, were ratified by the act of Congress approved August 15, 1894the Indian appropriation act. Under these agreements some 880,000
acres of land will be restored to the public domain for disposition as
provided in said act.
(Emphasis on last sentence is added).
As such, it is difficult to perceive that "under these agreements" that "some
880,000 acres of land will be restored to the public domain for disposition," and yet
assert that Congress intended to keep those lands (and waters) as part of the respective
reservations. How could the land (and water) be both "restored to the public domain" of
the United States, yet still be part of the Reservation; two totally different sovereigns?
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By restoring the land to the public domain of the United States, one must fairly conclude
that this evidences a present and total surrender of anr tribal interest therein.
In any event, a comparison between the respective Agreements with the Yankton
Sioux of 1892 and the Nez Perce of 1893 is again helpful. It should also be noted that the
Congressional Act of 1894 which ratified these two very similar agreements (Yankton
Sioux and Nez Perce) incorporated the two agreements in their entirety and appropriated
the necessary funds to compensate the respective tribes for the ceded lands.
How similar are the two Agreements (Yankton Sioux and Nez Perce) and related
documents?
Compare the following:

1. Purpose of the Agreement. One must fairly keep in mind the underlying
purpose of the respective Agreements, which in each case was the same: for the United
States to acquire the surplus non-allotted lands, restore them to the public domain and
open them to settlement by non-Indians. These respective Agreements were ratified by
Congress in one common statute, not separate statutes.

2. The respective cession language. Article I of the 1892 Yankton Sioux
Agreement provides:
The Yankton tribe of Dakota or Sioux Indians hereby cede, sell,
relinquish, and convey to the United States all their claim, right, title,
and interest in and to all the unallotted lands within the limits of the
reservation set apart to said Indians as aforesaid.
(emphasis added for illustration).

Article I of the 1893 Nez Perce Agreement provides in relevant part:

The said Nez Perce Indians hereby cede, sell, relinquish, and
convey to the United States all their claim, right, title, and interest in
and to all the unallotted lands within the limits of said reservation,
saving and excepting the following described tracts oflands, which are
hereby retained by the said Indians, viz: (legal descriptions omitted).
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(emphasis added for illustration).

Thus, the cession language is not just similar, it is identical in the two agreements.

3. Sum certain language. Article II of the 1892 Agreement with the Yankton
Sioux provides:
In consideration for the lands ceded, sold, relinquished, and conveyed
to the United States as aforesaid, the United States stipulates and agrees to
pay to the said Yankton tribe of Sioux Indians the sum of six hundred
thousand dollars ($600,000), as hereinbefore provided for.
Article III of the 1893 Agreement with the Nez Perce provides in relevant part:
In consideration for the lands ceded, sold, relinquished, and conveyed
as aforesaid the United States stipulates and agrees to pay to the said Nez
Perce Indians the sum of one million six hundred and twenty-six thousand
two hundred and twenty-two dollars.
Again, this sum certain language of the two agreements is essentially identical.
Keeping in mind that each of these respective agreements were for the sale of
land, the Supreme Court stated:
Article I of the 1894 Act provides that the Tribe will "cede, sell,
relinquish, and convey to the United States all their claim, right, title, and
interest in and to all the unallotted lands within the limits of the
reservation"; pursuant to Article II, the United States pledges a fixed
payment of $600,000 in return. This "cession" and "sum certain"
language is "precisely suited" to terminating reservation status. See
DeCoteau, 420 U.S., at 445, 95 S.Ct., at 1093. Indeed, we have held that
when a surplus land Act contains both explicit language of cession,
evidencing "the present and total surrender of all tribal interest," and
a provision for a fixed-sum payment, representing "an unconditional
commitment from Congress to compensate the Indian tribe for its
opened land," a "nearly conclusive," or "almost insurmountable,"
presumption of diminishment arises. Solem, supra, at 470, 104 S.Ct., at
1166; see also Hagen, supra, at 411, 114 S.Ct., at 965.
The terms of the 1894 Act parallel the language that this Court found
terminated the Lake Traverse Indian Reservation in DeCoteau, supra, at
445, 95 S.Ct., at 1093, and as in DeCoteau, the 1894 Act ratified a
negotiated agreement supported by a majority of the Tribe. Moreover,
the Act we construe here more clearly indicates diminishment than did
the surplus land Act at issue in Hagen, which we concluded diminished
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reservation lands even though it provided only that "all the unallotted
lands within said reservation shall be restored to the public domain." See
510 U.S., at 412, 114 S.Ct., at 966.
Id. at 798 (emphasis added).

Thus, the Nez Perce Agreement of 1893 contains identical "cession" language,
nearly identical "sum certain" language, and evidences the present and total surrender of
all tribal interest in the ceded lands.

4. Payment. Again referring to the Annual Report of the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs for 1894, referenced in the record before this Court as Exhibit 16 of the
Affidavit of Steven W. Strack, page 319, appears the following relevant language by the
Commissioner to the Two Houses of Congress:
For the fiscal year 1895 the total amount appropriated is
$10,750,486.03. This includes the following items:
Payment of damages to settlers on Crow Creek and
Winnebago reservations ............................. .
Payment to Yankton tribe for lands ............... .
Payment to Yakama tribe for lands ................... .
Payment to Coeur d'Alenes for lands ................ .
Payment to Siletz Indians for lands ............... .
Payment to Nez Perces for lands ................... .
Capitalization of Shawnee funds ...................... .
Face value of certain State bonds assumed by United
States ................................................... .

$119,119.19
621,475.00
20,000.00
15,000.00
142,600.00
1,668,622.00
100,000.00
1,330,666.66
4,017,482.85

(emphasis mine).

5. Liquor Prohibition. Article XVII of the 1892 Agreement with the Yankton
Sioux provides:
No intoxicating liquors nor other intoxicants shall ever be sold or given
away upon any of the lands by this agreement ceded and sold to the United
States, nor upon any other lands within or comprising the reservations of
the Yankton Sioux or Dakota Indians as described in the treaty between
the said Indians and the United States, dated April I 91h, 1858, and as
afterwards surveyed and set off to the said Indians. The penalty for the
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violation of this provision shall be such as Congress may prescribe in the
act ratifying this agreement.
Article IX of the 1893 Agreement with the Nez Perce provides:
It is further agreed that the lands by this agreement ceded, those
retained, and those allotted to the said Nez Perce Indians shall be subject,
for a period of twenty-five years, to all the laws of the United States
prohibiting the introduction of intoxicants into the Indian country, and that
the Nez Perce Indian allottees, whether under the care of an Indian agent
or not, shall, for a like period, be subject to all the laws of the United
States prohibiting the sale or other disposition of intoxicants to Indians.
In regards to the liquor prohibition language in the Yankton Sioux Agreement of
1892, the United States Supreme Court stated:
The State's position is more persuasively supported by the liquor
prohibition included in Article XVII of the agreement. The provision
prohibits the sale or offering of "intoxicating liquors" on "any of the lands
by this agreement ceded and sold to the United States" or "any other lands
within or comprising the reservations of the Yankton Sioux or Dakota
Indians as described in the [1858] treaty," 28 Stat. 318, thus signaling a
jurisdictional distinction between reservation and ceded land. The
commissioners' report recommends that Congress "fix a penalty for the
violation of this provision which will make it most effective in preventing
the introduction of intoxicants within the limits of the reservation,"
Report, at 21, which could be read to suggest that ceded lands remained
part of the reservation. We conclude, however, that "[t]he most
reasonable inference from the inclusion of this provision is that
Congress was aware that the opened, unallotted areas would
henceforth not be 'Indian country."' Rosebud, supra, at 613, 97 S.Ct.,
at 1376. By 1892, Congress already had enacted laws prohibiting
alcohol on Indian reservations, see Cohen 306-307, and "[w]e assume
that Congress is aware of existing law when it passes legislation,"
Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 32, 111 S.Ct. 317, 325, 112
L.Ed.2d 275 (1990).
Id. at 801 (emphasis added).
Thus, the same reasoning applies to the liquor prohibition in the 1893 Agreement
with the Nez Perce.
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6. Other similarities. Each agreement also provided for money to satisfy
disputed claims for scout pay, to award commemorative 20-dollar gold pieces, and
reserved certain sections in each township for common-school purposes.

7. Savings Clause. Article XVIII of the 1892 Agreement with the Yankton
Sioux provides:
Nothing in this agreement shall be construed to abrogate the treaty of
April 19th, 1858, between the Yankton tribe of Sioux Indians and the
United States. And after the signing of this agreement, and its ratification
by Congress, all provisions of the said treaty of April 19th , 1858, shall be
in full force and effect, the same as though this agreement had not been
made, and the said Yankton Indians shall continue to receive their
annuities under the said treaty of April 19th, 1858.
Article XI of the 1893 Agreement with the Nez Perce provides:
The existing provisions of all former treaties with said Nez Perce
Indians not inconsistent with the provisions of this agreement are hereby
continued in full force and effect.
With respect to the savings clause language in the 1892 Yankton Sioux
Agreement, the United States Supreme Court stated in part:
The Yankton Tribe and the United States, appearing as amicus for the
Tribe, rest their argument against diminishment primarily on the saving
clause in Article XVIII of the 1894 Act. The Tribe asserts that because
that clause purported to conserve the provisions of the 1858 Treaty, the
existing reservation boundaries were maintained. The United States
urges a similarly "holistic" construction of the agreement, which would
presume that the parties intended to modify the 1858 Treaty only
insofar as necessary to open the surplus lands for settlement, without
fundamentally altering the Treaty's terms.
Such a literal construction of the saving clause, as the South Dakota
Supreme Court noted in State v. Greger, 559 N.W.2d 854, 863 (S.D.1997)
would "impugn the entire sale." The unconditional relinquishment of
the Tribe's territory for settlement by non-Indian homesteaders can
by no means be reconciled with the central provisions of the 1858
Treaty, which recognized the reservation as the Tribe's "permanent"
home and prohibited white settlement there. See Oregon Dept. ofFish
and Wildlife v. Klamath Tribe, 473 U.S. 753, 770, 105 S.Ct. 3420, 3430,
87 L.Ed.2d 542 (1985) (discounting a saving clause on the basis of a
"glaring inconsistency" between the original treaty and the subsequent
agreement). Moreover, the Government's contention that the Tribe
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intended to cede some property but maintain the entire reservation as its
territory contradicts the common understanding of the time: that tribal
ownership was a critical component of reservation status. See Solem,
supra, at 468, 104 S.Ct., at 1164-1165. We "cannot ignore plain language
that, viewed in historical context and given a fair appraisal, clearly runs
counter to a tribe's late claims." Klamath, supra, at 774, 105 S.Ct., at
3432 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Rather than read the saving clause in a manner that eviscerates the
agreement in which it appears, we give it a "sensible construction"
that avoids this "absurd conclusion." See United States v. Ganderson,
511 U.S. 39, 56, 114 S.Ct. 1259, 1268-1269, 127 L.Ed.2d 611 (1994)
(internal quotation marks omitted). The most plausible interpretation of
Article XVIII revolves around the annuities in the form of cash, guns,
ammunition, food, and clothing that the Tribe was to receive in exchange
for its aboriginal claims for 50 years after the 1858 Treaty. Along with the
proposed sale price, these annuities and other unrealized Yankton claims
- dominated the 1892 negotiations between the Commissioners and the
Tribe. The tribal historian testified, before the District Court, that the loss
of their rations would have been "disastrous" to the Tribe, App. 589, and
members of the Tribe clearly perceived a threat to the annuities. At a
particularly tense point in the negotiations, when the tide seemed to tum in
favor of forces opposing the sale, Commissioner John J. Cole warned:
"I want you to understand that you are absolutely dependent upon the
Great Father to-day for a living. Let the Government send out
instructions to your agent to cease to issue these rations, let the
Government instruct your agent to cease to issue your clothes .... Let
the Government instruct him to cease to issue your supplies, let him
take away the money to run your schools with, and I want to know
what you would do. Everything you are wearing and eating is gratuity.
Take all this away and throw this people wholly upon their own
responsibility to take care of themselves, and what would be the result!
Not one-fourth of your people could live through the winter, and when
the grass grows again it would be nourished by the dust of all the
balance of your noble tribe." Council of the Yankton Indians (Dec.
10, 1892), transcribed in S. Exec. Doc. No. 27, at 74.
Given the Tribe's evident concern with reaffirmance of the Government's
obligations under the 1858 Treaty, and the Commissioners' tendency to
wield the payments as an inducement to sign the agreement, we conclude
that the saving clause pertains to the continuance of annuities, not the
1858 borders.
The language in Article XVIII specifically ensuring that the "Yankton
Indians shall continue to receive their annuities under the [185 8 Treaty]"
underscores the limited purpose and scope of the saving clause. It is true
that the Court avoids interpreting statutes in a way that "renders some
words altogether redundant." Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561,574,
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115 S.Ct 1061, 1069, 131 L.Ed.2d 1 (1995). Butin light of the fact that
the record of the negotiations between the Commissioners and the
Yankton Tribe contains no discussion of the preservation of the 1858
boundaries but many references to the Government's failure to fulfill
earlier promises, see, e.g., Council of the Yankton Indians (Dec. 3,
1892), transcribed in S. Exec. Doc. No. 27, at 54-55, it seems most likely
that the parties inserted and understood Article XVIII, including both the
general statement regarding the force of the 1858 Treaty and the particular
provision that payments would continue as specified therein, to assuage
the Tribes' concerns about their past claims and future entitlements.
Id. at 799 and 800 (emphasis added); See also Article II of the 1855 Treaty with
the Nez Perce (containing a similar provision that the reservation was for the
exclusive use and benefit of the tribe and white settlers were prohibited).
The two respective savings clauses set out in full above are obviously somewhat
different. However, several observations are easily made. First, the Supreme Court
found that the Government's negotiations with the Yankton Sioux in the 1892 Agreement
were dominated by the Government's failure to fulfill earlier promises, primarily annuity
payments which were part of the 1858 Treaty. However, by Article IV of the 1855
Treaty with the Nez Perce, and Article IV of the 1863 Treaty with the Nez Perce, all
annuity payments were due and payable long before the negotiations of 1893, and,
therefore, clearly would not be expected to be any part of the negotiations in 1893.
More importantly, however, is the actual language of the two respective savings
clauses. In this Court's view, the language in the Nez Perce Agreement of 1893 is much
stronger in support of diminishment than is the Yankton Sioux savings clause. The reason
being the plain, simple and explicit language of the clause. More specifically, and as
pointed out throughout this decision, a continuation or preservation of the then-existing
reservation boundaries (pre-1893 Agreement) would be wholly inconsistent with the
purpose of the Agreement, "would eviscerate the agreement in which it appears," and
would lead to an "absurd conclusion."
Lastly, according to the record of negotiations with the Nez Perce (see
Proceedings relating to the 1893 Treaty negotiations, entitled: Organization of the
council ofthe Nez Perce tribe ofIndians in the State ofIdaho and on Nez Perce
Reservation, Lapwai Agency, Idaho, December 2, 1892, transcribed in S. Exec. Doc. No.
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31, pp. 26-61; in this Court's record as Exhibit 4 to the Affidavit ofJames C. Tucker

Dated - July 17, 1998, filed July 20, 1998), the dominant theme, as read and interpreted
by this Court, was whether members of the Tribe would sell the surplus land or not in the
first instance.

8. Record of negotiations on discussions of preservation of reservation
boundaries. As noted earlier, the Supreme Court in Yankton Sioux held that the record
of the negotiations between the Commissioners and the Yankton tribe contains no
discussion of the preservation of the 185.8 boundaries. Id. at 800.
A reading of the record of negotiations with the Nez Perce in 1893, however, does
reveal at least a minimal discussion of changing reservation boundaries (the following
quotes taJr..en from: Proceedings relating to the 1893 Trear; negotiations, entitled:

Organization of the council of the Nez Perce tribe ofIndians in the State ofIdaho and on
Nez Perce Reservation, Lapwai Agency, Idaho, December 2, 1892, transcribed in S.
Exec. Doc. No. 31, pp. 26-61; in this Court's record as Exhibit 4 to the Affidavit ofJames
C. Tucker Dated-July 17, 1998, filed July 20, 1998).

First, it was clearly understood by all at the negotiations that the Government's
sole purpose was to purchase the surplus (unalloted) lands with the exception of certain
timber lands. For instance, the following excerpts are from the First Day of Council at
Lapwai, Idaho, December 5, 1892:
Commissioner ROBERT SCHLEICHER. You have known for several
years, since the special agent was sent to allot your lands, that a
commission would be sent to buy your lands. Your allotments were
completed several months ago, and commissioners have now come to treat
for your surplus lands, you reserving enough timber land for yourselves
and children.
p.26,and
JAMES LAWYER. Is the sale ofunallotted lands the only object?
Commissioner JAMES F. ALLEN. Yes; the land you do not require
after your allotments are made and what timber and wood land you
need. The commission has your interest at heart. I was selected by the
Secretary of the Interior as your special friend. We are authorized to
treat, arrange terms, and no other business. The Government believes
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that if you cede these lands at a fair and reasonable price you will receive
a payment for them, the balance to be invested, drawing 5 per cent
interest, which will be paid to you every year or expended for your benefit
as agreed upon. These lands can be of small benefit to you. The
Government tries too [sic] keep trespass~rs off and cattle off, but is
not always able. If you have the money from this sale you v.,ill be sure of
receiving it.
p. 27 (emphasis added).
Second, and as alluded to immediately above with respect to trespassers, there were
discussions on the Sixth Day of Council about the difficulties in keeping trespassers off
the then-existing (pre-1893 Agreement) Reservations.
JAMES LAWYER. That provision of the treaty only had reference to the
time being and did not expect them to keep the land altogether. It was a
small piece of land and the land was to be used as a stage station.
Wbether it is there, in the treaty, or not, it should have been that the agent
should have authority, if he overstepped the privilege of remaining there,
to remove his cattle and horses. He can get them as far up as to the
canyon - and they go that far - and bring them back. Not only that, in
going there he is not particular, but gets some of ours too. Last year I had
a cow and a calf and a yearling, and this man took them from us, and only
with considerable trouble I was enabled to get them back again.
Commissioner JAMES F. ALLEN. My friend Lawyer has given a far
better argument than I can give why you should sell the land. As I have

said before, the Department has ordered Caldwell off the reservation.
It was supposed he was off. If he is back again with his cattle and
horses it only shows the great difficulty the Department labors under
3,000 miles from here in keeping such men off the reservation and
keeping it clear of cattle and horses so that it would be of some use to you.
If you will sell the surplus lands and have the money for it, it won't
then make any difference if white men's cattle roam over it. But they
will not, for settlers will come and take up land and fence their farms, and
that will keep cattle not only off their lands but it will help to keep them
off your lands, for before the cattle can get on your farms they will have to
come over white men's farms. The white men will be interested in
keeping them off their lands and so help to keep them off your lands. I
said the other day that when the land is settled up with farms and
settlers all round inside and outside and mixed among you there will
be no difficulty in keeping cattle off your land. Now, this is a strong
argument why you should dispose of this land, and is one of the reasons
why the Secretary and the President are anxious you should do so.
p. 45 (emphasis added).
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A fair reading of the above discussion also reasonably leads to the conclusion that
if sold, the land would no longer be a part of the reservation, i.e., "If you will sell the
surplus lands ... it won't then make any difference if white men's cattle roam over it." In
other words, white men's cattle on land was only a trespass problem if it was onreservation.
Next, on the Seventh Day of Council, held on December 13, 1892, the following
breakdown of the subject lands was stated.
Commissioner ROBERT SCHLEICHER. My friends, we have spoken a
great deal, and you have spoken a great deal else, and you and we think
now the time has come not to make such long speeches, but devote
ourselves to business.
We were requested yesterday by some speakers to bring you this
morning a list of the number of acres in the whole reservation, and the
number of acres that was allotted and the number of acres that is left for
you to dispose of. This we are prepared to do. And we will now read it
out and ask that the interpreter shall translate it slowly, so that every one
can understand it, as follows:

Acres

The reservation contains .................................................. 756,968
The allotments comprise ................................................... 182,234

Leaving a surplus oflands .................................................. 574,734
Reserved for wood and timber. ............................................. 64,820

509,914

If the amount of timber land is reduced to 34,820 acres it
will add to surplus

..................................................... 30,000

And the surplus to be sold will amount to ........................ 539,914
p. 47 (emphasis added).
And finally, on the Tenth Day's Council, held on December 15, 1892, the following
was stated in regards to the understanding that at least some members of the Tribe
possessed; that is by selling the land the reservation boundaries would change.
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SALMON RIVER BILLY. You see me, and you see, too, I am left of the
number who helped to make the first treaty with Governor Stevens in '55,
as also the treaty of 1863, made by Mr. Hale. I learned then, and know
what I learned then was true. And I was one of the speakers at both
treaties, all of which that was spoken of. I remember well Mr. Hale told
us that the former treaty made by Governor Stevens was, as it were,
fenced in and all right, and I was also told by him at same time that the
country had been inclosed [sic] according to the treaty and prevented
the entrance on the reservation of any white man and any who should
try to set aside or break down the boundaries of that reservation.
Should it be done by us Indians, we should take the matter in hand, but if
by the white men the Government should be appealed to. In case your
agent would not take cognizance of the matter, it would be for you to push
that agent out of office and refer the matter to the Government. Perhaps
it may be on account of having another President, who is a Democrat;
perhaps it is he who has made the edict for breaking down the lines of
the reservation.

p. 56 (emphasis added).
9. Preamble language in the Congressional Act of 1894. The Act of August
15, 1894, 28 Stat. 286, contains preamble language to the Articles of Agreement for both
the agreements with the Yankton Sioux and the Nez Perce. The preamble Yankton
language is as follows:
Whereas the Yankton tribe ofDacotah-now spelled Dakota and so
spelled in this agreement - or Sioux Indians is willing to dispose of a
portion of the land set apart and reserved to said tribe, by the first
article of the treaty of April (19 th) nineteenth, eighteen hundred and fiftyeight (1858), between said tribe and the United States, and situated in the
state of South Dakota.
Now, therefore, this agreement made and entered into in pursuance of
th
the provisions of the act of Congress approved July thirteenth (13 ),
eighteen hundred and ninety-two (1892), at the Yankton Indian Agency,
South Dakota, by J.C. Adams of Webster, S. D., John J. Cole of St. Louis,
Mo., and I.W. French of the State of Neb., on the part of the United States,
duly authorized and empowered thereto, and the chiefs, headmen, and
other male adult members of said Yankton tribe of Indians, witnesseth:
(emphasis mine).
Act of August 15, 1894, ch. 290 (53d Cong. 2d Sess. 1893), p. 314.
The preamble Nez Perce language is as follows:

Whereas the said Nez Perce Indians are willing to dispose of a
portion of the tract of land in the State of Idaho reserved as a home
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for their use and occupation by the second article of the treaty
between said Indians and the United States, concluded June ninth,
eighteen hundred and sixty-three:
Now, therefore, this agreement made and entered into in pursuance of
the provisions of said Act of Congress approved February eighth, eighteen
hundred and eighty-seven, at the Nez Perce Agency, by Robert Schleicher,
James F. Allen, and Cyrus Beede, on the part of the United States, and the
principal men and male adults of the Nez Perce tribe oflndians located on
said Nez Perce Reservation, witnesseth: (emphasis mine).
Act of August 15, 1894, ch. 290 (53d Cong. 2d Sess. 1893), p. 327.
An examination of the above language reveals some important matters. First,
Congress expressly found and stated in the statute that the respective Tribes were willing
to dispose of a portion of the lands previously reserved to the respective tribes; i.e., a
clear expression of congressional intent. Second, as it relates to the Nez Perce, note that
the language (bolded by this Court for emphasis) provides that the Tribe is willing to
dispose of part of the lands reserved to the Tribe by the Treaty of 1863 (not t.1-ie Treaty of
1855). Thus it is clear that at least Congress thought that the Reservation of 1855 had
been diminished by the Treaty of 1863 and that Congress intended to further diminish it
by the ratification in 1894 of the Agreement of 1893.
With the above in mind, this Court then considers the respective cession language
in each of the Treaties/Agreement with the Nez Perce. Article I of the Treaty of 1855
provides in relevant part:
ARTICLE I.

The said Nez Perce tribe of Indians hereby cede, relinquish
and convey to the United States all their right, title, and interest in and
to the country occupied or claimed by them, bounded and described as
follows, to wit:
(emphasis mine).
Articles I and II of the Treaty of 1863 provide in relevant part:
ARTICLE I. The said Nez Perce tribe agree to relinquish, and do
hereby relinquish, to the United States the lands heretofore reserved
for the use and occupation of the said tribe, saving and excepting so
much thereof as is described in article II. for a new reservation.
ARTICLE II. The United States agree to reserve for a home, and for
the sole use and occupation of said tribe, the tract of land included
within the following boundaries, to wit:
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(emphasis mine).
And again the cession language of Article I of the 1893 Agreement with the Nez
Perce provides:
The said Nez Perce Indians hereby cede, sell, relinquish, and convey to
the United States all their claim, right, title, and interest in and to all the
unallotted lands within the limits of said reservation, saving and excepting
the following described tracts of lands, which are hereby retained by the
said Indians, viz: (legal descriptions omitted).
Therefore, an examination of the above quoted language of the three agreements
with the Tribe reveals the following logic. No one contends that by the 1855 Treaty that
the Tribe did not cede, sell, and relinquish to the United States approximately 7 million
acres and reserved an approximate 7 million acres. Or, therefore, if the cession language
in the 1855 Treaty has any legal effect, then the near identical language in the Agreement
of 1893 must be consistently interpreted in a like fashion. Furthermore, no one seriously
contends that the Treaty of 1863 had not diminished the Reservation created in the 1855
Treaty from about 7 million acres to about 750,000 acres (at least as noted above in the
Nez Perce Preamble, Congress speaks of the Tribe disposing of lands reserved in Article
II of the 1863 Treaty, p. 327).

10. Presidential Proclamations Following the Congressional Act of 1894.

As further clear evidence of "contemporary interpretation" by the federal
government regarding _the interpretation that the 1893 Agreement (specifically the
"cession" and the "sum certain" language) had the effect of diminishing the Nez Perce
Reservation, an examination of the respective Presidential Proclamations opening the
Reservations for settlement is useful.
President Grover Cleveland's Proclamation of May 16, 1895, opening for
settlement the ceded lands of the previous Yankton Sioux Reservation, provides in
relevant part:
Whereas, all the terms, conditions and considerations required by said
agreement made with said tribes of Indians and by the laws relating
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thereto, precedent to opening said lands to settlement, have been, as I
hereby declare, complied with:
Now, therefore, I, Grover Cleveland, President of the United
States, by virtue of the power in me vested by the Statutes hereinbefore
mentioned, do hereby declare and make known that all of the lands
acquired from the Yankton tribe of Sioux or Dacotah Indians by the
said agreement, saving and excepting the lands reserved in pursuance of
the provisions of said agreement and the act of Congress ratifying the
same, will, at and after the hour of twelve o'clock, noon (central standard
time), on the twenty first day of May, 1895 and not before, be open to
settlement, under the terms of and subject to all the conditions,
limitations, reservations, and restrictions contained in said agreement,
the statutes hereinbefore specified and the laws of the United States
applicable thereto.
The lands to be so opened to settlement are for greater convenience,
particularly described in the accompanying schedule, entitled "Schedule of
lands within the Yankton Reservation, South Dakota, to be opened to
settlement by Proclamation of the President", and which schedule is made
a part hereof. (emphasis_ added).
·
Likewise, the President's Proclamation of November 8, 1895, opening for
settlement the ceded lands of the previous Nez Perce Reservation provides in relevant
part:
Whereas all the terms, conditions, and considerations required by said
agreement made with said tribe oflndians hereinbefore mentioned, and
the laws relating thereto, precedent to opening said lands to settlement
have been, as I hereby declare, provided for, paid and complied with:
Now, therefore, I Grover Cleveland, President of the United States,
by virtue of the power in me vested by the statutes hereinbefore
mentioned, and by said agreement, do hereby declare and make known
that all of the unallotted and unreserved lands acquired from the Nez
Perce Indians, by said agreement, will, at and after the hour of 12
o'clock, noon, (Pacific Standard time) on the 18th day of November 1895
and not before, be opened to settlement under the terms of and subject
to all the conditions, limitations, reservations, and restrictions
contained in said agreement, the statutes above specified and the laws
of the United States applicable thereto.
The lands to be so opened to settlement are for greater convenience
particularly described in the accompanying schedule, entitled "Schedule of
lands within the Nez Perce Indian Reservation, Idaho, to be opened to
settlement by Proclamation of the President", and which schedule is made
a part hereof. (emphasis added).
In Yankton Sioux, t.11.e United States Supreme Court stated in this respect:
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Finally, the Presidential Proclamation opening the lands to settlement
declared that the Tribe had "ceded, sold, relinquished, and conveyed to the
United States, all [its] claim, right, title, and interest in and to all the
unallotted lands within the limits of the reservation set apart to said tribe
by the first article [of the 1858 Treaty]." Presidential Proclamation (May
16, 1895), reprinted in App. 453. This Court has described substantially
similar language as "an unambiguous, contemporaneous, statement by the
Nation's Chief Executive, of a perceived disestablishment." (citation
omitted).
Id. at 803.
The operative language in the respective Presidential Proclamations cited above is
nearly identical and is legally indistinguishable. As such, and consistent with the holding

in Yankton Sioux, the language in the Presidential Proclamation regarding the ceded lands
of the former Nez Perce Reser.ration must likewise be construed as "an unambiguous,
contemporaneous, statement by the Nation's Chief Executive, of a perceived
disestablishment."
More fundamentally, the purchased land was "opened to settlement under ... the
laws of the United States applicable thereto." Therefore, the land was clearly
contemplated to be a part of the United States and not the Reservation.

VIII.
Court's Declaration For Clarification Of Ruling Regarding Diminishment And The
Claimed Instream Flow Water Rights On Appeal, i.e., Even If This Court Is Wrong
Regarding Diminishment Of The Reservation, There Is Still No Off-Reservation
Instream Flow Water Right.

In light of the present motion to alter or amend the judgment and the
pending/imminent appeals, the Court desires to clarify its prior ruling regarding the
asserted reservation of any off-reservation in-stream flow water rights. As previously
discussed, this Court ruled that the 1893 Agreement and its subsequent Congressional
ratification diminished the boundaries of the Reservation and that such diminishment also
would have necessarily included any then existing off-reservation in-stream flow water
rights. However, it needs be clarified that irrespective of the effect of the 1893
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Agreement on the boundaries of the Reservation, the Nez Perce did not impliedly reserve
in-stream flow water rights extending outside the current boundaries of the Reservation,
wherever those boundaries are ultimately detennined to exist. Simply put, based on the
Court's interpretation of the 1855 Treaty, the Nez Perce did not reserve any in-stream
flow water rights outside the boundaries of the Reservation.
Contrary to the assertion made by the United States, this does not make the
Court's ruling on the effect of the 1893 Agreement on the boundaries of the Reservation

"orbiter dicta." The basis for the Nez Perce Tribe's reserved water right claims
originated in conjunction with the fishing rights reserved in pursuant to Article ill of the
·1855 Treaty. Article III of the 1855 Treaty distinguished between the nature of the
fishing rights reserved by the Nez Perce Tribe both on and off the Reservation.
Specifically, the Nez Perce reserved "exclusive" fishing rights on t.lie Reservation and "in
common" fishing rights extending outside of the Reservation. The "in-common"
language contained in Article ill is the only express language contained in the Treaty that
arguably supports the claim for a reserved in-stream flow water right outside the
boundaries of the Reservation. Therefore, it belies the plain language of the Treaty to fail
to distinguish between the nature of the fishing right reserved by the Nez Perce Tribe
both on and off the Reservation. 1 As this Court previously discussed in its Memorandum

Decision and Order, the nature and extent of the off-Reservation :fishing right reserved
pursuant to "in-common" fishing language, as that language has been previously
interpreted in both the subject treaty and in other Steven's Treaties, does not give rise to
the implication that a reserved water right necessarily accompanied the fishing right. The
Court did not rule on the whether the "exclusive" fishing rights reserved by the Nez Perce
Tribe also implied an in-stream flow water right on the Reservation because the scope of
the motion was limited to claims outside the boundaries of the Reservation. Since, based
on this Court's analysis, there is a difference between the on and off reservation :fishing
rights which in turn ultimately form the basis for the claimed water rights, and since this
Court ultimately must adjudicate the in-stream flow claims, the present boundaries of the
1 Although the Nez Perce Tribe argues that the distinction between claimed water rights on and off the
Reservation is irrelevant, this Court disagrees. Again, the claimed basis for the water rights is the fishing
rights reserved in Article III of the 1855 Treaty. Article III clearly does not reserve the same fishing rights
both on and off the Reservation.
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Reservation are clearly at issue. Accordingly, the effect of the 1893 Agreement is both
integral to the determination of the boundaries of the Reservation and also the alternative
conclusion that even if the Nez Perce Tribe has previously reserved in stream flow t1ghts
outside the boundaries of the Reservation, those rights were ceded. Although the physical
boundaries of the Reservation have not yet been determined, if it is later resolved that the
Nez Perce Tribe, or the Federal Government on behalf of the Tribe, reserved in-stream
flows on the Reservation, the boundaries will ultimately have to be particularly described
so that the water rights can also be properly described.

IV.
Conclusion

This Court reaffirms its rulings made in the November 10, 1999 Orders on
Summary Judgment and also adopts as additional grounds the matters stated herein.
For all of these reasons, the United States' Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment
is denied. Likewise, the alternative motion for an evidentiary hearing is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED:

DATED: JANUARY 21, 2000.

BARRY WOOD
Administrative District Judge and
Presiding Judge of the
Snake River Basin Adjudication
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ISSUES PRESENTED
Although the issue in this case centers around a tribal water claim, the scope of this brief is
limited to the primary question of law involving the status of the Nez Perce Indian Reservation:
whether the ceded area of the 1863 Nez Perce Reservation, now 90% owned and populated by nonmembers of the Nez Perce Tribe, was properly considered by the district court to be within the
purview of the almost irrebuttable presumption of cession reservation disestablishment repeatedly
affirmed by the United States Supreme Court, and whether the overall conclusion of the district court
that the Nez Perce Reservation was disestablished by this 1894 cession legislation should be affirmed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard ofreview set forth by Respondent State ofldaho at 1-2 is adopted in this amicus
curiae brief.
ARGUMENT
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 8 (I.A.R.), the North Central Idaho Jurisdictional Alliance
(Alliance) submits this brief as amicus curiae in support of Respondent State ofidaho. The Alliance
is an unincorporated association; its members include 3 counties, 8 cities, 3 school districts and 7
highway districts in north central Idaho, whose geographical boundaries include land which was
within the Nez Perce Indian reservation as it existed prior to 1894. This area is now ninety percent
(90%) owned and populated by non-members of the Nez Perce Tribe. The purpose of the Alliance
is to provide an organization to foster cooperation between its members and to focus their efforts
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toward obtaining a resolution of their jurisdictional authority in relationship to the jurisdictional
authority of the United States and the Nez Perce Tribe.
The United States and the Nez Perce Tribe can not claim to be surprised by the arguments
in this amicus curiae brief. For the most part, every argument of substance was previously submitted
in the amici curiae briefs in United States v. Scott, Case No. CR98-0l-N-EJL (D. Idaho, Aug. 12,
1998) and United States v. Webb, 219 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2000), which were served on the United
States and the Nez Perce Tribe at the time.
I. THE PRECEDENT VALUE OF UNITED STATES V. WEBB, 219 F.3d 1127 (9 th Cir. 2000),
IS UNDERMINED BY THE FACT THAT THE HISTORICAL RECORDS AND REPORTS
WERE WRONGFULLY SEALED ANDAMICUS PARTICIPATION WAS NOT ALLOWED.
Although this brief focuses generally on the merits of the litigating position of the United
States, the efforts of the United States to seal the historical records and the historical reports relied
on by the courts in Webb bears special emphasis. Brief of Respondent State ofidaho has highlighted
these specific Nez Perce historical records and reports that confirm disestablishment in the traditional
sense. Initially, the amicus curiae motion of the Alliance in the court of appeals in Webb was not
accompanied by a proposed amicus curiae brief because the entire historical record and transcript
in the district court regarding the jurisdictional issue was inexplicably under seal (at the insistence of
the United States). Rather, in order to fairly brief the important jurisdictional question regarding
congressional intent and reservation status, the Alliance respectfully submitted that amicus curiae
should first have been allowed access to this historical evidence, including the expert testimony that
evaluated that evidence. The district court expressly relied upon this historical evidence and
·2

testimony. UnitedStatesv. Webb, Memorandum Decision and Order, No. CR98-80-N-EJL(D. Idaho
Jan. 12, 1999).
For that reason, pursuant to Cir. R. 27-13(c), a motion to unseal the historical record and
transcript accompanied the initial motion for leave to appear amicus curiae. Although amicus was
not a party entitled to submit a motion to unseal pursuant to Cir. R. 27-13(c), Petitioner Webb did
not oppose this motion to unseal (or any other motion to unseal). And, in any event, the Alliance
pointed out that the court of appeals could, in the interests of justice, enter an appropriate Order on
its own motion. The Alliance further noted that the previous Order that set the briefing schedule need
not have been modified.
By Order of September 30, 1999, the court of appeals denied both motions without prejudice
to renewal following the filing of the opening brief. The Alliance submitted a renewed Motion to
Unseal pursuant to that Order. That renewed motion was denied as moot three (3) days before the
decision on the merits (because the court of appeals denied the motion to file an amicus curiae brief
at the same time). United States v. Webb, 219 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S.
1200 (2001).
Public officials throughout the Nez Perce area are still dumbfounded. What legitimate
interests could have been advanced by keeping historical records sealed when the issue was
congressional intent? A satisfactory answer to that question has not been forthcoming to date. The
decision ofthe court ofappeals does not mention the issue ofthe sealed historical record and sealed
historical reports.
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II. THE RESERVATION STATUS ARGUMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES ARE
WITHOUT MERIT.
A. An Overview of the Arguments Submitted in the United States Supreme Court
Establishes Three General Themes.
A fair reading of the reservation status cases, Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351
(1962); Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973); DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425
(1975); Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977); Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984);

Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994); and South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329
(1998), clearly undermines the views set forth by the court of appeals in Webb. The State highlights
these important principles and, for that reason, they will not be repeated here.
However, a proper perspective regarding the history ofthis reservation status litigation is also
important in order to accurately assess the issue in conjunction with the principles set forth in these
decisions. This brief is intended to serve that purpose and provide that perspective. The Alliance
starts with a brief review of the primary arguments presented and rejected in each case decided by
the United States Supreme Court, as well as the historic perspective available or established at the
time. 1 Such a review advances three overriding themes.

1

This brief does not address the decision of the Court in Oregon Dept. of Fish and Wildlife v.
Klamath Tribe, 473 U.S. 753 (1985), only because itisnottrulyareservation status case. However,
Oregon does involve a cession agreement and the Oregon opinion sheds considerable light on
understanding the cession process. The Supreme Court of South Dakota in State v. Greger, 559
N.W.2d 854 (S.D. 1997), cited and discussed Oregon in several instances. For all of these reasons,
Oregon is important and merits consideration.
·
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First, as one would expect, each time the United States Supreme Court was presented with
this issue, more primary sources were available from which a proper historical perspective could be
reconstructed and the intent of Congress more conclusively ascertained. The opinions reflect this
documentation.
Second, the views of the United States are especially noteworthy. The United States rarely
failed to advocate the resurrection of original reservation boundaries, presumably because of a
perceived obligation to support the tribal position. The shifting, but very sophisticated arguments of
the United States, (for the most part repeatedly rejected by the United States Supreme Court) have
. served to perpetuate the confusion and conflicts in this area of federal Indian law, fueling the prospect
of additional litigation.
The central arguments of the United States are therefore closely examined for a third reason.
As will be seen, the United States repeatedly has made a number of important concessions in the
United States Supreme Court, subsequent to DeCoteau, regarding the effect ofcession agreements,
like this one, on Indian reservations. The United States conceded that these cessions disestablished
reservations. These cession concessions, made in conjunction with submissions that urged the
continued recognition of other original reservation boundaries, cannot be explained away. The views
of the United States in this regard, submitted to the United States Supreme Court, merit continued
consideration. 2

2 Because

Yankton Sioux Tribe is the most recent reservation boundary case decided by the United
States Supreme Court, this brief should also mention, in chronological order, the specific concessions
5
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B. A Review of the Arguments Previously Presented and Re.iected in the United States
Supreme Court Establishes Clear Principles that Undermine Any Argument Supporting a
Resurrection of the 1863 Boundaries of the Nez Perce Reservation.

I. Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962). A reservation status issue was first
presented to the United States Supreme Court in Seymour. Although we now know that the 1906
Colville Act (Act of March 22, 1906, 34 Stat. 80) at issue in that case was one in a series of surplus
land statutes enacted pursuant to the General Allotment Act of 1887 (Dawes Act)-a routine matter
for Congress by 1906-neither the General Allotment Act of 1887 nor the limited legislative history
of the 1906 Act played any real role in the resolution of the question. Act of February 8, 1887, 24
Stat. 388. The Seymour opinion does not cite the General Allotment Act or the legislative history of
the 1906 Colville Act. The briefs are similarly silent with respect to the General Allotment Act and
the few citations to the 1906 legislative history are set forth almost as an afterthought.

of the United States regarding the disestablisr..ment of the 1858 Yar.u.1<.ton Sioux reservation effected
by the passage of the 1894 Yankton Sioux cession act. In 1984, the United States formally submitted
this Yankton disestablishment concession in the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. United States v.
Dion, 752F.2d 1261 (1985),rev'd,476U.S. 734(1986). TheUnitedStatesdidsoinordertomaintain a cession distinction in Solem essential to its argument there supporting original reservation
boundaries. See Solem discussion infra. Moreover, in other litigation also pending at the same time,
and also involving the 1858 Yankton Sioux reservation and the 1894 Yankton Sioux cession act, the
United States acknowledged that Court's decision in DeCoteau considered "a similar and
contemporaneous cession agreement" with "the same language" and "purpose" as the Yankton
cession. Brief for the United States in Opposition, at 11, Yankton Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 796 ·
F.2d 241 (8th Cir. 1986) (No. 86-1436). Significantly, the unusually expansive saving clause of the
1858 treaty that the United States subsequently insisted was so important in Yankton Sioux Tribe (to
preclude disestablishment), was not mentioned in any of this. Yankton Sioux Tribe, of course,
unanimously rejected that savings clause argument and the litigating position of the United States.
6

In short, Seymour was decided almost without the benefit of any historical perspective.
"Almost" is used because, although neither the General Allotment Act nor the legislative history of
the specific act in question played any role in the decision, Petitioner Seymour did rely on the contrast
between·the 1906 Act and the earlier 1892 "public domain" legislation that concededly disestablished
the North Half of the Colville Reservation. Brief for the Petitioner at 9, Seymour v. Superintendent,
368 U.S. 351 (1962) (No. 62). At best, this was a limited perspective, but certainly one that
benefited Petitioner by simple contrast. More important matters were not briefed, i.e. the argument
that the public domain format of the 1892 Act was the result of a refusal by Congress to ratify a
previously negotiated 1891 cession agreement due to the questionable nature of the title to the
Colville Executive Order Reservation and the argument that the language was added to deal with a
congressional concern that undesirable precedent might be established. Antoine v. Washington, 420
U.S. 194,216 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); S. Rep. No. 664, 52d Cong., 1st Sess. (1892); See

also US. v. Pelican, 232 U.S. 442 (1914). In any event, it is doubtful whether any of the above
would have altered the fixed views of the United States, which argued in support of the reservation
boundaries of the South Half of the Colville Reservation ("Solicitor General has urged this
construction upon the Court"). Seymour, 368 U.S. at 357.
The Solicitor General's three page argument in Seymour was based predominantly on the 1948
statutory definition of Indian country which, of course, begs the question. 18 U.S.C. § 1151. It was
also based upon subsequent congressional materials purportedly constituting a "recognition," primarily in 1956, that the reservation continued to exist. Mem. for the United States at 3, Seymour v.
7

Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962) (No. 62). Neither the General Allotment Act nor the historical
perspective of the 1906 Act played any role in the brief for the United States. In this light, Seymour
concluded, without further citation, that:
The fSeymour l Act did no more than open the way for non-Indian settlers to own land
on the reservation in a manner which the Federal Government, acting as guardian and
trustee for the Indians, regarded as beneficial to the development of its wards.

Seymour, 368 U.S. at 356.
The United States later seized on this statement from Seymour and tied it to the General
Allotment Act of 1887 (which, as previously noted, was not even mentioned in Seymour). In effect,

the United States attempted to attribute to both Seymour and the General Allotment Act, a new
congressional plan or purpose consistent with a new argument. That new argument stated that no
surplus land statute, passed pursuant to the General Allotment Act of 1887, was ever intended by
Congress to disestablish portions ofIndian Reservations-a "whole cloth 11 argument: the revisionist
theory of the General Allotment Act. 3
The United States focused on the General Allotment Act of 1887 for more than one reason.
Prior to 1887, Congress routinely utilized treaties, cession agreements and other similar

3

Now, this principle that Congress did not intend to disestablish the Reservations is
not one that the government has made up out of whole cloth. It is supported both by
history and by the previous decisions of this Court.
Tr. Oral Argument at 22, Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977) (No. 75-562).
The Court in Rosebud Sioux Tribe squarely rejected the "history" and the analysis of the
United States in support of this revisionist view of the General Allotment Act in a manner similar to
the rejection of the same argument by the United States Supreme Court in DeCoteau v. District
County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975).

8

arrangements, some of which contained allotment provisions, to disestablish reservations and open
territories throughout the United States to settlement for decades:
ftlhe policy of the Government from its earliest days has been to restore Indian
reservations or portions thereof to the public domain as the exigencies of advancing
population required it ....
H.R. Rep. No. 791, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. at 3 (1888).
No one had ever attempted to even formulate an argument that Congress never intended these
actions to disestablish the limits or boundaries oflndian reservations. If similar cession agreements,
passed subsequent to 1887, were not intended to have the same effect, the General Allotment Act of
1887 was the only point in history that Congress could have even arguably intended to have altered .
such a fundamental historical process. This is especially so in the absence of some affirmative evidence
that Congress specifically intended to depart from that historical format, either generally or in a certain
case. (The United States could not produce such evidence at the time--or, as a matter of fact, ever.
And it will not do so in this case.)
The first opportunity for the United States to advance the new revisionist theory ofthe General
Allotment Act argument in the United States Supreme Court came in Mattz v. Arnett, supra.
2. Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973). Although the United States argued forcefully for the
broad sweep of Seymour tied to the General Allotment Act, this argument met with only limited
success in Mattz. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 10-12, Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S.
481 (1973) (No. 71-1182). The history of the Klamath River Reservation at issue in Mattz was so
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tortuous and fact specific, isolated and atypical, that the Mattz dicta regarding the General Allotment
Act, while all that the United States could have hoped for, did not really seem pivotal to the decision.
Certainly, the United States repeatedly told the Mattz Court:
The Act of 1892 can properly be understood only in light of the General Allotment Act
which Congress had recently passed.
In our view, the Act of June 17, 1892, can properly be understood only in light of two
considerations: (1) what Congress had done five years earlier in the General Allotment
Act ....

The policy of the Act was to continue the reservation system and the trust status of
Indian land ....

This Court's more recent decision in Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351, is, in
our view, controlling here ....

Id. at 8, 12, 13, 24 (emphasis added). See also, id. at 9, 14 n.9.
And at oral argument, the United States squarely placed this issue "into a little bit of historical
perspective":

This sa.111e policy 1s recognized more recently by tliis Court m Seymour v.
Superintendent ....
Tr. Oral Argument at 19-20, Mattz (No. 71-1182). See also, id. at 13, 14, 15, 21.
At the same time, to shore up this new General Allotment Act argument and supplement this
"little bit" of historical perspective for the Court, the United States also discussed certain statutes that
concededly disestablished Indian reservations. According to the United States, the Court could, by
contrast, look to these examples in determining when congressional action was really intended to
disestablish an Indian reservation-an instant historical perspective. Brief for the United States at 1710
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18, Mattz (No. 71-1 I 82). Following Petitioner's lead in Seymour, and especially in light of this aspect
of the Seymour opinion, the controlling example cited by the United States of a congressional
mandated disestablishment was the 1892 Colville statute, where the operative language restored the
north half of the reservation to the public domain. As the United States told the United States Supreme
Court in Mattz, among other things:
This Court's more recent decision in Seymour v. Superiniendent, 368 U.S. 351, is, in
our view, controllin~ here .... Inholding that the Act did not terminate the reservation
there at issue, the Court emphasized the absence from the Act oflanguage abolishing
the reservations or "restoring that land to the public domain" (368 U.S. at 355).

Id. at 24 (emphasis added).
Other examples of express termination were also listed by the United States to support this 11 by
contrast" argument, including a typical cession. Id. at l 8a-19a. The cession example merits special
attention in the text at 14-15, infra.
At oral argument, the United States repeated the "by contrast" point:
MR. SACHSE ... In closing, since I assume I am out of time, I refer the Court to
page 17 of our brief where we have samples oflanguage that Congress used when it
did want to discontinue a portion of a reservation.
Tr. Oral Argument at 20-21, Mattz (No.71-1182). (Except for the cession example, the text infra
also establishes that the others on the lis! were representative of atypical situations enacted by
Congress only on rare occasions and decades apart.)
Without question, the Mattz opinion reflects both arguments made by the United States. First,
with respect to the General Allotment Act:
11

. 0) f} ,-,
0U
~

.......

:J

Its policy was to continue the reservation system and the trust status of Indian lands,
.... See~ 6 of the General Allotment Act, 24 Stat. 390; United States Department
of the Interior, Federal Indian Law 115-117, 127-129, 776-777 (1958) ....
. . . This Court una.11imously observed in an analogous setting in Seymour, id., at 356,

Mattz, 412 U.S. at 496,497 (emphasis added).
Secondly, with respect to the "by contrast" argument, the Court in Mattz noted:
More significantly, throughout the period from 1871-1892 numerous bills were
introduced which expressly provided for the termination of the reservation and did so
in unequivocal terms ....
Congress has used clear language of express termination when that result is desired.
See, for example ....

Id at 504, n.22 (emp~asis added).
The success of the United States in Mattz was short-lived. Two years later, the United States
Supreme Court was actually presented with a typical su.."J)lus land statute specifically patterned and
enacted pursuant to the terms of the General Allotment Act. With the supporting documentation of
both the specific act, as well as the General Allotment Act, the General Allotment Act dicta in Mattz
did not dissuade the Court, including the author of the Mattz opinion, from correctly concluding that
surplus land statutes passed pursuant to the General Allotment Act were intended and routinely
passed by Congress to disestablish Indian reservations. De Coteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S.
425, 447-449 (1975). Predictably, the United States again argued forcefully for a different result in
De Coteau.
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3. DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975). In DeCoteau, the surplus land
statute at issue was one of eight similar cession agreements jointly ratified in an 1891 Appropriation
Act. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 989. Each of these agreements was specifically tailored to the
provisions in the General Allotment Act, which had recently been passed after nearly a decade of
focused debate. For these two reasons, fortuitous in retrospect, the historical record consisted of
hundreds of pages directed to this aspect of the General Allotment Act (Section 5) and the effect the
cession agreements were understood and intended to have.
Moreover, for the first time, all of this primary documentation was excerpted and presented
to the DeCoteau Court in several hundred pages of briefs, setting forth a complete and proper
historical perspective. That perspective established that although simple allotment per se (Section 6
of the General Allotment Act) was only intended to disestablish reservations at some point in the
foreseeable future, a separate and distinct surplus land statute, in a cession format, opening the
reservation or a portion thereof to settlement pursuant to Sec. 5 of the General Allotment Act, was
intended to disestablish the affected reservation pro tanto (on the date of the opening set forth in the
Presidential Proclamation). This was precisely the manner that pre-1887 cessions had disestablished
reservations for decades, when Congress and/or the President authorized similar legislation.

The United States elected to ignore the force of this documentation, and instead urged the
DeCoteau Court to recognize the continuing existence of the original reservation boundaries on the

basis of Seymour and Mattz and the United States' revisionist theory of the General Allotment Act.
While agreeing that the focal point of the issue had to be the General Allotment Act of 18 87, the
13

United States pressed the point that Seymour and Mattz were both openings pursuant to that act, and
that no act pursuant to the General Allotment Act was ever intended to effect reservation
disestablishment, except at some future point in time. (Again, as in the Brief for the United States in
}vfattz, the United States blurred the distinction between allotment per se (Section 6 of the General
Allotment Act) which eventually resulted in some non-Indian ownership within the limits oflndian
reservations, but was never intended to immediately disestablish the reservations, and surplus land
statutes enacted pursuant to Sec. 5 of the General Allotment Act, which repeatedly accomplished this
result). Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 13-17, DeCoteau v. District County Court,
420 U.S. 425 (1975) (No. 73-1148). 4
In addition, the United States submitted a series of very sophisticated arguments drawn from
little scraps of language found in Seymour and Mattz to support this general proposition. No degree
of sophistication, however, could overcome the problem the United States never addressed: namely,
the fact that all of the contemporary historical evidence irrefutably pointed to the opposite conclusion:
reservation disestablishment. DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 432,434,436,438 and 441.
Further, the cession format utilized by Congress in previous decades-with the end result never
questioned in terms ofreservation boundaries-was only slightly modified at this point in time (1887
through the early l 900's). As a result, the United States could only argue that the cession format itself
was probative of nothing because it was not within the list of self-serving "by contrast" examples the

See also Tr. Oral Argument at 11, 13, 17, 21, Erickson v. US. ex rel. Feather, (No. 73-1500),
decided with DeCoteau.

4
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United States now said Congress utilized when Congress "clearly" intended to effectuate this result
(the list noted previously was compiled by the United States and noted in Mattz, 412 U.S. at 497,
n.19). 5
Even without a specific historical point ofreference, it is difficult to believe that the DeCoteau
Court would have found this argument credible when actually presented with a real cession agreement.
\1/hen all of the DeCoteau documents conclusively established that the De Coteau cession format was
still the rule at this point in time i.e., after the General Allotment Act, rather than the exception, this
argument was soundly rejected. Cession terminology was "precisely suited" to disestablishment and
the remainder of the sophisticated arguments of the United States were noted and rejected for that
reason. DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 445. 6

In the original version of the list presented to the Court in Mattz, the United States had included
representative cession language as evidence of express termination. Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae at 17-18, Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973) (No. 71-1182). When that cession
language did not appear in the Mattz opinion, the United States omitted any mention of this fact to
the Court, simply adopted the Mattz list an.d argued tliroughout DeCoteau that the cession la..'1.guage
was meaningless. Id. at 40a-41a. At the time, the State of South Dakota evidently overlooked this
aspect of the original list and the fact that the typical cession example submitted by the United States
in the Brief for the United States in Mattz (as "direct and unambiguous language" of disestablishment)
was actually ratified in the same statute as the cession agreement presented in DeCoteau. To the
extent that the United States was making the opposite argument in DeCoteau, this oversight was
fortuitous for the United States in that this contradictory position was never brought to the Court's
attention.
6 As the Court in DeCoteau noted, as recently as 1963, the United States had joined with South
Dakota in the argument that cessions disestablished reservations. Joint Brief of Respondent State of
South Dakota and United States as Amicus Curiae at 7, DeMarrias v. State, 319 F .2d 845 (8th Cir.
1963) (No. 17200). DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 443.
Not surprisingly, in every way that is arguably significant, the Yankton and Nez Perce
documents mirror and reflect the same terminology, discussions, considerations, policies, and
5
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4. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977). The United States subsequently
resisted the force of DeCoteau, i.e., that, as a general rule, the intended effect of surplus land statutes
after 1887 was reservation disestablishment. In 1977, in Rosebud, the United States Supreme Court
considered three Sec. 5 surplus land statutes considered by Congress a decade after the DeCoteau
surplus land statutes were passed. The United States again argued that, after adopting the General
Allotment Act, Congress never intended this type of statute to disestablish portions of Indian reservations. As in the past, reliance for this argument was placed almost entirely upon Seymour and Mattz.

In its brief, the United States specially emphasized that Mattz noted:
Placing the 1892 Act into the historic context of the General Allotment Act of 1887,
24 Stat. 388, the fMattzl Court further observed that the Allotment Act "permitted the
President to make allotments of reservation lands to resident Indians and, with tribal
consent, to sell surplus lands. Its policy was to continue the reservation system ...
Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 13, Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584
(1977) (No. 75-562) (first emphasis added). 7

generalities presented in DeCoteau. In fact, the Yank.ton Commissioners repeatedly referred
specifically to the terms of the DeCoteau Agreement. Br. ofResp't District at 18-19, South Dakota
v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998) (No. 96-1581). See also South Dakota Representative
Pickler's remarks in the Congressional Record ("same kind of a treaty we have always made" ...
"procure these lands in the same way" ... "we make no departure from our past policy" ... "just as
all other cessions ofland" ...). Id. at 36-37. As a result, in all instances the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs and the Secretary of the Interior also acknowledged that both reservations were "restored to
the public domain." Id. at 9. See generally Hagen 510 U.S. at412-414 (public domain). These same
points are further substantiated in the Nez Perce documentation discussed in Brief of Respondent
State.
7 The United States ignored the fact that the author of the Mattz opinion joined in DeCoteau.
16
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In its discussion of DeCoteau, the United States failed to mention the role played by Sec. 5 of
the General Allotment Act and the cessions in the DeCoteau process. Id. According to the United
States, DeCoteau was important primarily because of the differences between the cession act there and
the Rosebud legislation, i.e., the unilateral nature of the congressional action in Rosebud and the uncertain payment in trust for the Rosebud land.
At oral argument, the United States repeatedly stressed its revisionist theory of the General
Allotment Act. The United States maintained that after this act, Congress never intended reservation
disestablishment. DeCoteau was mentioned only in passing and then primarily to somehow support
continued reservation boundaries throughout this period. Tr. Oral Argument at 20, 21, 27, 29,

Rosebud (No. 75-562).
The Rosebud Court proceeded, in the most definitive opinion to date, to squarely address each
and every argument-sophisticated argun1ents to be sure (and there were ma..•-iy)--adva.."'lced in support
of the Court restoring the original boundaries ofthe Rosebud Reservation. Although one or two minor
exceptions might exist, a careful reading of Rosebud, together with De Coteau as recognized historical
background, and with Yankton Sioux Tribe as the final word, establishes that the United States and
the Nez Perce Tribe, can not advance any argument of substance that has not already been made and
answered. (And, as in DeCoteau, the public domain concept, whether expressed on the face of the act
or in the legislative history, was still important in Rosebud and equated with reservation
disestablishment.)

17
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Unquestionably, as time went on, the cession format of the earlier period was modified, but
these changes in format reflect no change in congressional intent. Thus, it ultimately mattered little that
the 1904 Rosebud Act was technically not a "cession." As the Court in Rosebud explained:
As a matter of strict English usage, petitioner is undoubtedly correct; "cession" refers
to a voluntary surrender of territory or jurisdiction, rather than a withdrawal of such
_jurisdiction by the authority of a superior sovereign. But as Mr. Justice (then Judge)
Holmes commented, we are not free to say to Congress: "We see what you are driving
at, but you have not said it, and therefore we shall go on as before." Johnson v. United
States, 163 F. 30, 32 (CAI 1908) ....
The use of the word "cession" in the 1904 Act, which was not consented to by the
required extraordinary majority of the Tribe, does not make the meaninR of the Act
ambiRUous as between diminution of the Reservation boundaries on the one hand, and
merely opening up designated lands for settlement by non-Indians, on the other. The
word is technically misused, but the meaninf< is quite clear. It was intended to
accomplish, in 1904, precisely what it was intended to accomplish in 1901.
Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 597-598 (emphasis added).

In the instant case, of course, the word "cession" is not technically misused. A11d the United
States' arguments regarding real cessions in Rosebud (alternatively, in an attempt to distinguish
Decoteau) bear repeating now:

The court of appeals, however, failed to recognize the crucial difference that in
DeCoteau the United States itself purchased the land in the reservation pursuant to an
fcessionl agreement with the Indians; this, the Court held, restored the land to the
public domain and extinguished the reservation. 420 U.S. at 446-447.
Memorandum of the United States at 13, Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977) (No.
75-562) (emphasis added).
The 1891 Act fDeCoteaul had ratified an agreement in which the Tribe expressly
ceded to the United States all its "right, title and interest" in the land for a lump sum.
18
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The Court contrasted this transaction with the Acts involved in Seymour and Mattz .
. . . The differences identified by the Court are important to the present case. The 1891
Act was aner<otiated ar<reement with the Tribe, whereas the Acts involved in Seymour
and Mattz were "unilateral" Acts of Congress not agreed to by the Tribes ....
The 1891 Act fDeCoteaul was a strair<htforward cessionfor a sum certain in amount
.... These distinctions led to the conclusion that the Lake Traverse Reservation was
extinguished and the land restored to the public domain ....
In DeCoteau (but not in Seymour or Mattz) the United States itselfpurchased the land
in the Reservation pursuant to an aweement with the Indians; this, the Court held,
restored the land to the public domain and extinguished the Reservation.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 14-15, Rosebud (No. 75-562) (emphasis added).
The United States also reminded the United States Supreme Court of the 1934 Interior
Department Opinion which they continued to rely upon for traditional confirmation that real cessions
disestablished reservations:

In this way fby cession disestablishmentl the exterior boundaries of a reservation were
further reduced. The lands thereby separated from a reservation were no longer looked
upon as being part of that reservation.
54 Interior Dec. 560 (1934) (emphasis added) cited and quoted in part in Memo. of the United States
at 19-21, Rosebud (No. 75-562) and Brief for the United States at 29-30, Rosebud (No. 75-562)
("The Secretary noted that many reservation lands had been ceded for a sum certain and concluded
that' [t]he lands thereby separated from a reservation were no longer looked upon as being a part of
that reservation' " (54 I.D. at 560) ). Id. at 29-30.

It is beyond dispute that the Sisseton cession agreement [DeCoteau], the Yankton cession
agreement [Yankton Sioux Tribe] and the Nez Perce cession agreement are within the purview ofthis
19

00023~

analysis. For this reason, as the United States pointed out, the list ofreservations in the 1934 Interior
Department Opinion included some 26 "reservations." It did not include the Sisseton Reservation

[DeCoteau], the Yankton Reservation [Yankton Sioux Tribe] or the Nez Perce reservation. Id. at 31.
In oral argument, the United States reiterated, by negative implication, this same dominant
point:
fWlhenever Congress without a binding agreement opens lands to white settlers, it
does not pay for them and does not guarantee any payment but only agrees to act as
trustee for future uncertain sales and leaves the property interest in the Indians-as they
did in this case-that act does not remove the lands from the boundaries of the
Reservation.
Tr. Oral Argument at 22, Rosebud (No. 75-562) (emphasis added).
A few minutes later, the same cession distinction was stressed in a different context:
filn DeCoteau, which distinguishes both cases in a case where sale was made for a sum
certain and an agreement was made, as counsel for the Tribe has discussed ....
Id. at28. 8

Until the United States at least offers some explanation to purportedly distinguish the
representations, made before the United States Supreme Court, that this so-called traditional

See also Rosebud Sioux Tribe's Brief in Rosebud that tracks this position and confirms that same
understanding regarding the traditional view that real cessions disestablished reservations. Tribe's
Brief at 12, 13 and 16, Rosebud (No. 75-562). Counsel for the Rosebud Sioux Tribe had decades of
experience in this area of the law. At oral argument, he unequivocally stated:
A cession is a sale. It is a high-class sale. It is a sale between sovereigns .... The
Court assumed there was a cession. That is the fundamental error of the Court Below.
Tr. of Oral Argument at 12-13, Rosebud, (No. 75-562).
8

20

OU02Jb

distinction, this "crucial" difference, (that real cessions disestablished reservation boundaries), the
arguments ofthe United States to the contrary (in support ofa recognition ofreservation boundaries
somehow surviving a traditional cession) are wholly undermined.

5. Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984). In Solem, the United States combined and restated
so many variations of earlier arguments that even a summary review is difficult to present here.
Moreover, since the United States did not participate in oral argument, that source is not available.
In short, however, it can be fairly stated that the United States in Solem argued whatever was
necessary to resist reservation disestablishment.
Most important for the present case are the concessions of the United States regarding
cessions, which were adopted in the Court:s Opinion. Solem, 465 U.S. at 470,473 n.15, 474,476,

478.
For example, ti1ie United States said:
(CJritically different from the situation in DeCoteau and Rosebud in at least the
following respects: (1) the releva.-rit legislation contains no language of "cession11 ; (2)
there was no prior tribal agreement to cede the relevant area ....

Br. for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent (opposing Pet. for Cert.) at 4 n.3,
Solem, 465 U.S. 463 (1984) (No. 82-1253) (emphasis added).

On the merits, the cession theme was restated with unmistakable clarity:
The critical question remains whether the statute invoked worked an immediate and
irrevocable cession ....
To be sure, as DeCoteau and Rosebud illustrate, there are instances in which a
Reservation must be found to have been irrevocably terminated or diminished .... In
21
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the climate of the times, the oniy meanineful question is whether the legislation meant
to accomplish a present, unequivocal and irrevocable transfer of Reservation lands
from the Tribe to the United States.
The critical fact in all these cases is that Congress exacted a present and total
surrender of all tribal interest in the ceded land in return for an unconditional
commitment by the United States to an agreed payment ....
fTlhe clear line between outri~ht cession and mere opening up of tribal lands was not
always observed . . . . But we do not read Rosebud as erasing the traditional
distinction.
What is relevant, however, is that, at the end of the day, no cession resulted.
Br. for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 6, 11, 13, 14, 24, Solem, 465
U.S. 463 (1984) (No. 82-1253) (emphasis added).
In this light, it is not surprising that Solem repeatedly made these same cession observations. 9

Similar cession concessions made by the United States in Rosebud are discussed supra. In
order to maintain the cession distinction essential to the argument in Solem, the United States had to
make similar concessions in other cases then pending. As a result, at about the same time ( 1984), the
United States recognized that cession disestablishment was the dominant factor in the history of the
1858 Yankton reservation and forJier, that the 1858 Yankton reservation had in fact been
disestablished by the 1894 Yankton cession act at issue in the Yankton case. Opening Brief for the
Federal Appellant at 16, 17 n.10, United States v. Dion, 752 F.2d 1261 (8th Cir. 1985) (Nos. 832353, 2538, 2543, 2544). This submission by the United States was made in the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals sitting en bane in conjunction with the appeals of federal prosecutions ofYankton Sioux
tribal members and others for unlawfully killing bald eagles, as the United States acknowledged. Brief
for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 18 n.8, Yankton Sioux
Tribe v. Southern Missouri Waste Dist., 99 F.3d 1439 (8th Cir. 1996) (No. 95-2647).
Eight other briefs were filed in the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Dion. No one disagreed
with the United States' disestablishment assessment of the 1894 Yan.kton cession act or the
controlling federal and state law. The en bane majority opinion in the Eighth Circuit in Dion
acknowledged this 18 94 Yankton cession act disestablishment, and the dissent did not disagree with
this conclusion. Dion, 752 F.2d 1261 (8th Cir. 1985).
Apart from Dion, the United States has only had one opportunity since DeCoteau (but before
9
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6. Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994). Hagen recaps the views of the United States Supreme
Court in resolving reservation status issues. Due to the history of the Utah legislation, the United
States devoted most of its arguments in Hagen-naturally in favor of a recognition of original
reservation boundaries-to "public domain" terminology. These arguments were generally rejected in

DeCoteau. Again, in Hagen the Court squarely rejected them.
More importantly, in order to belittle the significance of Utah "public domain" terminology,
the United States unequivocally recognized the force of all true cessions as set forth in DeCoteau.

the Yankton Sioux Tribe litigation) to tell the United States Supreme Court specifically about the
Yankton statute and how it compared to the DeCoteau statute. In that instance, involving a lakebed,
the cession comparison is also telling:
[T]he United States' right to control Lakes Andes and its bed, to the exclusion
of the Yankton Sioux Tribe, is in any event secured by the 1892 Cession Agreement
.... First, Article I is framed in terms that this Court has repeatedly characterized as
"express language of cession." Oregon Dep't of Fish & Wildlife v. Klamath Indian
Tribe, No. 83-2148 (July 2, 1985), Slip op. 15 n.19; Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463,
469 (1984). In DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 445 (1975)
(emphasis added), this Court, in considering a similar and contemporaneous cession
agreement, found that the same language was "precisely suited" to the purpose of
conveying to the United States, "for a sum certain, all of[the Jndians1 interest in all
of their unallotted lands."
Second, the retention ofthe lakebed by the Tribe would have been inconsistent
with the purposes ofthe 1892 Cession Agreement. Those purposes consisted not only
of opening additional lands for non-Indian settlement, but also of paving the way for
the anticipated end of the tribal way of life ....
Brief for the United States in Opposition at 10-11, Yankton Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 483 U.S.
1005 (1986) (No. 86-1436) (emphasis added).
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The United States also repeatedly conceded and strongly argued that a cession and sum certain
agreement was broadly understood to effect disestablishment:
Language that "f elxplicitriyl referf sl to cession" or otherwise "evidencefes l the present
and total surrender of all tribal interests" in the opened area suggests that Congress
meant to sever it from the reservation. Ibid. When such language is buttressed by an
unconditional commitment to compensate the tribe, "there is an almost insurmountable
presumption that Congress meant for the tribe's reservation to be diminished." In the
presence of both of those factors, the Court found .a reservation to have· been
extinguished in DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 431-449 (1975) .

But the statute at issue in Rosebud contained explicit language of cession ....
That language does not refer to a 11 cession," or otherwise "evidencfel the present and
total surrender of all tribal interests" in the opened land .... fClontrasts sharply with
that of the statutes at issue in DeCoteau and Rosebud, the two recent cases in which
the Court has found that reservation boundaries were altered by Congress. See
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 445 (statute provided that the Indians did "cede, sell,
relinquish, and convey to the United States all their claim, right, title, and interest in
and to all the unallotted lands," Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 543, 26 Stat. 1036); Rosebud,
430 U.S. at 596597 (statute provided that Indiai.7.s did "hereby cede, surrender, grant,
and convey to the United States all their claim, right, title, and interest in and to all that
part of the Rosebud Indian Reservation now remaining unallotted." Act of Apr. 23,
1904, ch. 1484, 33 Stat. 254) . In su..1n, t.½.e 1905 Act contains neit.J.ier a..ri "If elxplicit
reference to cession" nor any other "language evidencing the present and total·
surrender of all tribal interests" in the portion ofthe Reservation opened to non-Indian
settlement. Accordin~ly, under Solem, it fails to demonstrate a clear congressional
intention to alter the boundaries .... ruanguage demonstrating that Congress
provided for the total surrender of all tribal interests in the portions of the Reservation
.... Act does not refer to any cession ....
As the Rosebud Court explained, a ruling that the Rosebud Sioux Reservation was not
diminished by the 1904 Act at issue there could only have frustrated congressional
intent. The statute used unequivocal lan5<ua5<e of cession, and adopted an agreement
of the Indians that unequivocally approved the cession (albeit with modifications
approved by only a simple majority of the adult male Indians) ....
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!Nlone of the relevant documents ... uses the indisputable lan1<ua1<e of cession that
was a feature of all of the relevant documents in Rosebud. Moreover, in our view, the
requirement in Solem that the "understanding" be "widely held" requires proof that the
Indians shared in an understanding that alteration of the Reservation's boundaries was
at hand; the onfy obvious manifestation of such an understanding on the part of the
Indians is an agreement of cession, like the one approved in Rosebud.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 11, 14, 15-16, 22, 23, Hagen
v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994) (No. 92-6281) (emphasis added).
Significantly, in this instance the United States also participated in oral argument and made
explicit representations as to the effect of the use of cession language:
MR. MANN: Well, the language in DeCoteau said that the Indians cede, sell,
relinquish and convey to the United States all their claim, right, title, and interest in the
land in question, and the statute in Rosebud stated that the Indians cede, surrender,
grant, and convey to the United States all their claim, right, title, and interest in and to
all the land in question.
It would be rather difficult, I think, to construe that language as language that
allowed the Indians to retain sovereignty over the land.
QUESTION: I think you're probably right ....

MR. MANN: ... fTlhe lan1<ua1<e of cession. That seems to be-that phrase seems to
be the phrase Congress used when it intended to alter the boundaries ofa reservation.
QUESTION: Well, when it intended to alter the boundaries of the reservation by
cession. That much is clear. But still, isn't it the case that in deciding what to make of
the less explicit language, the reference to f271 returns to public domain, that we
should construe that in light of the overriding congressional policy, which at the time,
as I understand it, was to end the reservation system?
Tr. Oral Argument at 25-26, Hagen (No. 92-6281) (emphasis added).
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The Alliance would not attempt to improve upon this exchange. Cession results m
disestablishment. Nothing more need be said on this point.
7. South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998) (Yankton I).

(a). YanktonSiov.:x Tribe v. Southern Missouri Waste Management District, 99 F.3d 1439 (8th
Cir. 1996). The United States did not participate in this litigation in the district court. In the court of
appeals, the United States, as amicus curiae, told the court that because the federal government retains
jurisdiction over Indian country generally, the continuing integrity of the exterior boundaries ofindian
reservations is of "significant import." Br. of the United States at 1, Yankton Sioux v. Southern

J\1issouri, 99 F.3d 1439 (8th Cir. 1996) (No. 95-2647). (The United States did not contest the fact that
federal jurisdiction had not been exercised in this area initially).
Moreover, the United States argued that it had a strong interest in protecting "the integrity of
reservation boundaries" because ofits "special relationship with Indian tribes." Id. The strength ofthis
interest presumably overpowered any inclination to present, address, explain or defend any of the
previous United States' cession arguments that were plainly inconsistent with continued reservation·
status, including the Dion Yankton Sioux Reservation disestablishment concession. The United States
mentioned none of this and simply noted: "We do not agree with the arguments raised by the County
in its brief. They are irrelevant to this case." Id at 19 n.11. 10

At oral argument in the companion case of United States v. Greger, 98 F.3d 1080 (8th Cir. 1996),
the United States glossed over the 1894 cession act because, unlike the act in Hagen, it did not
contain probative public domain language on its face. (In Hagen, the premise of the argument of the
United States was just exactly the reverse: public domain language was meaningless, cession language
10
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As a preliminary matter, only two points in the argument advanced by the United States in
Yankton 1 in support of original reservation boundaries are significant. First, the commendable

concession that the Court's 1914 Yankton decision in Perrin v. United States, 232 U.S. 478 (1914),
"assumed" disestablishment. Br. of the United States at 19 n. 10, Yankton, 99 F.3d 1439 (8th Cir.
1996) (No. 95-2647). 11 And secondly, the United States (and everyone else) continued to make this
same assumption for quite some time.
fTlhe United States stated in a footnote in its brief that, based on decisions of state
courts in South Dakota, the reservation had been diminished by the 1894 treaty.

Id. at 18 n.8. The Eighth Circuit should have been more reluctant in disregarding this venerable
precedent.
Nothing in the Yankton documents indicated that the 1894 Yankton Act was intended to alter
the fundamental attributes of the Yankton cession. In De Coteau, the United States argued against
cession disestablishment and lost. As noted supra, after the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in DeCoteau, even the United States initially ack.."1owledged that Congress routinely intended

cession statutes such as the Yankton cession to disestablish reservation areas. Before Yankton 1, the
United States did not attempt to circumvent the holding in DeCoteau regarding this type of cession,
openly acknowledging, as in Hagen, that it would be "rather difficult" to support any other
construction. Id.

would have been dispositive.) See text at 23-25, supra.
11 In Dick v. United States, 208 U.S. 340 (1908), the United States and the United States Supreme
Court assumed the Nez Perce Reservation was similarly disestablished.
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In Yankton I, the United States ignored DeCoteau and that traditional cession analysis and
advocated the "narrower" position ultimately adopted by the court of appeals in Yankton I:
The key question in interpreting the 1894 statute and agreement is whether Congress
intended that the tribe's governmental authority be transferred with the land. sale.
Amicus United States argues that the 1858 treaty gave the tribe governmental
authority within the treaty boundaries and that Article XVIII savings clausel requires
that the agreement be read to preserve that right. Although the cession language in
Articles I and II could be viewed as describing a transfer of tribal governmental
authority as well as land, thereby changing the 1858 treaty boundaries, the narrower
reading is that the 1894 act simply authorized the conveyance ofreal property... .leads
· to the conclusion that Congress intended by its 1894 act that the Yankton Sioux sell
their surplus land to the government, but not their governmental authority over it.

r

Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Southern Missouri Waste Dist., 99 F.3d 1439, 1448, 1457 (8th Cir. 1996),
( emphasis added). That narrow position, namely, that an unusually expansive savings clause in

Yankton Sioux Tribe trumped the otherwise dispositive cession agreement, was erroneous.
In this new version of the savings clause argument the United States keyed on the fact that for
some inexplicable reason, the Yankton savings clause did not contain the standard "not inconsistent"
exception. The stan.dard savings clause only preserved previous treaty provisions "not inconsistent"
with the subsequent cession. As a result, the United States argued that the Yankton savings clause
preserved original reservation boundaries because it preserved all treaty provisions, not just those "not
inconsistent" with the subsequent treaty. In the process, the United States necessarily acknowledged,
recognized and conceded that standard savings clauses, such as the Nez Perce savings clause (that did
include the "not inconsistent" exception), could not be construed in this fashion because the United
States Supreme Court had previously rejected that argument. Br. of the United States, Yankton, 99
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F.3d 1439 (8th Cir. 1996) (No. 95-2647). (The first time the United States advanced the "savings
clause" argument it was accepted in City ofNew Town, North Dakota v. United States, 454 F.2d 121
(8th Cir. 1972). In Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977), the United States Supreme
Court squarely rejected the argument. Rosebud, 430 U.S. 584, 623 (Marshall, J., dissenting).)
Nothing of substance could be cited by either the United States or the panel majority in the
Eighth Circuit in Yankton 1 to support this anomalous and otherwise "rather difficult" construction.
Brief for United States asAmicus Curiae, Yankton Sioux Tribe, 99 F.3d 1439 (8 th Cir. 1997) (No. 95264 7). Moreover, the prior views of the United States, summarized above, precluded this "narrower"
view--at least in the absence of some affirmative evidence of congressional intent to the contrary. In
this respect, generic arguments loosely tied to the unusually expansive savings clause in Yankton Sioux

Tribe should not have sufficed. Even that unusually expansive savings clause was not intended to alter
the fundamental attributes of the Yankton cession--and not a single word in any of the Yankton
documentation supported the position of the United States. Nevertheless, the court of appeals was
persuaded by the argument of the United States.
(b) South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998) (Yankton 1).
1. The United States Supreme Court in Yankton 1 unanimously rejected the unusually
expansive savings clause argument of the United States. First, the Court noted that the holding of the
court of appeals keyed on this circuitous argument:
The court relied primarily on the savings clause in Article XVIII, reasoning that,
given its "unusualfy expansive lan~ua~e," other sections of the 1894 Act "should
be read narrowly to minimize any conflict with the 1858 treaty." Id., at 1447.
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Yankton 1, 522 U.S. at 342 (emphasis added).
The United States Supreme Court then disposed of the savings clause argument of the United
States in no uncertain terms:
The United States urges a similarly "holistic" construction of the agreement, which
would presume that the parties intended to modify the 1858 Treaty only insofar as
necessary to open the surplus lands for settlement, without fundamentally altering the
treaty's terms.
Such a literal construction of the saving clause, as the South Dakota Supreme Court
noted in State v. Greger, 559 N.W.2d 854, 863 (1997), would "impugn the entire
sale." ....
Moreover, the Government's contention that the Tribe intended to cede some property
but maintain the entire reservation as its territory contradicts the common
understanding of the time: that tribal ownership was a critical component of
reservation status ....
Rather than read the saving clause in a manner that eviscerates the agreement in which
it appears, we give it a "sensible construction" that avoids this "absurd conclusion."

Yankton 1,522 U.S. at 345,346. The sensible constrnction adopted by the United States Supreme
Court in Yankton 1 with reference to that "unusually expansive" savings clause is controlling here.
Moreover, the other concessions of the United States in Yankton 1 with reference to
disestablished reservation boundaries are also significant here. In the process of advancing the
unusually expansive savings clause argument, the United States conceded that but for the presence of
that kind of savings clause, the 1894 Yankton act would have disestablished the 1858 Yankton
reservation in the traditional sense recognized by the United States Supreme Court in DeCoteau. In
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other words, the United States conceded that a standard savings clause (with the standard "not
inconsistent" exception) would be probative of nothing. The savings clause in the Nez Perce Act is
a standard savings clause in every respect (it includes the "not inconsistent" exception). As a result,
it is too late in the day for this argument of the United States to be persuasive in this case. Br. for
United States, Yankton, 522 U.S. 329 (1998) (No. 96-1581).
2. In oral argument in Yankton 1, the United States, in response to direct questions from the
Court, described the disestablishment process in the following manner:
QUESTION: Now, this-this is a totally checker boarded situation?
MS. MCDOWELL: That's correct. And this Court-....
MS. MCDOWELL: Well, the Court inDeCoteau, found total diminishment. But that
was a different case, in several respects, from this one. In the first place, of course,
there was no [atypical] savings clause preserving rights under an earlier treaty ....
QUESTION: But do you-do you agree with both counsel, it seemed to me, that the
choice is either we accept your argument based on Article XVIII or there's a
diminishment?
MS. MCDOWELL: That's correct.
QUESTION: That there is no such thing as diminishment applicable on these facts?
MS. MCDOWELL: That's correct. Diminishment seems to be limited to cases such
as Rosebud, where there was a selling or a ceding of a part of the reservation in so
many words, as opposed to this sort of situation.
Tr. Oral Argument at 49-50, Yankton 1 (emphasis added).
The totally checker boarded situation or "total diminishment" holding of the Court in
DeCoteau (in the words of the United States), resulted from the extinguishment of the reservation
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boundaries by the act at issue there. DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 427 n.2, 446-447. Also, as the United
States further conceded in response to the last question from the Court, the Yankton cession was not
a diminishment where there was only a "ceding of a part of the reservation" ("as opposed to this sort
of situation"). Id. (emphasis added). The Yankton cession was a cession of all of the resenration that
was not allotted. On these facts, diminishment in the sense of maintaining any portion of the 185 8
resenration boundary was not possible.
For this reason, the entire 1858 resenration boundary was within the scope of the cession in
Yankton 1. In this respect, the rejection of the unusually expansive savings clause argument of the
United States by the Court resulted in the standard extinguishment of the 1858 resenration boundary,
"total diminishment" of the 1858 Yankton resenration. Tr. Oral Argument at 49-50, Yankton 1.

C. The Remand in Yankton, 188 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir. 1999), Confirms the 1863
Boundaries of the Nez Perce Reservation Should Not Be Recognized.
l. Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Gaffey, 188 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1261
(2000).
As noted above, over several decades, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly
rejected the savings clause arguments advanced by the United States. For example, see Rosebud Sioux
Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 623 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Most recently, the Court in
Yankton 1 emphatically rejected a more sophisticated savings clause argument in Yankton Sioux Tribe
because it simply did not make any sense. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents, South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 345-349 (1998) (No. 96-1581).
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In this instance, there is nothing in the Nez Perce documents to distinguish the Nez Perce
argument from the standard savings clause arguments that have been previously rejected. Rosebud
Sioux Tribe, v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584,623 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting). In fact, in Yankton Sioux
Tribe the parties, amici and the courts expressly singled out the Nez Perce savings clause as a perfect
example ofa standard savings clause provision that everyone, including the United States, conceded
would not even arguably support an attempt to resurrect Indian reservation boundaries. Yankton
Sioux Tribe is absolutely controlling in this case. In Yankton Sioux Tribe, a list of dozens of Nez

Perce-like standard savings clauses in reservation statutes across the United States was compiled to
distinguish that list (including the Nez Perce savings clause) from the stronger, unusually expansive
savings clause at issue in Yankton Sioux Tribe.
The United States Supreme Court made clear that the 1858 Reservation boundaries of the
Yan..1<.ton Reservation were not maintained.
The 1894 Act is also readily distin!<uishable from surplus land Acts that the Court has
interpreted as maintainin~ reservation boundaries ....The Tribe asserts that because
that clause purported to conserve the provisions of the 185 8 Treaty, the existinf<
reservation boundaries were maintained. ... fWle conclude that the saving clause
pertains to the continuance of annuities, not the 1858 borders.
Yankton 1, 522 U.S. at 345-347 (emphasis added).

It is important to focus directly on the Court's discussion of the 1858 Yankton Reservation
boundaries. The Alliance has specifically addressed the position of the United States with reference
to that discussion. In addition, a discussion directed to the holding of the district court in Yankton,
14 F.Supp.2d 1135 (D.S.D. 1998), reinstating the 1858 reservation boundaries follows.
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(a)

As a preliminary matter, it is logical to focus on the 1858 reservation boundaries

because that is the manner in which cession precedent has been traditionally understood. In other
words, if a cession removed lands from a reservation, it did so by extinguishing the reservation
boundaries around the area affected. For decades, every court in every case, every federal Indian law
text, every historian and every commentator that reviewed this precedent have agreed on this
fundamental point.

In this case, the United States can not cite a single example to the contrary. On the other hand,
references to support this understanding are commonplace. As early as 197 5, even the title of a note
in the North Dakota Law Review reflected this understanding: INDIANS-RESERVATIONSJURISDICTIONAL EFFECT OF SURPLUS LAND STATUTE UPON TRADITIONAL
BOUNDARIES

OF

AN

INDIAN

RESERVATION.

James

M.

Bekken,

Comment,

Indians-Reservations-Jurisdictional Effect ofSurplus Land Statute Upon Traditional Boundaries
of an Indian Reservation, 52 N.D. L. Rev. 411,417 (1975) (emphasis added).
In the text of the note, the analysis is directed to the effect of surplus land statutes on
reservation boundaries. For example, in the discussion of DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420
U.S. 425 (1975) (the cession the Court in Yankton l, 522 U.S. at 344, described as "parallel" to the
Yankton Act) the law student structured the statement of the issue in boundary terms:
DeCoteau has clearly shown that to determine the effect a particular statute had on
reservation boundaries the court must ....
Bekken, supra at 418 (emphasis added).
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This concentration on the extinguislm1ent of reservation boundaries is also routinely
acknowledged even by tribal advocates who disagree with reservation disestablishment. For example,
see the "boundaries" discussion throughout Susan D. Campbell, Reservations: The Surplus Lands Acts

and the Question of Reservation Disestablishment, 12 Am. Ind. L. Rev. 57, 58, 63, 64, 71, 75, 96
(1984).
(b)

With the extinguishment ofreservation boundaries, it has also followed, a fortiori, that

the Indian country remaining in the affected area, if any, would be either dependent Indian
communities under 18 U.S.C. § 1151(b) orindian trust allotments under 18 U.S.C. § l 15l(c). Every

court in every case, every federal Indian law text, every historian and every commentator are also
in agreement in this instance. 12
In 1914, the United States Supreme Court made this point clear in United States v. Pelican,
232 U.S. 442 (1914) with respect to Indian trust allotments. In this situation, allotments subsequently
heldinfee(theprimaryissuehere) arenolonger"Indiancountry." Pelican was codified in 18 U.S.C.

§ 1151(c).13

In the court of appeals in Yankton, 188 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir. 1999), even the United States, in the
alternative, finally acknowledged the legitimacy ofthis analysis. Br. ofPlaintiff-Intervenor/Appellee
United States of America at 26 n. 3, Yankton, 188 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir. 1999) (Nos. 98-3893, 3894,
3896, 3900).
13 The Court recently reaffirmed and explained the analysis and codification of Pelican in Alaska v.
Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government, 522 U.S. 520, 528-529 (1998). See also DeCoteau,
420 U.S. at 427 n.2, 446-447, Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 586,601 n.24, 613-615 n.47, 615-616 n.48.
12
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Moreover, a recognition that the United States Supreme Court expressly held that the 1858
reservation boundaries were extinguished by the Yankton cession for a sum certain is not in any way
inconsistent with the fact that the Court specifically reserved the question of whether the reservation
was disestablished altogether. Yankton 1, 522 U.S. at 358. That entirely distinct issue has yet to be
decided. Yankton, Civ. 98-4042, (Order dated Feb. 12, 2004).
For these reasons, the Alliance submits that the United States Supreme Court intended that the
subject of the Yankton remand would be limited to the "reservation status" of only existing trust
allotments, dependent Indian communities, and other trust lands. When reservation boundaries are
extinguished, this would ordinarily be the case. See the reference in Yankton 1 to "conflicting
understandings about the status of the reservation" and the "fact that the tribe continues to own land
in common." Yankton 1, 522 U.S. at 358. These contentions do not directly implicate the status of
fee lands, which are predominantly owned and populated by non-members. See Yankton 1,522 U.S.
at 356-357.
In other words, Yankton 1 clearly resolved the status of the 1858 reservation boundaries. See
Yankton 1, 522 U.S. at 333, 343, 345, 345-346, 347, and 353. Because of the law of the case, the

1858 boundary issue should not have even been addressed in the remand in Yankton.
All else aside, the Court made clear in Yankton 1 that the 1858 "reservation boundaries" were
not "retained" or "maintained "-"we conclude... continuance of annuities, not the 1858 borders." Id.

at 347 (emphasis added). At the very least, the Court decided that question. The Court stated that
the "case" presented the question of whether "Congress diminished the boundaries" of the Yankton
36

Sioux Reservation. Id at 333 (emphasis added). The unresoived issue, as the Court also clearly
stated, was "whether Congress disestablished the reservation altogether." Id. at 358. That issue
should not have involved resurrecting the status of 1858 reservation boundaries.
(c). Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Gaffey, 14 F.Supp.2d 1135 (D.S.D. 1998) rev'd 188 F.3d 1010
(8th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1261 (2000).
Even after Yankton I, the United States maintained that the 1858 reservation boundaries
remained in tact. And the district court in Yankton, 14 F.Supp.2d 1135 (D.S.D. 1998), squarely held
that even after Yankton I, the 1858 reservation boundaries were still intact. Yankton, 14 F.Supp.2d

at 1143. ("If the original exterior boundaries remain, as it appears they do from the Supreme Court's
opinion"). See also Yankton, No. 98-4042 (D.S.D. Oct. 5, 1998) (order denying motion for new trial
at 3) ("The Court has now held that the remaining lands within the 1858 boundaries remain a part of
the Yankton Sioux Reservation"). The district court was clearly mistaken (for the second time). 14

In the remand, an initial concession by the United States in June, 1998, undermined the
strength of the conclusion of the district court in Yankton, 14 F.Supp.2d. At that time, the United
States conceded that the United States Supreme Court in Yankton 1 recognized that Congress did not
intend to maintain the 1858 reservation boundaries:

The district court in United States v. Webb cited this decision with approval. The court of appeals
in Webb barely mentioned the fact that the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Yankton, 188 F.3d
1010 (8th Cir. 1999), squarely reversed the district court in Yankton, 14 F.Supp.2d 1135 (D.S.D.
1998), on this important point.
14
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fTlhe United States Supreme Court found the savings clause insufficient to maintain
the reservation boundaries o/ the 1858 Treaty here, and thus did not prevent
diminishment of the Reservation....
Summ. J. Br. for the United States at 22 n. 5, Yankton, 14 F.Supp.2d 1135 (D.S.D. 1998) (No. 984042) (emphasis added). See also id. at 2, 5, 6. Nevertheless, the United States made other
arguments in support of the position of the Yankton Sioux Tribe. After the district court recognized
the 1858 reservation boundaries in Yankton, 14 F.Supp.2d, the United States never again mentioned
this concession or the conflict with the express language of the Court in Yankton 1.
(d). Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Gaffey, 188 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S.
1261 (2000).
In their brief to the court of appeals in Yankton, 188 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir. 1999), the United
States avoided any discussion of the express conflict between the holding of the district court and the
conclusion of the Court in Yankton 1 regarding the 1858 reservation boundaries. The court of appeals
viewed the argument to recognize the Yank:ton reservation in the form resurrected by the district court
in light of all of the above. In addition to the opinion of the United States Supreme Court, all Yankton

1 briefs and related documents were made part of the record in Yankton, 188 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir.
1999). Moreover, in oral argumentmembersofthepanelin the court of appeals in Yankton, 188 F.3d,
expressly referenced the transcript of oral argument in the United States Supreme Court in Yankton

1 directed to the scope of the cession.
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In this instance, the United States could not convince the court of appeals to affirm the holding
of the district court. Instead the court of appeals expressly confirmed that the 1858 reservation

boundaries were extinguished by the 1894 Yankton act. See Yankton, 188 F.3d at 1020-1021, 1030.
2. United States v. Webb, 219 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 53 I U.S. 1200 (2001).
The court of appeals in Webb should not have ignored the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court that emphatically and repeatedly reject every "savings clause" argument. The court
of appeals in Yankton further confirms that conclusion.
At the conclusion of the oral argument in Webb, the United States also told the court of
appeals that the Nez Perce savings clause "saved this reservation." Tr. Oral Argument, US. v. Webb,
219 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (No. 99-30155). The court in Webb mistakenly adopted the argument
of the United States ("enforcing the savings clause"). Webb, 219 F.3d 1127, 1137. This is a nonsense
argument and the United States knows better. It is truly remarkable that the United States convinced
the court of appeals in Webb to adopt this position. Clearly, the United States should not have
repeated this argument in this Court.
The unprecedented decision of the court of appeals in Webb, unless disputed, will encourage
the United States to now support others on the standard savings clause list in attempts to resurrect
additional "Indian country" in Idaho, in the Ninth Circuit and across the United States.
III. THE DECISION OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT IN MINNESOTA v.
11/1LLE LACS BAND OF CHIPPEWA INDIANS, 526 U.S. 172 (1999) DOES NOT ADDRESS
THE "IRREBUTTABLE" PRESUMPTION OF DISESTABLISHMENT.
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The United States has also argued that the recent decision of the Court in Minnesota v. Mille
Lacs Band ofChippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999), somehow detracts from the force of Yankton
Sioux Tribe. The court of appeals repeated the reasoning of the United States. Webb, 219 F.3d 1127,

1133 n.5. However, nothing in the decision of the Court in Mille Lacs sanctions this result. Afille
Lacs was not a reservation disestablishment case. Whatever the Court in Mille Lacs said about

congressional intent with respect to hunting and fishing rights in a case by case approach in those
cases, is simply not applicable in reservation disestablishment cases dealing with cession language and
sum certain payments.
In these reservation disestablishment cases, the United States Supreme Court has explicitly set
forth and repeatedly reaffirmed a "nearly conclusive," "almost insurmountable" ''presumption". of
disestablishment. DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 445 (1975), Solem v. Bartlett,
465 U.S. 463,470 (1984), Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329,344. In 1975, DeCoteau established
that disestablishment presumption as a general rule. In 1984, Solem unanimously recognized the
presumption and, in 1998, Yankton Sioux Tribe unanimously reaffirmed it.
The bits and scraps of language that the United States has pieced together to support a
revisionist's view ofthe history of the Nez Perce reservation does not answer that "nearly conclusive,"
"almost insurmountable" presumption of disestablishment. The presumption of disestablishment set
forth in DeCoteau, Solem, and Yankton Sioux Tribe is a rule of law of national application. The
decision of the court of appeals in Webb conflicts with the Court's decisions and the decisions of all
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other United States Courts of Appeal.

Judge Wood cannot be faulted for adhering to these

presumptions established by the United States Supreme Court.
CONCLUSION
The United States ignored the cession presumption established by the applicable decisions of
the United States Supreme Court. In Webb, the federal district court and the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit erroneously concluded that the 1863 Nez Perce Reservation still exists. The decision
of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State ofidaho, in and for Twin Falls County,
correctly resolves the reservation disestablishment issue. That decision should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
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ISSUE PRESENTED
The question of law addressed in this brief is whether the ceded area of the
Nez Perce Reservation, 90% owned and populated by non-members of the Nez
Perce Tribe, was disestablished by the 1894 legislation.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Respondent State of Idaho sets forth the standard of review.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE UNITED STATES VIGOROUSLY PURSUES THE RESURRECTION OF
ORIGINAL RESERVATION BOUNDARIES.
Importantly, in both instances, the district court and the court of appeals in
US. v. Webb, Memorandum Decision and Order, No. CR98-80-N-EJL (D. Idaho,

Jan. 12, 1999), ajf'd, 219 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2000), were persuaded by the
arguments of the United States. Someone should have been allowed to point out
that the United States assumes more than one role in this type of litigation. The
role the United States neglected to mention is important here and bears scrutiny.
Apart from the interests of justice that the United States rightfully pursues in any
federal criminal prosecution or in any case supporting tribal claims generally, in
6
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· cases of this nature the United States also vigorously pursues the judicial
resurrection of original Indian reservation boundaries.
The United States has done so for decades (unsuccessfully in this type of
cession-related litigation, except in this instance). See generally the position of the

United States in the United States Supreme Court in the reservation status cases:
Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962); Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481

(1973); DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975); Rosebud Sioux
Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977); Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984);
Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994); and South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe,

522 U.S. 329 (1998) discussed in the Brief of North Central Idaho Jurisdictional
Alliance, Amicus Curiae, in Support of Respondent State of Idaho. The United
States Supreme Court has consistently rejected the cession related reservation
status arguments of the United States. Id.
There is, of course, nothing wrong in serving more than one master in this
regard or in zealously pursuing a policy goal in the process-as the United States
has done in this instance. At the same time, however, it should be kept in mind
that this is the light in which the cession related reservation status arguments of the
United States should be viewed in these cases. This is also the case with reference
7
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to the insistence of the United States that the historical record be sealed in U.S. v.
Scott, Case No. CR98-01-N-EJL (D. Idaho, Aug. 12, 1998) and Webb and with

reference to the United States opposing any amicus curiae participation.
This advocate overview is important in this case for one additional reason.
In 1998, the United States Supreme Court considered and rejected, for the third
time, all the cession arguments of substance that the United States and the Nez
Perce Tribe have submitted in the instant case. Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522

U.S. 329 (1998) (No. 96-1581). Moreover, there is no "special" reason for the
Court to view the Nez Perce issue of statutory construction any differently. The
law on this question has not been changed in any significant respect since that
time. The Brief of North Central Idaho Jurisdictional Alliance, Amicus Curiae, in
Support of Respondent State of Idaho discusses the Mille Lacs case at 39-40.
Ordinarily, this cession issue would come within the purview of the "almost
irrebuttable" presumption of disestablishment repeatedly recognized by the Court
and explicitly set forth again in Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. at 343-347, 349351. Contrary to the position of the United States, the Nez Perce legislation does
not represent a meaningful distinction. And in Yankton Sioux Tribe, the United
8
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States conceded that point with reference to standard savings clauses. On its face,
Yankton Sioux Tribe supports that conclusion.

II.
SPECIFIC NEZ PERCE DOCUMENTATION CONFIRMS DISESTABLISHMENT IN THE TRADITIONAL SENSE.
As the State has submitted, the transcripts of the tribal negotiations
contained in Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 31, 53d Cong., 2d Sess. (1894), are particularly
telling. In South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998), the United
States Supreme Court set forth, at length, the bou..11dary discussions significant
there. For example:
[Y]ou must accept the new life wholly. You must break down the
barriers and invite the white man with all the elements of
civilization....
Cole's vivid language and entreaty to "break down the barriers" are
reminiscent of the "picturesque" statement that congress would "pull
up the nails" holding down the outside boundary of the Uintah
Reservation, which we viewed as evidence of diminishment in Hagen,
510 U.S., at 417, 114 S.Ct. at 968-969.
Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. at 352-353 (1998) (emphasis added).

The Nez Perce transcript documents a strikingly similar understanding:
Salmon River Billy: ... [T]he country had been inclosed according to
the treaty and prevented the entrance on the reservation of any white
9

10

man and any who should try to set aside or break down the
boundaries of that reservation ....Perhaps it may be on account of
having another President, who is a Democrat; perhaps it is he who has
made the edict for breaking down the lines of the reservation.
Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 31 at 56 (1894) (emphasis added).
In fact, in this instance, the Nez Perce documentation is more explicit than

Yankton.

Salmon River Billy's "breaking down the boundaries" and "breaking

down the lines of the reservation" are stronger and more vivid than the Yankton
reference to '"break down the barriers'" set forth as evidence of diminishment in

Yankton Sioux Tribe. In Urtited States v. Webb, Memorandum Decision and Order,
No. CR98-80-N-EJL (D. Idaho Jan. 12, 1999) ajf'd 219 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2000),

cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1200 (2001), the district court and the court of appeals did
not mention this vivid language.
In addition, the federal commissioners here also specifically cited the

DeCoteau example ("the Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians have sold their land"),
among others, in their discussions with the Nez Perce Tribe in an effort to gain
general support for the Nez Perce Agreement. Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 31 at 30. In
response to the price to be paid per acre, Commissioner Allen again referenced the

DeCoteau Agreement:

10
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The Government has made you the most liberal offer in my
opinion that has been made to any tribe since Harrison was President.
The only tribe that I can remember that have received $2.50 per acre
for any considerable quantity of land is the Sisseton and Wahpeton
tribe in Dakota. They had a smaller body of land, very little of which
was waste land not good for agriculture. We paid the same price we
propose to pay you for all your land ....
Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 31 at 45 (emphasis added).
Later in the congressional debates, this same disestablishment concept was
again described, but in different terms. References to "public domain" appear in
more than one instance. 53 Cong. Rec. 6425, 6426, 8269, 53d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1894). There is little doubt that Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994), conclusively
resolved the significance of that concept in reservation disestablishment cases.
Hagen, 510 U.S. at 412-414 (1994). Significantly, the United States Supreme
Court in Yankton Sioux Tribe cited these passages and repeated the point. Yankton
Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. at 353-354.
Here, as in Yankton Sioux Tribe, after the passage of the 1894 Nez Perce
Act, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, in his Annual Report, unequivocally
stated that the Nez Perce

lands would be "restored to the public domain."

11
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Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs at 26 (1894). Again, the
United States Supreme Court in Yankton Sioux Tribe specifically noted this point.
Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. at 354. Similarly, the Secretary of Interior's Annual
Report reflects this same under?tanding for both the Yankton and Nez Perce lands:
"restoring to the public domain." Report of the Secretary of the Interior, H. Exec.
Doc. 1, pt. 5, 53d Cong., 3d Sess. (Vol. 14) at IX (1894-95).

The Secretary

included the Yankton and the Nez Perce cession in the same listing. Clearly, the
evidence to support a contrary conclusion, pales in comparison.
As provided in the 1894 Act, on November 8, 1895, the President of the
United States, Grover Cleveland, described the "cession and agreement" and
proclaimed that the ar_ea "acquired" from the Nez Perce Tribe would be open to
settlement on November 18, 1895. Proclamation of November 8, 1895, 29 Stat.
873, 875. The Presidential Proclamations opening the reservations to settlement
were deemed especially significant in Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. at
602-603 (1977), and Hagen, 510 U.S. at 419-420. In Yankton Sioux Tribe, the
United States Supreme Court repeated the point:
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This Court has described substantially similar language as "an
unambiguous, contemporaneous, statement by the Nation's Chief
Executive of a perceived disestablishment." Rosebud, 430 U.S., at
602-603, 97 S.Ct. at 1371.
Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. at 354 (emphasis added). The cession terminology

of the Nez Perce Proclamation similarly reflects this same important
disestablishment construction. The court of appeals mentions none of this.
At the time, the local press reported the common perception of the event in
the following manner:
RESERVATION IS NO l\AORE ... At twelve o'clock l\Aonday the Nez
Perce reservation passed into history...heads began bobbing up all
over the former reservation ....
Lewiston Tribune (Idaho), November 20, 1895 at I.

CANNON BOOMED AT NOON ... The cannon was fired in front of
the land office, at twelve o'clock, Monday. This was the death knell
of the great Nez Perce reservation, and the introduction of new
conditions to follow these important changes.
Lewiston Teller (Idaho), November 21, 1895 at 1. Even the local Indian agent

recognized that the reservation "formerly embraced" the "ceded lands." H. R. Doc.
No. 5, Vol. II, 54th Cong., 2d Sess. (Vol. 13) 141 (1897).
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In terms of solid contemporary historical documentation, the United States
attempts to counter all of this indicia of disestablishment with one piece of
informal correspondence (four sentences) from some acting Commissioner in the
Indian Affairs Office, in response to some New York map company. See also US.
v. Webb, 219 F.3d at 1136 n.13 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1200 (2001).

In context, even the probative value of this letter is questionable.
As the State of Idaho points out, the correspondence was written months
before Congress ratified the Nez Perce Agreement, and it noted this fact ("not yet

been ratified by Congress"). In fact, the reservation was not formally "opened"
until seventeen months later.

Until the actual opening, ceded areas of all

reservations continued to be administratively treated as Indian reservations, even
on official maps. In other words, to the extent that the agreement had not been
ratified and the area was not yet opened, the agreement itself did not make any
"change in the boundaries of that reservation." Moreover, a reference in the very
next sentence to the reservation as "at present existing," arguably supports this
construction. In any light, this documentation is at least suspect. In the proper
historical perspective established by the Nez Perce documentation, it means
nothing. No particular significance should be attributed to this letter.
14
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After the opening, the 1863 Nez Perce Reservation was treated in the same
manner as the original Sisseton-Wahpeton and Yankton reservations.

It was

deleted from official reservation maps, and described as a "former" reservation in
numerous other instances. Frederick W McReynolds, 40 Pub. Lands Dec. 413
(1912); Lee v. Thomas, 29 Pub. Lands Dec. 251 (1899); Railroad Right of Way-

Special Act; Spokane & Palouse Ry. Co., 22 Pub. Lands Dec. 674 (1896). Even
after the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, Act of June 18, 1934, 48 Stat. 984, the
Department of the Interior continued to delineate the "FORMER NEZ PERCE
INDIAN RESERVE" on the Official General Land Office Map of the State of
Idaho (1939).
The foregoing is significant because of the contemporaneous understanding
reflected in the treatment of the Sisseton-Wahpeton, Yankton and Nez Perce
opemngs.

The Nez Perce record confirms the view that Congress, the

Commissioner of Indian Affairs, the local Indian populations and the non-Indian
populations each perceived that disestablishment was intended by both the
Yankton and Nez Perce acts. Moreover; your amicus is constrained to point out, in
response to the court of appeals, that other later generic references to a Nez Perce
!!reservation" lack significance.
15
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First, the Court in Hagen noted that "confusion" in the subsequent legislative
records did nothing to alter a conclusion firmly grounded upon "textual and
contemporaneous evidence" of disestablishment. Hagen, 510 U.S. at 420. See
also Pittsburg & Midway Coal Min. Co. v. Yazzie, 909 F.2d 1387, 1416 (10th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1012 (1990). In Yankton Sioux Tribe, the Court
repeated the crucial point:
We need not linger over whether the many references to the Yankton
Reservation in legislative and administrative materials utilized a
convenient geographical description or reflected a considered
jurisdictional statement. The mixed record we are presented with
"reveals no consistent, or even dominant, approach to the territory in
question," and it "carries but little force" in light of the strong textual
and contemporaneous evidence of diminishment. Rosebud, 430 U.S.,
at 605, n. 27, 97 S.Ct., at 1373, n. 27; see also Solem, 465 U.S., at
478, 104 S.Ct., at 1170 (finding subsequent treatment that was "rife
with contradictions and inconsistencies" to be "of no help to either
side").
Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. at 355-356 (emphasis added).

Importantly, the

Webb Court ignored this prudential advice.
Secondly, here, as in Hagen, the subsequent demographics further support a
conclusion of disestablishment. Within the 1863 Nez Perce Reservation, roughly
90% of the population is non-Indian and roughly 90% of the lands are non-Indian
fee lands.

The Court noted in Hagen, that in this same situation "a contrary
16
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conclusion would seriously disrupt the justifiable expectati~ns of the people living
in the area." Hagen, 510 U.S. at 421. In addition, the Court in Yankton Sioux

Tribe, reiterated this observation:
Today, fewer than ten percent of the 1858 reservation lands are in
Indian hands, non-Indians constitute over two-thirds of the population
within the 1858 boundaries, and several municipalities inside those
boundaries have been incorporated under South Dakota law. The
opening of the tribal casino in 1991 apparently reversed the
population trend; the tribal presence in the area has steadily increased
in recent years, and the advent of gaming has stimulated the local
economy. In addition, some acreage within the 1858 boundaries has
reverted to tribal or trust land. See H. Hoover, Yankton Sioux Tribal
Land History (1995), reprinted in App. 545-546. Nonetheless, the
area remains "predominantly populated by non-Indians with only a
few surviving pockets of Indian allotments," and those demographics
signify a diminished reservation. Solem, supra, at 471, n. 12, 104
S.Ct., at 1167, n. 12.

Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. at 356, 357 (emphasis added).
In this instance, the demographics in the Nez Perce area are even more
persuasive than those set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Yankton

Sioux Tribe. Amicus submits that the demographics established in the opening of
the Nez Perce Reservation strongly support the disestablishment of the 1863 Nez
Perce Reservation. That opening proceeded along the same track as the Yankton
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opening in every significant respect.

In this case, as in Yankton Sioux Tribe,

neither the ceded land nor the former allotted fee lands are Indian country.

III.
THE JURISDICTIONAL HISTORY FURTHER SUPPORTS RESERVATION
DISESTABLISHMENT.
Perhaps the Webb court missed its usual way in this instance because of the
manner in \Vhich the United States recounted the recent jurisdictional history of the
Nez Perce Reservation. Webb, 219 F.3d at 1136-1137. Because of the argument
of the United States, the Webb court mistakenly assumed that recent Nez Perce
Reservation history was of controlling significance, and that it reflected the intent
of Congress at the time the 1894 Act was passed, as well as the jurisdictional
history established shortly thereafter. Amicus Curiae participation would have
pointed out that the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected this same
argument (recent jurisdictional history is of little significance).

Yankton Sioux

Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 355-56 (1998).

The importance of the fact that the Nez Perce Reservation is now ninety
percent (90%) owned and populated by non-members could have also been
addressed by Amicus Curiae. The United States Supreme. Court has placed
18
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considerable emphasis on similar demographics in each of the last five decisions
on point. DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 428 (1975); Rosebud
Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 605 (1977); Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463,

480 (1984); Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 421 (1994); South Dakota v. Yankton
Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 356-57 (1998). The United States mentioned none of

this; the opinion of the court of appeals is similarly silent.
In Vlebb, the court of appeals also failed to mention the substantial conflict
with the Idaho state courts even though the decision of the court of appeals was
unprecedented. United States v. Webb, 219 F.3d 1127 (9 th Cir. 2000).

Unlike

Webb, in In re SRBA, No. 39576 (5th Jud. Dist. County of Twin Falls) (Jan. 21,

2000), the decision of the district court correctly reflects the presumptions
reaffirmed by the United States Supreme Court in Yankton Sioux Tribe and the
arguments submitted by the State and Amicus Curiae.

The 1863 Nez Perce

Reservation was disestablished. The Response Brief of the State of Idaho details
the jurisdictional history of the area. Response Brief of State of Idaho, In re:
Snake River Basin Adjudication, appeal docketed, Nos. 26042 & 26128 (Idaho

Nov. 29, 1999).

19

-·
In attempting to limit amicus curiae participation in Webb, the United States
also stressed the fact that it has exercised some criminal jurisdiction in the area in
recent years.

The United States neglected to mention that the United States

Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that such recent jurisdictional history is really
quite insignificant.
CONCLUSION
The decision of the district cou..rt should be affirmed.
Dated this _ _ day of March, 2004.
Respectfully submitted,

Lori Gilmore
P.O. Box 1478
Kamiah, ID 83536
(208) 935-4242
Attorney for Laurine Nightingale
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